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Abstract 
The key research question of this thesis is to what extent and what types of public industrial 
policy and their interactions affect innovation in renewable energy (RE) as a whole and in 
different RE technologies (RETs). Innovation in RE is widely believed to be important in 
helping change the energy mix away from fossils and hence contribute to a more sustainability-
friendly energy transition.  
In the introductory chapter I outline the problem of climate change and the impact of fossils-
based energy use to that change. In the second chapter entitled “Theoretical Framework: 
Determinants of Innovation and the Role of Public Industrial Policy”, focuses on the conceptual 
foundations, notably on the role of innovation in fostering positive change in general and in 
RE in particular, as well as on how public industrial policy may help address problems of 
market failures and foster innovation in RETs. The third Chapter entitled “Empirical Protocol 
and Method” explains the main variables, data sources and our empirical methodology.  
Chapter four on ‘Industrial policy for renewable energy: The innovation impact of European 
policy instruments and their interactions’, examines the impact of RE policies as well as three 
RE policy instruments (demand-pull, technology-push and systemic), and their interactions on 
RE innovation in 15 European Union states for the period 1995–2014. Following a critical 
literature survey, I developed a conceptual framework and hypotheses which I then tested by 
employing a comprehensive data set that we collected for this purpose. I found that RE policies 
as a whole as well as demand-pull and technology-push instruments affect RE innovation 
positively. The impact of interactions between instruments on RE innovation was also found 
to be positive and significant, except in the case of specific pairs of instrument interaction 
where the outcome was contingent on the specification used. I discussed reasons for these 
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findings, as well as implications for public policy, limitations and opportunities for further 
research. 
In the fifth Chapter, entitled “Can Industrial Policy Pick Winning Renewable Energy 
Technologies?”, a lasting debate in Industrial Policy (IP) literature concerns whether 
government support to sectors and firms can help ‘pick winners’. More recent literature has 
shifted attention to picking winning policies, policy instruments and/or technologies, in 
particular General Purpose Technologies (GPTs). I suggested that RE can qualify as GPT that 
incorporates a number of more specific RE technologies (RETs). I developed theory and 
Hypotheses, and provide econometric evidence for the impact of three IP policy instruments 
on different RETs. I also examined the unexplored role of country experience in mediating this 
relationship, as well as regional variations in the EU. In addition, I constructed a quality 
adjustment indicator to examine whether IP affected the quality of the innovation outcomes. I 
employed a comprehensive data set for the OECD and EU and North and South EU regions 
and found support for our the theory-derived Hypotheses. 
In Chapter 6 (“Fostering Innovation in Renewable Energy Technologies: Choice of policy 
instruments and effectiveness”), I examined the effectiveness of different types of RE policy 
instruments (demand-pull, technology-push and systemic) on innovation, for an array of RETs. 
More specifically, I collected and analysed data on policy intervention, innovation activity and 
performance for 21 countries over the period 1990-2014 – which I then used to evaluate and 
compare the effect of different instruments on different RETs. Our results showed that demand-
pull policy instruments have been the most effective of all in fostering innovation activity, and 
that their level of effectiveness increases when they are used to target a specific RET. 
In Chapter 7 (“The Interrelationship Between Subsidies to Fossil Fuels and to Renewable 
Energy Sources in the OECD”), I looked at the question of the substitutability between 
Page | iv  
 
subsidies to fossil fuels and to RETs. While the issue of substitutability between energy sources 
has been widely examined in literature, the argument that supporting fossils fuels will hamper 
energy transitions, has been taken as self-evident. However, the relationship between subsidies 
to RE and to fossil fuels is more nuanced. In theory the two types of subsidies can substitute 
each other, be unrelated or even be complementary to each other. The overall impact on RE 
transition will depend on the exact relationship. In this context I examined three different 
specifications, each time with a more disaggregated independent variable. I found that overall 
subsidies to fossil fuels have a negative effect on subsidies to RE and that this varies between 
different types of fossil-based energy sources.  
In the eighth and final chapter (‘Summary, Conclusions and Policy Implications”), I 
summarised the key innovations and contributions of the thesis and examined its policy 
implications, as well as the limitations and opportunities for further research. Key contributions 
of this thesis alongside their policy implications are that the use of different policy instruments 
and their interactions matter; different RE technologies require different types of policy 
instruments in order to induce innovation; policy experience also matters; and public policy 
interventions can help induce lower quality innovations. In addition I found that different RET 
technologies require different types of RE policy instruments in order to induce innovation. 
Moreover I found that instruments that aim to increase demand are more effective in fostering 
RE innovation. Finally, I found evidence that subsidies to fossil fuels, impacts negatively on 
the subsidies on RETs. This is an extra reason that can hinder energy transitions to RE.  
In all, by cross-fertilising IP and RE literature, by developing and testing econometrically a 
number of novel Hypotheses, by employing a comprehensive data set created for the purposes 
of this thesis, and by extending the debate on IP from targeting sectors and firms to that of 
policies, policy instruments and RETs, I believe that our thesis makes significant inroads and 
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provides useful implications for policy making. Clearly more is better, and I hope to continue 
and to motivate others to contribute in this very important issue.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page | vi  
 
Acknowledgements 
Thanks are due to the Onassis Foundation for providing me with a scholarship to fund my 
studies.  
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Konstantinos Chalvatzis, for his support 
throughout the duration and for providing me with invaluable comments and information on 
the thesis. I am grateful to my second supervisor Dr. Nicholas Vasilakos for his valuable 
comments, guidance and information, especially in relation to the empirical/statistical methods 
of my dissertation. I would also like to acknowledge the help of my third supervisor, Dr. Tiago 
Botelho, for his useful comments.  
The dissertation benefited from feedback throughout by a number of colleagues at conference 
presentations, notably at the University of Ferrara, Universities of Bath, and University of 
Cambridge and on chapter drafts. I am especially thankful to Christos Pitelis, Michael Pollitt, 
and David Teece. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Jenny Fairbrass and 
Dr. Kosmas Kavadias – my viva examiners, for their meticulous comments and suggestions 
that greatly benefited my thesis.  
I would also like to thank my friends, ‘Τα Παιδιά’, for their support and patience throughout 
these years.  
Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents Christos and Ioanna and my sister Elena, 
for their support throughout my life, for motivating me, for generously advising me on all 
matters and especially for being so patient with me.  
 
 
 
Page | vii  
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................ vi 
List of Figures ......................................................................................................................................... x 
List of Tables ......................................................................................................................................... xi 
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................ xii 
Chapter 1  General Introduction and Overview ................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Overview of Renewable Energy Technologies ....................................................................... 4 
1.2 Overview of Renewable Energy Policy .................................................................................. 8 
1.3 Structure of Thesis ................................................................................................................ 12 
Chapter 2  Theoretical Framework: Determinants of Innovation and the Role of Public 
Industrial Policy .................................................................................................................................. 16 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 16 
2.2 Definition and Preliminaries ................................................................................................. 17 
2.3 Determinants of Innovation .................................................................................................. 23 
2.3.1 Theoretical Considerations ........................................................................................... 23 
2.3.2 Determinants of innovation at the organisational/firm level ......................................... 25 
2.3.3 Determinants of Innovation at the National Level ........................................................ 36 
2.3.4 Eco-innovation and public policy ................................................................................. 41 
2.4 Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................................. 46 
Chapter 3  Empirical Protocol and Methodology ............................................................................ 48 
3.1 Dependent Variable (DV): Patenting Activity on the RE Sector .......................................... 50 
3.1.1 Overview ....................................................................................................................... 54 
3.1.2 Biomass ......................................................................................................................... 58 
3.1.3 Geothermal .................................................................................................................... 60 
3.1.4 Hydro ............................................................................................................................ 61 
3.1.5 Ocean ............................................................................................................................ 63 
3.1.6 Solar .............................................................................................................................. 64 
3.1.7 Wind .............................................................................................................................. 66 
3.1.8 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 69 
3.2 Independent Variable (IV): RE Policy (and Policy) Instruments ......................................... 69 
3.2.1 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 80 
3.3 Econometric Model and Estimating Procedure ..................................................................... 81 
Chapter 4 Industrial policy for renewable energy: The innovation impact of European policy 
instruments and their interactions .................................................................................................... 85 
Page | viii  
 
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 85 
4.2 Background to the Study and Hypotheses ............................................................................ 89 
4.3 Description of the empirical protocol and results ............................................................... 101 
4.4 Empirical results and discussion ......................................................................................... 109 
4.5 Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................................... 118 
Chapter 5 Can Industrial Policy Pick Winning Renewable Energy Technologies? ................... 121 
5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 122 
5.2 Theory and Hypotheses Development ................................................................................ 125 
5.3 The Model and Variables .................................................................................................... 135 
5.3.1 Dependent Variable: RE Innovation ........................................................................... 135 
5.3.2 Independent Variable: RE policies and REP Instruments ........................................... 135 
5.3.3 Control Variables ........................................................................................................ 135 
5.3.4 Methodology ............................................................................................................... 137 
5.4 Results ................................................................................................................................. 138 
5.5 Summary, Conclusions and Discussion .............................................................................. 153 
Chapter 6  Fostering Innovation in Renewable Energy Technologies: Choice of policy 
instruments and effectiveness .......................................................................................................... 155 
6.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 155 
6.2 Background ......................................................................................................................... 157 
6.3 Methodology and Data Description .................................................................................... 161 
6.3.1 Measuring RE Innovation ........................................................................................... 162 
6.3.2 RE policies and REP Instruments ............................................................................... 162 
6.3.3 Control Variables ........................................................................................................ 163 
6.3.4 Methodology ............................................................................................................... 165 
6.4 Empirical Results and Discussion ....................................................................................... 166 
6.5 Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................................... 176 
Chapter 7  The Interrelationship Between Subsidies to Fossil Fuels and to Renewable Energy 
Sources in the OECD ........................................................................................................................ 178 
7.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 178 
7.2 The ‘Paradox’ and the Role of Public Policy ...................................................................... 180 
7.3 Empirical Protocol .............................................................................................................. 188 
7.3.1 Dependent Variables: RD&D Allocations on Renewable Energy Technologies ....... 188 
7.3.2 Independent Variables: RD&D Allocations on Fossil Fuels ...................................... 190 
7.3.3 Control Variables ........................................................................................................ 192 
7.3.4 Methodology ............................................................................................................... 194 
7.4 Empirical Results ................................................................................................................ 196 
Page | ix  
 
7.5 Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 200 
Chapter 8 Summary, Conclusions and Policy Implications .......................................................... 203 
References .......................................................................................................................................... 216 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page | x  
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Estimated Shares of Global Anthropogenic GHG (2014) ......................................................... 3 
Figure 2: Porter’s Diamond: Determinants of National Competitive Advantage ................................. 23 
Figure 3: Overview of measures of inputs (determinants) and outputs of innovation ........................ 50 
Figure 4: Percentage Sharing of RET Patenting Activity ....................................................................... 54 
Figure 5: RET Patenting Activity per Year ............................................................................................. 55 
Figure 6: Total RET Patenting Activity and Total RET Patenting Activity Adjusted for Quality ............. 56 
Figure 7: Total patents and percentage granted per RET between 1990-2014 ................................... 57 
Figure 8: Patenting Activity for Biomass Technologies per Year (1990-2014) ...................................... 59 
Figure 9: Patenting Activity for Geothermal Technologies per Year (1990-2014) ................................ 61 
Figure 10: Patenting Activity for Hydro Technologies per Year (1990-2014) ....................................... 63 
Figure 11: Patenting Activity for Ocean Technologies per Year (1990-2014) ....................................... 64 
Figure 12: Patenting Activity for Solar Technologies per Year (1990-2014) ......................................... 66 
Figure 13: Patenting Activity for Wind Technologies per Year (1990-2014) ........................................ 67 
Figure 14: Total Policy Instruments Proxied per Country between 1990 and 2014 ............................. 71 
Figure 15: Total Instruments per Country and per RET between 1990 and 2014 ................................ 72 
Figure 16: Instrument Types for Biomass Technologies (1990-2014) .................................................. 75 
Figure 17: Instrument Types for Geothermal Technologies (1990-2014) ............................................ 76 
Figure 18: Instrument Types for Hydro Technologies (1990-2014) ...................................................... 77 
Figure 19: Instrument Types for Ocean Technologies (1990-2014) ..................................................... 78 
Figure 20: Instrument Types for Solar Technologies (1990-2014) ........................................................ 79 
Figure 21: Instrument Types for Wind Technologies (1990-2014) ....................................................... 80 
Figure 22: Selection of appropriate statistical procedure .................................................................... 84 
Figure 23: Background to the study and conceptual framework schematic ........................................ 94 
Figure 24: Patenting Activity per EU15 Country (1995-2014) ............................................................ 107 
Figure 25: Total Patenting Activity for EU15 per Year ........................................................................ 108 
Figure 26: Distributional properties of patent data by renewable technology .................................. 138 
Figure 27: Share of fossil-fuels in electricity generation (2000-2014) ................................................ 179 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page | xi  
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Advantages and disadvantages of the six main renewable energy sources ............................. 7 
Table 2: Estimated Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE) (simple average of regional values) for new 
generation resources, for plants entering service in 2022 ................................................................... 10 
Table 3: Technology Readiness Levels and Schumpeter’s Technological Change Aspects .................. 18 
Table 4: Definitions of National Systems of Innovations ...................................................................... 24 
Table 5: Sectoral technological trajectories .......................................................................................... 27 
Table 6: Determinants of eco-innovation ............................................................................................. 45 
Table 8: International Patent Classes per Renewable Energy Technology ........................................... 53 
Table 9: Summary of Patenting Activity per RET and Total .................................................................. 58 
Table 10: Percentage share per country and per technology ............................................................... 68 
Table 11: Specifications of the Renewable Energy Policies .................................................................. 70 
Table 12: Comparison of the Variance and Mean Values of the Basic Variables ................................. 82 
Table 13: Summary of Variables and Variables’ abbreviations (in brackets) ..................................... 105 
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics of Variables ....................................................................................... 107 
Table 15: Estimated coefficients of the NBRM for the first four models ........................................... 112 
Table 16: Estimated coefficients of the NBRM for Model 5 ............................................................... 114 
Table 17: Results for the OECD Specification...................................................................................... 144 
Table 18: Results for the OECD Specification, Adjusted for Quality ................................................... 145 
Table 19: Results for the Europe Specification ................................................................................... 150 
Table 20: Results for the Europe Specification, Adjusted for Quality ................................................. 152 
Table 21: Definitions of main variables .............................................................................................. 164 
Table 22: NBRM Results for Model 1 and Model 2 ............................................................................. 167 
Table 23: NBRM Results for Model 3 .................................................................................................. 169 
Table 24: Total RD&D Allocations for the RETs under examination ................................................... 189 
Table 25: RD&D Allocations in Million US$ (2010 prices and PPP) per Fossil Fuel Technology and per 
Country ............................................................................................................................................... 190 
Table 26: Descriptive Statistics of all variables ................................................................................... 196 
Table 27: Estimated coefficients of the regression analysis for all specifications .............................. 199 
Table 28: Estimated Elasticities ........................................................................................................... 200 
Table 29: Summary of hypotheses and key results ............................................................................ 210 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page | xii  
 
Abbreviations 
 
COP     Conference of Parties 
EC     European Commission 
EPO     European Patent Office 
EU     European Union 
GHG     Green-House Gases 
GPT     General Purpose Technology(ies) 
IEA International Energy Agency 
IP Industrial Policy 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  
NBRM Negative Binomial Regression Model 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PCT Patent Cooperation Treaty 
RE Renewable Energy 
REP(s) Renewable Energy Policy(ies) 
RET(s) Renewable Energy Technology(ies) 
TRLs Technology Readiness Levels 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
WIPO World Intellectual Property Office 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page | 1  
 
Chapter 1  
General Introduction and Overview 
It is widely recognised that climate change represents an important challenge for the 
sustainability of our planet, and that unless steps are taken to mitigate the impact of 
anthropogenic emissions on the environment, the consequences can be dire (Weitzman, 2007; 
CISL, 2014). Indicatively, extreme weather events have become more frequent and in cases 
severe, and some climate scientists expect the severity and frequency of extreme weather 
events to increase in the next decades (IPCC, 2014). The global average temperature of both 
land and ocean have increased by 0.85ᵒC, while ocean acidity has increased by 26% (IPCC, 
2014; OECD, 2015a). As compared to pre-industrial levels, if no action is taken, average 
temperatures globally could increase by between 2.6ᵒC and 4.8ᵒC by 2100 and sea levels 
between 0.45 to 0.82 meters (IPCC, 2014). Apart from their environmental impacts, such 
developments are likely to have serious consequences on the different sectors and regions of 
the global economy. In a report by the OECD entitled The Economic Consequences of Climate 
Change that investigated such potentialities, it was found that the projected market outlook is 
expected to be negative because of climate change; in agriculture as a result of changes in crop 
fields, in coastal zones as a result from capital and land losses from the rising sea levels, from 
extreme events which may result in capital losses from hurricanes, in the health sector as a 
result of labour productivity losses from heat stress, costs of diseases, and health expenditures, 
and finally in demand on energy and tourism  (OECD, 2015b).  
Political responses internationally included a number of public sector initiatives nationally and 
internationally. Among the latter are conventions which are held annually, and are known as 
Conference of Parties (COP). In general, the objective of COPs is to review observance of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which came into force 
in 1994. The first COP took place in Berlin in 1995, and the most important meetings were 
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COP3 (1997) where the Kyoto Protocol was adopted. Kyoto protocol is important because it 
has helped redirect the innovative efforts of national governments towards renewables, and as 
a result it helped increase the expected size of the global market for clean energy, hence acting 
as a further inducement to policy makers to adopt policies related to Renewable Energy (Sterk, 
et al., 2007). Other important COPs include COP11 (2005) where the Montreal Action Plan 
was created, COP15 (2009) in which the Kyoto Protocol was reviewed, and finally COP17 
(2011) where the Green Climate Fund was created (Climate Action, 2015). More recently, 
COP21 (or 2015 Paris Climate Conference) was the first after 20 years to produce a universal 
agreement, establishing the international climate change policy objectives by (UNFCCC, 
2015): 
“[…] holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels […]” (Article 2, paragraph (a)) 
and 
“[…] achieve a balance between anthropogenic emission by sources and removals by sinks of 
greenhouse gases in the second half of this century […]” (Article 4, paragraph (1)) 
While that landmark decision suffered a major setback after the withdrawal of the US, the 
remaining parties and a number of US states have pledged their commitment to it. 
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Anthropogenic Green-House Gas (GHG) as well as CO2 emissions can be produced from 
various sectors, including energy, agriculture, and industrial processes. However, two-thirds of 
all anthropogenic GHGs as well as CO2 emissions come from the energy sector (CISL, 2014) 
(Figure 1). Within the energy sector, the largest gas contributor is CO2 that results from the 
oxidation of carbon in fuels through combustion. CO2 also holds the largest share of global 
anthropogenic GHG emissions, accounting for circa 58% of the global emissions (IEA, 2017c). 
At the same time, due to the world-wide economic growth and development, the energy 
demand is constantly increasing. As an example, the total primary energy supply (measure of 
energy demand), has increased by 150% between 1971 and 2015 (IEA, 2017c). Accordingly, 
improvements in the energy sector, can play a very important role in mitigating climate change. 
While the energy sector is the main contributor to anthropogenic GHG emissions and climate 
change, is also largely affected by it as well. The evident ambient temperature rises are likely 
to cause a decrease in the efficiency of the thermal conversion of thermal power plants. 
Additionally, the increased water temperatures and reduced water for cooling, may also reduce 
Figure 1: Estimated Shares of Global Anthropogenic GHG (2014)  
Source: IEA, 2017c 
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power operations or even result in temporary shutdowns. The rising sea levels are also likely 
to affect the infrastructure of the energy transport, and especially the oil and gas pipelines in 
coastal areas, thawing permafrost in areas with cold climates. This in return will probably cause 
new land zoning codes as well as additional risk-based design and construction standards, and 
require structural upgrades (CISL, 2014).  
From all forms of energy, electricity can play an essential role in decarbonising the economy 
because:  
1. It can be produced with very limited environmental impact, see for example low-carbon 
technologies such as renewables (CCC, 2016);  
2. It gradually substitutes other forms of energy in a number of activities such as transport, 
households and industry-see for example the autonomous electric vehicles (Arbib & 
Seba, 2017);  
3. Electricity use grows faster than any other form of energy growth, “due to the 
electrification of energy uses” (Enerdata, 2017). 
The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) 2-degree compatible scenario (2DS) projected a 79% 
increase in electricity demand by 2050, with the share of electricity in the final energy mix 
growing by 10% (from 18% to 28%) by the same year (Baron, 2016). If we are to reduce GHG 
emissions, we must therefore shift the electricity generation to low carbon technologies, and 
especially from direct fossil fuels to more RE-based ones (Baron, 2016),  
I examine six Renewable Energy Technologies (RETs) in this thesis, briefly reviewed below.  
1.1 Overview of Renewable Energy Technologies  
Renewable energy sources have been essential throughout the history of civilisation (for 
example biomass for heating and power generation; hydropower and wind energy for 
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movement and later electricity) and can generally be distinguished into the following six 
categories (Turkenburg, 2000, p. 221): 
• Biomass energy (plant growth driven by solar radiation) 
• Wind energy (moving air masses driven by solar radiation) 
• Direct use of solar energy (as for heating and electricity production) 
• Hydropower (as for power and electricity) 
• Marine energy (such as wave energy, marine current energy, and energy from tidal 
barrages).  
• Geothermal energy (from heat stored in rock by the natural heat flow of the Earth) 
There are three generations of RETs, dating back to more than 100 years (IEA, 2006).  
Following the industrial revolution (end of the 19th century) the first generation of RETs 
included hydropower, biomass combustion, and geothermal power. Hydropower is considered 
as a very flexible technology with regards to power grid operations, because it is very 
responsive, allowing to meet sudden energy demand fluctuations, as well as to compensate for 
the possible losses of other power supply options. In addition, hydro reservoirs come with built-
in energy storage, which allows for the optimisation of the electricity grid across the whole 
power grid. Finally, large-scale hydropower plants are cost –effective, mainly because they 
were built many years ago, and their facility cost have been amortised.  
Heating and power generation from biomass combustion is considered a fully matured 
technology, while it offers an economic fuel option and a ready disposal mechanism for the 
waste produced. Despite biomass demand continuing to grow (especially in the developing 
word), the industry as such remained fairly stagnant. This can be attributed to that biomass 
combustion has two major flaws. Firstly, the material used is directly combusted in cook stoves, 
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giving rise to severe health and environmental consequences (although technological advances 
alleviate some of these effects). Secondly, despite being considered as a “carbon-neutral” 
technology, among the pollutants emitted during the combustion is CO2. It is considered 
neutral, because presumably, the CO2 absorbed during growth is equal to the amount emitted. 
Overall, they are considered to be economically competitive, but in order to overcome the 
challenges of public acceptance and small-scale, deployment support is likely to be required. 
The final first-generation technology is geothermal. Geothermal power plant can provide base-
load capacity, as they can operate 24 hours a day and their cost has dropped significantly. 
However, this power is location-specific and despite its cost competitiveness, expanding it may 
require long developing times, and the risk and cost of exploratory drilling. Still, it can be 
useful in many countries producing geothermal electricity, and/or in regions with a lower 
temperature. 
The second generation technologies started entering markets in the 1980s, responding to the 
IEA’s RD&D investments, prompted by the oil crises of that era. These include solar heating 
and cooling, wind power, modern forms of bioenergy, and solar photovoltaics. Solar thermal 
collectors are widely used, mainly for heating water. Combined with heat pumps, they can also 
produce cooling. Wind technology, is very reliable, with more than 98% availability and a life-
span of more than 20 years. Their cost also constantly declines and reliability increases. 
Intermittency, public acceptance, and grid reliability are some of the factors that prevent their 
penetration into the world market, these barriers however are constantly receding.  
New, modern forms of bioenergy include biomass-based power and heat generation, co-firing, 
and others. As biomass can be used both as a stand-alone fuel and blended with other fuels, it 
seems more attractive. In terms of electricity, it can be generated from biomass based on a 
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steam turbine technology, which is still abundant in many regions of the world. These could be 
converted into competitive priced electricity by using steam turbine power plants.  
Third-generation technologies include concentrating solar power, which has three technology 
types, for electricity production based on thermodynamic processes, namely parabolic troughs, 
parabolic dishes and solar central receivers. However, as their optimal operating conditions are 
(semi)-arid climates, this limits its usefulness only to South Europe, North and South Africa, 
the Middle East, western India, Western Australia, the Andean Plateau, north-eastern Brazil, 
northern Mexico and the US Southwest. Energy from the ocean is not a new concept and there 
is currently renewed interest in it. That said, there are still two major problems; the energy 
conversion potential and the very high technical risk from a harsh environment. Other non-
technical barriers also exist, such as the location barriers, and design tools.  
Two more technologies that fall under the third-generation technologies are the enhanced 
geothermal systems, and the integrated bioenergy systems, however these are beyond the focus 
of this thesis, for reasons of comparability with other studies, and data limitations. The 
following table (Table 1) summarises the advantages and disadvantages of the six main RETs 
that are examined in this thesis.  
Table 1: Advantages and disadvantages of the six main renewable energy sources  
Renewable 
Energy Source 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Biomass energy • Abundant and renewable 
• Can be used to burn waste 
products 
• Burning biomass can result in air pollution 
• May not be cost effective 
Geothermal 
energy 
• Provides an unlimited 
supply of energy 
• Produces no air or water 
pollution 
• Start-up/development costs can be expensive 
• Maintenance costs, due to corrosion, can be a 
problem 
 
 
 
Hydropower 
• Abundant, clean, and safe 
• Easily stored in reservoirs 
• Relatively inexpensive way 
to produce electricity 
• Can cause the flooding of surrounding 
communities and landscapes. 
• Dams have major ecological impacts on local 
hydrology. Can have a significant environmental 
impact 
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Renewable 
Energy Source 
Advantages Disadvantages 
• Offers recreational 
benefits like boating, 
fishing, etc. 
• Can be used only where there is a water supply 
• Best sites for dams have already been 
developed 
Marine (Ocean) 
energy 
• Ideal for an island country 
• Captures energy that 
would otherwise not be 
collected 
• Construction can be costly 
• Opposed by some environmental groups as 
having a negative impact on wildlife 
• Takes up lots of space and difficult for shipping 
to move around 
 
Solar energy 
• Potentially infinite energy 
supply 
• Causes no air or water 
pollution 
• May not be cost effective 
• Storage and backup are necessary 
• Reliability depends on availability of sunlight 
 
 
 
Wind energy 
• Is a free source of energy 
• Produces no water or air 
pollution 
• Wind farms are relatively 
inexpensive to build 
• Land around wind farms 
can have other uses 
• Requires constant and significant amounts of 
wind 
• Wind farms require significant amounts of 
land 
• Can have a significant visual impact on 
landscapes 
• Need better ways to store energy 
Source: Ellabban, Abu-Rub, & Blaabjerg (2014) 
Contrary, however to the aforementioned, it should be noted that (i) since biomass depends on 
the consumption and recreation of the crops, it cannot be considered as an abundant form of 
energy, (ii) the gradual degradation of the energy in Geothermal fields means that the energy 
is limited in the long run, and (iii), the land used for installing wind farms can still be used for 
other activities.  
1.2 Overview of Renewable Energy Policy  
The required transition to RETs is unlikely to happen if we rely exclusively on market forces, 
as numerous types of market failures can be identified that could prevent this from happening. 
Such failures include the un-priced costs or negative externalities (including the social costs of 
emissions and of supply vulnerability), the un-priced benefits or positive externalities 
(including the benefits of innovation), the information market failures and distortions, and 
failures that arise from economies of scale and market power (Groba & Breitschopf, 2013). 
These require government intervention to help steer the energy system towards renewable 
sources of energy. According to OECD, if no climate policies exist there will be an annual 
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global GDP losses between 2% and 10% in 2100, while if both adaptation and mitigation 
climate policies are in place, annual global GDP losses will be between 1% and 3% (OECD, 
2015a). Government intervention in support of RE energy constitute a of public Industrial 
Policies. 
However, government intervention is subject to a number of important failures too, including 
rent seeking behaviour by public sector officials and the possibility of mistakes. All these can 
entail costs to the tax payers and in the case of sustainable energy to the producers of non-
sustainable energy, as well as to business and consumers who have to pay higher prices (see 
Karnitschnig, 2014). It is quite conceivable that public policies can result in higher cost of 
energy as a result of the higher levelised cost of renewables as compared to the non-renewables 
(see Table 2 for comparison of the levelised costs for various power generation sources (IEA, 
2017a, p. 8)) and the cost of subsidies. However, in 2017 a study was conducted that compared 
the levelised cost of energy for different conventional as well as alternative energy generation 
technologies, in order to examine which alternative energy generation technologies may be 
cost-competitive to conventional generation technologies. It was found that alternative energy 
technologies are complementary to conventional generation technologies (LAZARD, 2017). 
On the other hand, without policies that support innovation, profits-motivated producers have 
little incentive to invest on renewable energy1. This form of market failure results in a low 
penetration of RETs into the market place, and is usually considered a reason for public policy 
intervention. In the above context, various policies have been introduced by a number of 
countries in order to stimulate clean energy technological innovation (Johnstone et al, 2008) 
                                                          
1 This may not be the case anymore, as at times renewable energy technologies tend to be cheaper than fossil 
fuels, especially when it comes to investing in new generation capacity. It was true however during most of the 
time under examination of this thesis (1990-2014). 
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and foster economic performance (Dechezlepretre & Martin, 2010), by lowering production 
costs and hence motivating the commercialisation of RE.  
Table 2: Estimated Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE) (simple average of regional values) for new generation resources, 
for plants entering service in 2022  
 
Source: IEA, (2017a), p. 8 
It is therefore important to identify and substantiate the net benefits, if any, from public policies. 
One way to do this is to examine whether public policies foster RE innovation, after controlling 
for other variables that impact RE innovation.  
(Industrial) Renewable Energy Policies (REPs) adopted from various countries are currently 
under attack for poor design, see for example The Economist who claimed that the main 
objective of public policy to raise the price of pollution and promote investment, research and 
development in RE, have failed to materialise (The Economist, 2014). Michalena and Hills 
(2012) undertook a meta-analysis of the international scientific literature of the European RE 
generation and found a total 54 challenges related to the implementation of RETs on a local 
basis. The authors concluded that the RE policies in the EU partially fail as they are limited in 
their scope in dealing with RE on a local basis (Michalena & Hills, 2012). On the other hand, 
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Klessmann et al., (2011) suggested that although Europe may need additional policies in order 
to meet its 20% RES by 2020, this seems feasible especially since most of member states are 
well on track, and it is even possible that 15 member states may overachieve their national 
target (Klessmann, et al., 2011). Similarly, Fouquet (2013), argued that policies aiming at the 
2020 target, appear to be successful, although there remain challenges such as grid access and 
the fact that some member states are reconsidering their policies. In the author’s view Europe 
could serve as a role model for the rest of the world (Fouquet, 2013).  
Given extraneous factors such as the European crisis, it is arguable that the impact of public 
policy on RE innovation, has not yet had a chance to fully materialise. If so, it can be argued 
that policies might appear to have been a failure in the short term, but could become a success 
in the longer term. This is not least as policy makers can learn overtime hoe to improve policy 
design. It is therefore important to examine how RE policy impacts on innovation particularly 
after the Kyoto Protocol came into force, based on a rigorous conceptual and econometric 
analysis. An important factor to be addressed moreover concerns the types of policies and 
policy instruments (see below) that are more likely to be successful in terms of fostering RE 
innovation. 
Based on the above discussion, I aim to explore the role of public policy towards RE on RE 
innovation in theory and in terms of econometric investigations. In particular, I discuss whether 
and how RE policies and the various RE instruments impact on RE innovation, which is a 
major indicator of RE performance and hence potential for effective transition. With regards 
to the potency or otherwise of public policy, the research draws upon the extensive debates on 
Industrial Policy (IP) (Bailey et al., 2015). Traditionally IP has focused on support to particular 
sectors and firms (Bailey et al., 2018). While RE is a sector in itself, I also explore the role of 
different public policy instruments and their impact on particular RETs. This is in line with 
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more recent thinking on public IP that shifted attention from sectors and firms to policies, 
policy instruments and technologies. In this context I make a number of important innovations 
and contributions.  
The extent to which RE policies can help foster RE innovations, has been examined by a large 
literature body, and overall, it has shown that public policy does indeed foster RE innovation. 
The novelties of this thesis are both conceptual and empirical. In particular, I cross fertilise 
theory on IP and RE, develop novel hypotheses and examine the extent to which RE policy 
instruments and their interactions, have a positive effect on RE innovation. Taking this a step 
further, I explore if this effect varies between specific RE policy instruments and RETs and 
whether the impact of targeting particular RETs on RE innovation is mediated by a country’s 
experience, and varies across regional blocks. I also examine if such effects are contingent on 
the instrument, and if the effect is moderated by the degree of targeting of one or more RETs. 
I also examine the effects of subsidizing fossil fuels on subsidies to RETs, and the extent to 
which the relationship between subsidies for fossil fuels and RETs is mediated by the type of 
fossil fuel technology. These questions result in a number of contributions: (i) the literature on 
RE innovation and IP is cross-fertilised and enriched, (ii) I draw on the innovation literature to 
focus on different RE policy, (iii) I explore the impact of REP on RETs, (iv) I analyse the role 
of more traditional IP tools such as subsidies, and the role of subsidies towards non-renewables 
on RE innovation, (v) I look at the moderating role of country experience with RE and with 
RETs on RE innovation and on regional variations in the EU, (vi) I provide original 
econometric evidence based on a unique data set I have collected for this purpose.  
1.3 Structure of Thesis 
Following the present introduction (Chapter 1), the subsequent chapters are as follows: 
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Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework: Determinants of Innovation and the role of Public 
Industrial Policy 
This (second) chapter critically assesses debates on the two key conceptual aspects of the thesis, 
one on the nature and determinants of innovation and its impact on economic performance, the 
other on the role of pubic (industrial) policy in inducing innovation in general and in this case 
RE innovation. First, I discuss critically the literature on the determinants of innovation. 
Innovation is widely seen as a major contributor to economic development. It can take place 
within organisations and at the regional or macroeconomic level. In this chapter innovation is 
defined and distinguished from technological change and related concepts such as invention 
and diffusion. The focus is then placed on its determinants, paying attention to the 
macroeconomic and public policy determinants of innovations in RE and the role of RE policy. 
I then look at the long standing and ongoing and currently popular debate on industrial policy. 
In particular, the various arguments in favour or against and the debates on the role of public 
policy on innovation are discussed, paying attention to innovation in the RE sector.  
Chapter 3. Empirical Protocol and Method  
In this (third) chapter I present the methodology employed in the thesis. The focus on 
econometric investigation is explicated and appropriate (for the purposes of this thesis) 
econometric methods and techniques are detailed. Particular attention is paid to the use of 
“Negative Binomial Regression Analysis”. I mostly employ this method since in most cases 
the data for the dependent variable (RE innovation) is count data (i.e. patent counts related to 
RETs) in which case the aforementioned method is considered to be the most suitable one. 
Various equations have been used to express the relationship between the dependent (or 
response) variable (DV) and one or more independent (or explanatory) variables. 
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Chapter 4. Industrial policy for renewable energy: The innovation impact of European 
policy instruments and their interactions 
The forth chapter examines the impact of REPs as well as three REP instrument types (demand-
pull, technology-push, and systemic) and their interactions on RE innovation in 15 European 
Union member states for the period 1995–2014. A conceptual framework and hypotheses are 
developed and then tested by employing a unique and comprehensive data set. I found that 
REPs as a whole as well as demand-pull and technology-push instruments affect RE innovation 
positively and significantly. 
Chapter 5. Can Industrial Policy Pick Winning Renewable Energy Technologies? 
Following that, in the sixth chapter we cross-fertilised the literature on Industrial Strategy and 
RE. I suggested that the long lasting and ongoing debate on IP and industrial strategy has relied 
overly on conceptual arguments and case studies with little large data- based econometric 
support. At the same time work on public policy towards renewables has employed 
econometric techniques but mostly failed to draw the link with IP.. Given that the RE sector is 
an industrial one and that it has over the years received substantial public sector support, the 
failure to cross fertilise the two sets of literature is a glaring omission and presents a literature 
gap to be explored. Firstly, I have analysed and tested the ideas that public sector’s industrial 
strategy towards RE is effective. Secondly I tested whether targeted industrial policies (the so 
called “picking winners” approach) is more or less likely to succeed.  
Chapter 6. Fostering Innovation in Renewable Energy Technologies: Choice of policy 
instruments and effectiveness 
The fifth chapter served as a continuation of the previous one. In it I evaluated the effectiveness 
of the aforementioned types of REP instruments (i.e. demand-pull, technology-push and 
systemic) on innovation for an array of specific RETs. More specifically, I collected and 
analysed data on policy intervention, innovation activity and performance for 21 countries over 
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the period 1990-2014. I then used these to evaluate and compare the effect of different 
instruments on different RETs.  
Chapter 7. The Interrelationship Between Subsidies to Fossil Fuels and to Renewable 
Energy Sources in the OECD 
In the seventh chapter I examined the substitutability between subsidies to fossil fuel and 
subsidies to RETs. A joint paper from the International Monetary Fund and the University of 
California, that estimated fossil fuel subsidies along with the economic and environmental 
benefits from reforming them, found that in 2013 4.9 trillion USD, and 5.3 trillion USD in 2015 
(6.5% of global GDP in both years) were spent on subsidies (Coady et al., 2016). In another 
report by the International Energy Agency (2016), for the year 2015, fossil fuels subsidies 
amounted to 325 billion USD (from almost 500 billion USD in 2014), while for the same year 
for RE they were 150 billion USD. Unlike the substitutability between different types of energy 
sources, the relationship between subsidies to RE and to fossil fuels has not been explored in 
literature. In theory the two types of support can be substitutes, unrelated or even complements. 
Evidently, the impact on energy transition will depend in part on the exact relationship, 
something not tested before. My aim is to do this both conceptually and econometrically. 
Chapter 8. Summary, Concluding Remarks, Limitations, and Policy Implications and 
Opportunities for Further Research  
Finally, the eighth and last chapter presents a summary, concluding remarks, implications for 
public policy, as well as limitations and opportunities for further research. 
 
 
 
Page | 16  
 
Chapter 2  
Theoretical Framework: Determinants of Innovation and the 
Role of Public Industrial Policy 
2.1 Introduction 
Innovation in Renewable Energy (RE) sources is widely regarded as a key way through which 
energy transitions can come about. This is because innovation can improve products, services 
and processes, foster differentiation and/or reduce costs, in some cases help replace market 
incumbents with new challengers (Freeman, 1982). Innovation in RE can theoretically at least 
render RE both better and cheaper than energy through fossil fuels, hence gradually replacing 
them and benefiting the planet.  
Given the importance of innovation, it is not surprising that the debate on the definition, 
determinants and effects of innovation is long standing and continuing. The aim of this chapter 
is to discuss critically the literature on the definition and most importantly determinants and 
effects of innovation in general and as they relate to innovation in RE in particular. This can 
serve as an introduction to, and justification of, the focus of most scholars in RE, on RE 
innovation. As noted, one of the key aims in this thesis is to look at the debates regarding the 
role of public policy in fostering (or not) innovation in general and innovation in RE in 
particular. 
Innovation can be the result of efforts by corporate R&D departments, individual inventors, 
and/or of collaborative networks small and large firms, in the private, and/or the ‘third’ sectors, 
such as by the government, universities, and corporations (also known as the triple-helix), 
(Block & Keller, 2011). Innovation is widely seen as a major contributor to economic 
performance (Freeman, 1987). In what follows, I define innovation and distinguish it from 
other related concepts such as technological change, invention and diffusion. I then focus on 
the determinants of innovation, paying attention to the role of public policy as a determinant 
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of innovation, particularly in the focus of my interest, which is RE. These are followed by brief 
concluding remarks. 
2.2 Definition and Preliminaries 
The importance of technological change has long been recognised. For example Adam Smith, 
(1776), the founder of economics, had advocated that specialisation and the division of labour 
within firms led to new ideas and inventions, higher productivity and higher economic growth 
(Conte, 2007). A more general theoretical framework was subsequently developed by Joseph 
A. Schumpeter (1934), who originally put forward some general taxonomies and definitions 
for the theoretical and empirical research on technological change. Schumpeter defined 
‘technological change’ as new combinations of the means of production, and distinguished 
between invention, innovation, and diffusion (Schumpeter, 1934). The first stage (invention) 
related to the generation of new ideas and it was argued to be usually associated with basic and 
scientific research. The second one (innovation) was related to applied and technological 
research and development (R&D) and was said to determine the creation of economic value at 
the organisational level. The third one (diffusion) was associated to the spread of new products 
and process across markets. It also allowed for the measurement of the impact of new 
technologies on the economy (Conte, 2007).  
Schumpeter’s definitions remain influential. The European Commission for example, 
employed the concept of Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) which can be seen as an 
elaboration upon Schumpeter’s three types of technological change, see for example the EU’s 
Horizon 2020 Work Programmes, (European Commission, 2016). TRLs are a systematic 
metric/measurement system that assesses the maturity (readiness) of particular technologies 
and serves as a comparison for the maturity among the different types of technology (Mankins, 
1995). There are nine TRLs, with TRL 1 being the lowest and TRL 9 the highest, shown in the 
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Table 3. These correspond broadly to the first two of Schumpeter’s three phases, namely 
invention (TRLs 1 to 6) and innovation (TRLs 7 to 9).  
Table 3: Technology Readiness Levels and Schumpeter’s Technological Change Aspects 
Technology Readiness Level TRL Definition (European Commission, 2014) 
TRL 1 Basic principles observed 
TRL 2 Technology concept formulated 
TRL 3 Experimental proof of concept 
TRL 4 Technology validated in lab 
TRL 5 Technology validated in relevant environment 
TRL 6 Technology demonstrated in relevant environment 
TRL 7 System prototype demonstration in operational environment 
TRL 8 System complete and qualified 
TRL 9 Actual system proven in operational environment 
Source: European Commission (2014) 
 
In the context of Schumpeter’s work, innovation was therefore originally seen as a specific part 
of technological change. As the discussion below shows, in his later works and today the term 
innovation has acquired a broader meaning. 
In his subsequent book on “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy”, Schumpeter (1942) 
presented his key idea that innovation was a force of ‘creative destruction’, in that it destroyed 
the old but replaced it with something more novel and better. Schumpeter had argued that 
innovation is reflected in novel outputs: a new good or a new quality of a good or service; a 
new method of production; a new market; a new source of supply; or a new organizational 
structure (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010). This implied a definition for innovation as “doing things 
differently” (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010) and also better. This may be seen as rather too general 
a definition, in that as Hansen and Wakonen (1997) have stated, doing things identically is 
practically impossible (Hansen & Wakonen, 1997). Moreover, today it is widely acknowledged 
that new need not mean better-consider the debates on new financial instruments such as 
financial derivatives that have been debited by many with the onset of the latest financial crisis. 
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Gradually the focus has been more narrowly on commercialisation, with innovation being seen 
as inventions that have been commercialised (Edison, et al, 2013). 
Over the past fifty years or so, various studies and analyses explored the issue of innovation. 
These aspects relate to the nature of the innovation process itself (Dosi, 1988), as well as the 
relationship between inputs and outputs of innovative activities (i.e. the relationship between 
the resources devoted to innovative search and the rates of generation of innovations, however 
measured). In a survey of the literature by Edison et al., (2013) out of the 204 reviewed studies, 
41 studies formulated their own or used existing definitions, 12 studies did not clearly defined 
innovation, and 151 studies did not define it at all. This has resulted in various and different 
definitions of the term, which may signify different aspects of innovation, and which in turn, 
can determine what are considered as elements of innovation and how these are measured 
(Edison, bin Ali, & Torkar, 2013). 
To the best of my knowledge, one of the first attempts for a comprehensive definition of 
innovation was made by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) in 1991, who defined innovation as “an iterative process initiated by the perception 
of a new market and/or new service opportunity for a technology-based invention which leads 
to development, production, and marketing tasks striving for the commercial success of the 
invention” (OECD, 1991, p. 303). This definition incorporates two important aspects: firstly, 
that the innovative process comprises the technological development of an invention combined 
with the market introduction of that invention to end-users through adoption and later diffusion. 
Secondly, that the process is iterative in nature and as a result, it includes the first introduction 
of a new innovation and the reintroduction of an improved innovation (Garcia & Calantone, 
2002). In 2005, the OECD “Oslo Manual” revisited the term innovation as being “the 
implementation of a new or significantly improved product (goods or service), or process, a 
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new marketing method, or a new organisational method in business practices, workplace 
organisation or external relations” (OECD, 2005, p. 46). In 2010, Crossan and Apaydin 
(2010), redefined this to be “[Innovation is:] production or adoption, assimilation, and 
exploitation of a value-added novelty in economic and social spheres; renewal and 
enlargement of products, services, and markets; development of new methods of production; 
and establishment of new management systems. It is both a process and an outcome” (Crossan 
& Apaydin, 2010, p. 1155). The term value added is useful here as it addresses the challenge 
of non-value adding innovations, while also it adds a non-technological dimension to the 
definition, in line with more recent (broader) uses of the term. On the other hand, it raises the 
challenging question what constitutes value adding innovation and what not.  
For the purposes of this thesis, and based on the above definitions, in order for an invention to 
become an innovation, it must be commercialised and diffused into the market. It includes both 
basic and applied research, as well as product development, manufacturing, marketing, 
distribution, servicing, and later product adaptation and upgrading (Smith & Barfield, 1996). 
Schumpeter (1934) had originally identified five types of innovation (I) product innovation, 
which is the introduction of a new good, or of a new quality of a good, (II) process innovation, 
related to a new method of production, (III) opening of a new market, (IV) discovering new 
resources or intermediates, and (V) a new organisational form (Schumpeter, 1934). Many more 
types and categories have been identified since by many authors. For example, Daft (1978), 
Kimberly and Evanisko (1981), and Damanpour (1987) distinguished between administrative 
and technical innovations. Dewar and Dutton (1986), Ettlie, Bridges, and O'Keefe (1984), and 
Nord and Tucker (1987) focused on the difference between radical innovations (ones that 
involve and lead to significant transformations, such as the commercialisation of electricity) 
and incremental innovations (like for example improving the functionality of an existing 
product). Marino (1982) and Zmud (1982) separated the initiation and implementation stages 
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of the adoption of innovation; Aiken, Bacharach, and French (1980) distinguished between 
innovations in different levels in organizations.   
In 1995, Clayton Christensen distinguished between two more major categories of innovation, 
sustaining and disruptive. According to his analysis, a sustaining innovation does not 
significantly affect existing markets and can be evolutionary, in which case a product is 
improved by an innovation in an existing market as the customers would expect, or 
revolutionary (discontinuous, radical), when an innovation is unexpected but does not affect 
existing markets. On the other hand, a disruptive innovation was one that creates a new market 
(Christensen, 1997). According to Damanpour (1991), among the various typologies of 
innovation that emerged from the relevant literature, three have gained the most attention, 
administrative and technical, product and process, and radical and incremental (Damanpour, 
1991).  
More recently, innovations related to the way an organisation goes about creating and capturing 
value and known as the “Business Model Innovation”, (Teece, 2010) has acquired significance. 
Last but not least a category that is particularly useful for this thesis is that of “General Purpose 
Technologies” (GPTs)-based innovations. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) identified GPTs 
by using three criteria: (1) pervasive, i.e., in wide use, (2) capable of ongoing technical 
improvement, and (3) enabling complementary innovations in application sectors. In other 
words, GPTs are those that have economy-wide effects, improve over time, and help trigger 
discoveries in other activities.   
For the purposes of this thesis GPTs are particularly important because 
1. RE can be seen as a GPT.  
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2. There are recent debates suggesting that it may be easier and/or best for governments 
to focus on fostering GPTs and leaving commercialisation to the private sector. 
RE qualifies as a GPT because it can be applicable in virtually every economic activity-from 
construction to manufacturing, to agriculture (consider energy self -sufficient greenhouses), as 
a result of scale flexibility and the potential for electricity transmission. Beyond scale 
flexibility, the existing power grid and virtual power markets allow physical and logistical 
power transmission between producers and consumers. This enables large power consumers to 
sign private Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) with wind or solar farms (see Google, 
Facebook etc.) or residential consumers to sign up for RE tariffs (Bird, et al., 2017). RE 
technologies also improve over time in terms of their efficiency in energy generation and in 
terms of their own manufacturing - solar PV cost for example has gone down over twelve times 
during the last decade (LAZARD, 2017). Last but not least, innovation and growth of RE 
applications has triggered further innovation in adjacent sectors; for example, long-distance 
High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) transmission systems have been developed to take RE 
from remote offshore wind farms to urban consumption centres (Elliott, et al., 2016); smart 
grid applications were developed to facilitate grid services and power multi-directionality 
(Batista, et al., 2017) and grid-scale batteries were developed to improve demand and supply 
timing with intermittent output renewables (Zafirakis, et al., 2016).  
I develop these ideas further in the subsequent chapters. The next section focuses on the 
determinants of innovation.  
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2.3 Determinants of Innovation  
2.3.1 Theoretical Considerations 
Innovation can be driven by individuals and their personal traits and motives and/or by 
organisations and organisational l factors, such as the capabilities, processes and infrastructure 
(such as R&D labs) within a company. The external environment for innovation is also 
important (Porter & Stern, 2001). This relates to the wider macroeconomic, institutional, 
cultural, and policy environment. These two can be interrelated, with certain companies in 
specific nations being more capable of consistent innovation. The reason for that according to 
Porter’s (1990) Diamond of National Advantage, (see Figure 2) is due to the existence or 
absence of four interrelated factors or attributes. According to (Porter, 1990) these are the: (1) 
Factor Conditions, which refers to the nation’s position in factors of production (such as skilled 
labour or infrastructure, necessary to compete in a given industry), (2) Demand Conditions, 
which refers to the nature of home-market demand for the industry’s product or service, (3) 
Related and Supported Industries which refers to the presence or absence in the nation of 
supplier industries and other related industries that are internationally competitive, and (4) Firm 
 
Firm Strategy,  
Structure and 
And Rivalry 
Related  
and Supported  
Industries 
Factor  
Conditions 
Demand 
Conditions 
Figure 2: Porter’s Diamond: Determinants of National Competitive Advantage  
Source: Porter, 1990 
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Strategy, Structure and Rivalry, which refers to the conditions in the nation governing how 
companies are created, organised, and managed, as well as the nature of domestic rivalry 
between firms. According to Porter (1990), these determinants create the national environment 
under which a company is born, innovates and competes (Porter, 1990).  
The “diamond” is related to the earlier concept of a National Innovation System (NIS). The 
notion of NIS, dates back to Freeman (1987). Since then, different definitions have been 
provided, summarised in the Table 4 below: 
Table 4: Definitions of National Systems of Innovations  
“[…] The network of institutions in the public- and private-sectors whose activities and interactions 
initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies” (Freeman, 1987) 
“[…] The elements and relationships which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, and 
economically useful knowledge […] and are either located within or rooted inside the borders of a 
nation state” (Lundvall, 1992) 
“[…] The set of institutions whose interactions determine the innovative performance of national 
firms” (Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993) 
“[…] the institutions and economic structures affecting the rate and direction of technological 
change in the society” (Edquist & Lundvall, 1993) 
“[…] the system of interacting private and public firms (either large or small), universities, and 
government agencies aiming at the production of science and technology within national borders. 
Interaction among these units may be technical, commercial, legal, social, and financial, in as much 
as the goal of the interaction is the development, protection, financing or regulation of new science 
and technology” (Niosi, et al., 1993) 
“[…] The national institutions, their incentive structures and their competencies, that determine the 
rate and direction of technological learning (or the volume and composition of change generating 
activities) in a country” (Patel & Pavitt, 1994) 
“[…] That set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually contribute to the development 
and diffusion of new technologies and which provides the framework within which governments 
form and implement policies to influence the innovation process. As such it is a system of 
interconnected institutions to create, store and transfer the knowledge, skills and artefacts which 
define new technologies” (Metcalfe, 1995) 
Source: Niosi, (2002) 
Key in all definitions is the inter-linkages between organisations, institutions and the private, 
public, and civic spheres. This concept of linkages is central also in Porter’s “diamond”. In this 
argument, strong linkages facilitate innovation, weak linkages hinder it. As noted, innovations 
can take place at the individual, organisational or macroeconomic/national levels. As most 
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individual inventors eventually require an organisation in order to commercialise their 
inventions, below I look at the organisational and the national levels. 
2.3.2 Determinants of innovation at the organisational/firm level  
In order to analyse the determinants of innovation on an organisational/firm level, one should 
first have a clear understanding of the various types of firms and sectors. This is because both 
firms and sectors can differ significantly in their capabilities, the sources of technology they 
adopt, the users and technology developed and the methods they use to capture value from an 
innovation. Pavitt (1984) based on a number of previous studies, identified four categories of 
firms. The first, supplier dominated firms, are found in the traditional sectors of manufacturing 
and are usually small with weak R&D and engineering capabilities. Most of their innovations 
come from suppliers of equipment and materials although in some cases large customers and 
government research institutions also make a contribution. The second, production intensive 
firms, are further divided into large scale producers, which are usually big and produce a high 
proportion of their process technologies to which they devote relatively high proportion of their 
resources. They have a relatively high level of vertical technological diversification into 
equipment related to their own process technology and they make a relatively big contribution 
to all the innovations produced in their principal sectors of activity. The second subcategory is 
the specialised suppliers who also produce a high proportion of their own process technologies 
but the main focus of their innovative activities is the production of product innovations for 
use in other sectors. They diversify technologically relatively little and they do not make a big 
contribution to all the innovations produced in their principal sector of activity. Users and other 
firms outside the sector make significant contributions. The third, science-based firms have 
their main source of technology in internal R&D. Such firms produce a relatively high 
proportion of their own process technology, as well as a high proportion of product innovations 
that are used in other sectors. They are also relatively big, most of their technological 
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diversification is conglomerate (in unrelated sectors) and they produce a relatively high 
proportion of all the innovations made in their principal sector of activity (Pavitt, 1984). Table 
5, extracted from Pavitt (1984), summarises the main sectoral technological trajectories for 
each category. 
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Table 5: Sectoral technological trajectories 
Category 
of firm 
Typical core sectors Determinants of 
technological trajectories 
Technological 
trajectories 
Measured characteristics 
  Sources of 
technology 
Type of user Means of 
appropriation 
 Source of 
process 
technology 
Relative 
balance 
between 
product 
and 
process 
innovation 
Relative 
size of 
innovating 
firms 
Intensity and 
direction of 
technological 
diversification 
Supplier 
dominated 
Agriculture; housing; 
traditional 
manufacture 
Suppliers, 
research 
extension 
services, big 
users 
Price 
sensitive 
Non-technical 
(trademark, 
marketing, 
advertising, 
aesthetic 
design) 
Cost-cutting Suppliers Process Small Low vertical 
Scale 
intensive 
Bulk materials (steel 
glass); assembly 
(consumer durables 
and autos) 
PE suppliers; 
R&D 
Price 
sensitive 
Process 
secrecy and 
know-how; 
technical lags; 
patents; 
dynamic 
learning 
economies 
Cost-cutting 
(product 
design) 
In-house; 
suppliers 
Process Large High vertical 
Specialised 
suppliers 
Machinery; 
instruments 
Design and 
development 
users 
Performance 
sensitive 
Design know-
how; 
knowledge of 
users; patents 
Product 
design 
In-house; 
customers 
Product Small Low 
concentric 
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Category 
of firm 
Typical core sectors Determinants of 
technological trajectories 
Technological 
trajectories 
Measured characteristics 
Science-
based 
Electronics/electrical; 
chemicals 
R&D; public 
science; 
product 
engineering 
department 
Mixed R&D know-
how; patents; 
process 
secrecy and 
know-how; 
dynamic 
learning 
economies 
Mixed In-house; 
suppliers 
Mixed Large Low vertical; 
high 
concentric 
Source: Pavitt, 1984 
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Later studies have identified additional categories. For example Archibugi et al. (1991), 
identified the suppliers of traditional intermediate goods which falls between traditional firms 
and specialised suppliers and operate by selling their products to other companies and receiving 
information through this channel (Archibugi, Cesaratto, & Sirilli, 1991). In 1997, Tidd et al., 
identified the information intensive firms, which are usually found in newly emergent service 
industries (Tidd, Bessant, & Pavitt, 1997).  
Regardless, of the type of organization/firm, an innovation is adopted in order to foster the 
performance or effectiveness of the adopting organization, either as a response to changes in 
its internal or external environment, or as a pre-emptive action taken to influence the 
environment (Damanpour, 1991).  
Damanpour (1991), identified 13 determinants of innovation on an organizational level, from 
reviewing previous studies, as follows:  
Specialization: This provides a broader knowledge base and increase the 
cross-fertilization of ideas. 
Functional Differentiation: Coalitions of professionals form differentiated units 
elaborate upon, introduce changes in the units' technical 
systems and influence changes in their administrative 
systems.  
Professionalism: This increases boundary-spanning activity, self-
confidence, and a commitment to move beyond the status 
quo.  
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Formalization:  Flexibility and low emphasis on work rules facilitate 
innovation. Low formalization permits openness and 
encourages new ideas and behaviours.  
Centralization:  The concentration of decision-making authority prevents 
innovative solutions, while the dispersion of power is 
necessary for innovation.  
Managerial Attitude Toward Change: Managers' favourable attitude toward change leads to an 
internal climate conducive to innovation.  
Managerial Tenure:  The longevity of managers in their jobs provides 
legitimacy and knowledge of how to accomplish tasks, 
manage political processes, and obtain desired outcomes.  
Technical Knowledge Resources:  The greater the technical knowledge resources, the more 
easily can new technical ideas be understood and 
procedures for their development and implementation be 
attained. 
Administrative Intensity:  A higher proportion of managers facilitates intensity of 
innovation because the successful adoption of 
innovations depends largely on the leadership, support, 
and coordination of managers. 
Slack Resources:  These allow an organization to pursue innovations, 
absorb failure, bear the costs of instituting innovations, 
and explore new ideas in advance of an actual need. 
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External Communication:  Environmental scanning and extra-organizational 
communication professional activities of members can 
bring innovative ideas.  
Internal Communication:  This facilitates dispersion of ideas within an organization 
and increases their amount and diversity, which results in 
cross-fertilization of ideas. Also it creates an internal 
environment favourable to the survival of new ideas.  
Vertical Differentiation: Hierarchical levels increase links in communication 
channels, making communication between levels more 
difficult and inhibiting the flow of innovative ideas. 
Damanpour (1996), added two more determinants, namely structural complexity and size.  
These were defined as follows: 
Structural Complexity: This refers to the number of locations at which work is 
performed, the number of jobs or services performed; or 
the number of hierarchical ranks performing different 
tasks. Other dimensions of differentiation in 
organizations are spatial, occupational, hierarchical, and 
functional.  
Size: One of the most important factors affecting the structure 
and processes of an organization, large organizations 
have more slack resources for new projects and 
diversification, greater challenges and more 
opportunities for growth among their employees, and 
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more control over the external environment. They also 
are more bureaucratic and less flexible; are unable to 
change and adapt quickly; and tend to have impersonal 
work environments. 
In 1997, Balachandra and Friar (1997), have added Market type (i.e. existing versus new), and 
Technology type (i.e. innovativeness of the technology). These are defined as follows: 
Market Type: When a new product is introduced, there should be a 
strong market in order for it to succeed. Although market 
strength is a composite factor, its estimation is 
contextual, because some components for estimating 
market strength may contribute positively in some 
situations but negatively in others. The main contextual 
feature is whether the new product is entering an 
established market or is an innovative product for which 
there is no established market. 
Technology Type:  The success of a new product depends on technology 
factors and on the innovativeness of the technology. The 
precise relationship between innovativeness and 
commercial success however is a matter of dispute. 
A later study, conducted by Pittaway et al. (2004), argued that, network relationships with 
suppliers, customers, and intermediaries (e.g. professional and trade associations) are important 
factors affecting innovation performance and productivity. Networks can endure and evolve 
over the years and as a result they go through periods of conflict between partners, which can 
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(and usually do) lead to the failure of the network. Networks may also display internal conflicts, 
and conflict with other alternative networks (Pittaway, et al., 2004).  
In a more recent study, Anderson et al. (2014) identified and/or restated some determinants at 
the organisational level by systematically reviewing the existing literature. These are 
(Anderson, Potocnik, & Zhou, 2014):  
Management-Related Factors:  Human Resource (HR) practices were found to have a 
mixed effect, with some arguing that the provision of 
training, employee involvement practices, use of 
performance based pay systems, flexible working hours, 
job variety and autonomy, and human resource flexibility 
engender higher levels of innovation. The role of 
management support in organizational innovation in 
terms of the CEO’s transactional and transformational 
leadership, management support, and top managers’ 
favourable attitude towards innovation was found to 
have a positive effect on innovation.  
Knowledge Utilisation and Networks: Knowledge search and spillover (transfer), knowledge 
stock, and social network had overall mixed effects, 
while the absorptive capacity of an organisation (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990) and intellectual capital, were found 
to have positive effect.  
Structure and Strategy: Decentralised, more complex structures, and structures 
with harmonisation or commitment to low power 
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differentiation, and low formalization have a positive 
effect on innovation. In terms of strategy, the 
formalization and the structural integration had a 
negative effect on innovative practices.  
Size: The size of a firm and its innovativeness are positively 
linked which is not surprising since larger organisations 
are more likely to have more assets of different classes 
(finances, personnel, expertise, etc.) to devote to 
innovation.  
Resources:  The availability of resources was found to have no effect 
on the innovativeness of a firm. The diversity and quality 
of the resources were found to have a positive effect, 
while the results on slack resources were mixed.  
Culture and Climate:  A climate supportive of innovation is favourable to 
organizational-level innovation; a climate that favours r 
personal initiative and psychological safety enhances the 
relationship between process innovativeness and firm 
performance. The national culture, and empowerment 
were found to have mixed effects.  
External Environment: Market competition was found to have a positive effect 
on the innovative activity of a firm, while mixed effects 
were found for the geographic distribution of R&D 
activity, as well as for environmental uncertainty, 
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turbulence, dynamism, urbanization, community wealth, 
population growth, and the unemployment rate. 
Innovation Diffusion:  The diffusion process was found to have mixed effects 
on further innovation. 
Corporate Entrepreneurship as Innovation: Entrepreneurship as a process of human creativity, 
financial resources, and technological capital, can 
enhance new product development processes and new 
institutional forms and foster new ventures and 
successful innovations.  
It is apparent from the above that some determinants are common, such as the size of an 
organisation, the resources and the market structure and competition.| others differ, 
depending in part on the classification criterion used.  
 A regression analysis by Bhattacharya and Bloch (2004) examined how firm size, market 
structure, profitability and growth influence innovative activity in small to medium sized 
Australian manufacturing businesses. They found that size, R&D intensity, market structure 
and trade shares were conducive to further innovative activity for the full sample and for 
high-tech firms. For low-tech industries, fewer variables were significant (Bhattacharya & 
Bloch, 2004).  
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2.3.3 Determinants of Innovation at the National Level 
In addition to within organisations, innovation can take place at the level of the wider nation. 
In this sub-section I look at whether and how can organisational innovation scale up to the 
national level and/or how organisational and national innovation interact. Porter and Stern 
(2001) suggested that a nation’s competitiveness depends on the capacity of its industry to 
innovate and upgrade. Companies gain advantage over the world’s best competitors as a result 
of pressure and challenge, while they also benefit from having strong domestic rivals, 
aggressive home-based suppliers, and demanding local customers. For example, Israeli firms, 
who have a striking innovative output, are benefiting by the environment of innovation, 
including strong university-industry linkages, as well as a large pool that includes highly 
trained scientists and engineers (Kuan, 2004). Similarly, the United States had attracted 
innovation in pharmaceuticals in the 1990s, while Sweden and Finland have had extraordinary 
rates of innovation in wireless technology (Porter & Stern, 2001). In the authors’ view, as the 
basis of competition has shifted towards the creation and assimilation of knowledge, the role 
of the nation (and hence public policy) has grown (Porter, 1990). 
In one of the earliest studies, Patel and Pavitt (1994) identified national institutions, their 
incentive structures and their competencies, as the determinants of the rate and direction of 
national innovation (in terms of technology created). In more detail the authors identified and 
defined the following (Patel & Pavitt, 1994):  
Institutions: 1. Business firms, and especially those investing in 
change-generating activities; 
2. Universities and similar institutions, providing basic 
research and related training; 
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3. A mixture of public and private institutions, providing 
general education and vocational training, and; 
4. Governments, financing and performing a variety of 
activities that both promote and regulate technical 
change. 
Incentives: Government support for basic research (given non-
appropriability and non-depletability) is accepted in all 
countries. However, less attention had been placed on 
firm-based training (including training in change-
generating activities) when employees are mobile 
between firms. 
 The balance between the incentive of temporary 
monopoly profits for innovation, and the pressure of 
competition for imitation. The inadequate nature of such 
incentives in the previously centrally planned economies 
was a major reason for their lack of technological 
accumulation. 
 International differences in the rate and direction of 
technological activities amongst advanced market 
economies, and most importantly the local supply of 
skills, specific local demands, and the pressure of 
competition. 
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Competencies: One major reason for international differences in growth 
and trade performance is the existence of international 
technology gaps i.e. international differences in 
technological competence resulting from differences in 
the volume and sectoral pattern of R&D and related 
activities. 
The above is closely linked both to NIS and the “diamond”. But it goes further in identifying 
the role of competences and incentives that both the NIS and diamond-based approaches seem 
to downplay.  
While their original work was not linked to NIS, more recently, Furman, et al. (2002) have 
tried to link the diamond to the NIS and other economic literature. They have also developed 
the notion of National Innovative Capacity (NIC) which they defined as [a] country’s 
potential-as both an economic and political entity-to produce a stream of commercially 
relevant innovations, which depends on the overall both on the technological sophistication of 
an economy and its labour force, as well as on the investments and policy choices made by the 
government and the private sector. The authors based their framework on three different 
theories: Romer’s (1990) endogenous growth theory; Porter’s (1990) cluster-based theory of 
national industrial competitive advantage; and Nelson’s (1993) research on national innovation 
systems. Drawing from Romer’s (1990) work, their framework proposed that the innovative 
performance is determined by the following set of influences, (Furman, Porter, & Stern, 2002): 
 
Where: 
 ?̇?𝐴𝑗𝑗.𝑡𝑡 is the flow of new-to-the-world technologies, per county (j), per year (t); 
𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗.𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴  is the total level of capital and labour resources allocated to the ideas sector of the 
economy; 
(2-1) 
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𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is the total stock of knowledge held by an economy at a given point in time to drive 
future production; 
𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is the level of cross-cutting resource commitments and policy choices that constitute 
the common innovation infrastructure; 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the specific environments for innovation in the industrial clusters of a country; and 
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 is the strength of linkages between common infrastructure and the industrial clusters 
of the nation. 
The equation assumes that the elements forming the NIC are complementary, i.e. the marginal 
boost to ideas production from increasing one factor is increasing in the level of all the other 
factors, As a result, the determinants of the framework were divided into three categories: (i) 
innovation-supporting infrastructure (i.e. the common pool of institutions, resources, and 
policies), (ii) a country’s industrial clusters, and (iii) the linkages and interaction between the 
two. In so doing the authors brought together organisational, sectoral, institutional and national 
determinants of innovation, including policy related determinants. 
In the case of the first category, two major determinants identified were an economy’s 
aggregate level of technological sophistication, and the amount of the total available scientists 
and engineers that can be dedicated to the production of new technologies. The authors 
expanded this concept to include the extent to which an economy invests in higher education 
and public policy choices (e.g. patent and copyright laws), the extent of R&D tax credits, the 
nature of antitrust laws, the rate of taxation of capital gains, and the openness of the economy 
to international competition (Furman, Porter, & Stern, 2002).  
Regarding the second category, they argued that firms - influenced by their microeconomic 
environment – are the main actors who develop and commercialize innovation, and hence, the 
NIC depends on the microeconomic environment present in a nation’s industrial clusters. A 
number of cluster specific determinants were identified, including investments, and policies 
which influence the extent to which a country’s industrial clusters compete on the basis of 
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technological innovation. These clusters can be complementary to one another, both due to 
knowledge spill-overs and other interrelationships (Furman, Porter, & Stern, 2002).  
Public policy was argued to have a significant role in shaping a country’s national innovative 
capacity. Apart from increasing the level of R&D resources available to the economy, other 
policy choices shape human capital investment, innovation incentives, cluster circumstances, 
and the quality of linkages. Every country that had increased their estimated level of innovative 
capacity over the last quarter century (i.e. Japan, Sweden, Finland, Germany) have 
implemented policies that foster human capital investment in science and engineering (for 
example by establishing and investing resources in technical universities) as well as greater 
competition on the basis of innovation (e.g. through the adoption of R&D tax credits and the 
gradual opening of markets to international competition) (Furman, Porter, & Stern, 2002). 
Finally, the relationship between the common innovation infrastructure and industrial clusters 
was said to be mutually reinforcing: for a given cluster innovation environment, innovative 
output will tend to increase with the strength of the common innovation infrastructure and vice 
versa. These strengths are translated into specific innovative outputs, hence shaping the 
realized rate of national R&D productivity. Linkages can be assisted by various types of 
institutions, such as universities, cluster trade associations, and informal alumni networks. In 
the absence of strong linking mechanisms, the authors observed that upstream scientific and 
technical activity may spill over to other countries more quickly than opportunities can be 
exploited by domestic industries (Furman, Porter, & Stern, 2002). 
Despite the emphasis on the role of firms, Furman et al., (2002) focused on the cluster level, 
not the firm level as such, and also on public policy. It is worth noting that competences and 
incentives mentioned by Patel and Pavitt (1994) can be both organisational level and cluster 
and more macro level, hence it is important to maintain these as part of the analysis of the 
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determinants of innovation and NIS. Unlike Patel and Pavitt (1994), Furman et al., (2002) have 
not paid sufficient attention to competences and incentives. 
A large number of empirical studies have tried to test for the importance of different 
determinants of innovation. In 1996, a study conducted by Malebra et al., (1996) concluded 
that the patterns of innovative activities differ systematically across technological classes2 but 
are remarkably similar across countries for each technological class. They examined the 
patterns of innovative activities at the technological and country levels, using patent data for 
49 technological classes in six countries (USA, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom and 
Italy) (Malebra & Orsenigo, 1996). This statement was later supported by other studies – see 
Breschi, et al., (2000), and Carlsson, (2006).  
2.3.4 Eco-innovation and public policy  
Given the importance of country level and technological class in the remainder of this chapter 
the focus will be on the determinants of a particular class, that of eco-innovation 
(environmental innovation) and a particular key aspect of country-level factors, that of public 
policy. Eco-innovation is defined as “the introduction of any new or significantly improved 
product (good or service), process, organisational change or marketing solution that reduces 
the use of natural resources (including materials, energy, water and land) and decreases the 
release of harmful substances across the whole life-cycle” (European Commission, 2016). The 
OECD, based on their definition of innovation (OECD, 2005), identified three dimensions 
based on which eco-innovation can be understood and analysed, being its targets (the main 
focus), its mechanisms (methods for introducing changes in the target) and its impacts (the 
                                                          
2 In order for international comparisons to be feasible, sector classifications (such as comparisons of productions, 
and employment) are important. These sectors are defined by typical products, which however are broad in 
nature, while their production and function are based on technologies. The said technologies (as well as sectors) 
are classified for ease in comparisons into five broad categories, being electrical engineering, instruments, 
chemistry, mechanical engineering, and other fields (Schmoch, 2008).  
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effects on environmental conditions). Renewable energy is part of the scope of the general eco-
innovation concept (OECD, 2009).  
In one of the earliest studies, Green et al. (1994) identified the existence and anticipation of 
environmental regulation, expanding market share of green products, and cost savings as the 
main determinants of eco-innovation by surveying UK firms (Green, McKeenin, & Irwin, 
1994). In a similar study, focusing on the US manufacturing firms, conducted by Florida 
(1996), the author identified the environmental regulation, corporate citizenship, and factors 
related with the industrial performances (Florida, 1996). 
On the empirical front, Lanjouw and Mody (1996) have found a strong correlation between 
pollution abatement expenditures and the rate of patenting for several countries (Lanjouw & 
Mody, 1996). Jaffe and Palmer (1996) used R&D expenditures and patents application as 
measures of innovative activity and data on regulatory compliance costs to study whether 
changes in regulatory stringency are associated with more or less innovative activity by US 
regulated industries. They concluded that (lagged) environmental compliance expenditures had 
a significant positive association with R&D expenditures, but that there was no relationship 
between compliance costs and inventive output (as measured by successful applications) (Jaffe 
& Palmer, 1996). The regulatory stringency (as measured by pollution abatement and control 
expenditure) was also identified as key determinant by Brunnermeier et al. (2003), alongside 
the role of the international competition (Brunnermeier & Cohen, 2003).  
Newell et al. (1999) considered the effect of both energy prices and energy-efficiency 
standards on the average efficiency of a group of energy-using consumer durables (i.e. room 
air conditioners, central air conditioners, and gas water heaters). They showed that over time, 
changes in energy prices induce both the production and commercialization of new models and 
the elimination of old models from the USA market. In contrast, the imposition of 
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environmental standards leads to a drop of those products which are energy-inefficient (Newell, 
Jaffe, & Stavins, 1999). Popp (2002) analysed the inducement effect of changing energy prices 
and technological availability on energy-efficient and environmentally-friendly innovations by 
using data on US patents and patent citations between 1970 and 1994. Using a knowledge stock 
(see Popp, 2002) to proxy for the supply-push determinant of innovation and energy prices as 
proxy for demand-pull determinant, he concluded that both demand-side and supply-side 
factors have an important role in the inducement of innovation (Popp, 2002).  
De Vries et al. (2005) identified policy stringency as a determinant of eco-innovation by 
examining European patents on sulphur dioxide abatement technologies (De Vries & 
Withagen, 2005). However, Frondel et al. (2008), when surveying OECD countries, found a 
significant positive correlation between policy stringency (as well as technology standards and 
regulatory compliance) with the introduction of end-of-pipe technologies3, but not with clean 
technologies. Innovations in clean technology tended to be more market driven and motivated 
by cost savings (Frondel, Horbach, & Rennings, 2008).  
The certification of environmental management systems was found by Rehfeld et al. (2007) to 
have a significantly positive effect on environmental product innovations. By examining a 
dataset of the German manufacturing sector (at firm level), they also found that environmental 
policy seemed to be a driver for product innovations, and finally that technology-push (R&D) 
and market pull also have a positive effect on environmental product innovations (Rehfeld, 
Rennings, & Ziegler, 2007). Wagner (2007) found the implementation level of environmental 
                                                          
3 Any device and/or treatment system applied to storm-water, combined wastewater, municipal wastewater 
and/or industrial wastewater at the outlet of a collection system prior to a receiving water body. The majority of 
wastewater treatment systems including sanitary and combined wastewater treatment plants and many storm-
water treatment schemes such as detention basins are end-of-pipe systems (US EPA, 2016). 
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management systems to have a positive effect on environmental process innovations, by 
surveying and using patent data on German manufacturing firms (Wagner, 2007). 
Horbach (2008) examined two panel databases on German firms and concluded that 
improvement of the technological capabilities by R&D is very important for environmental 
innovation as well as that an increase in the expected future demand fosters environmental 
innovations. Environmental regulation and environmental management tools are highly 
relevant determining factors (Horbach, 2008). 
In 2010, Braun et al. (2010) found that (eco-) innovation is strongly driven by knowledge spill-
overs, especially those occurring at the national level. By investigating two major renewable 
energy technologies - wind and solar - across a panel of 21 OECD countries over the period 
1978 to 2004, they concluded that the technologies under examination exhibit distinct 
innovation characteristics: both are stimulated by intra-sectoral spill-overs, but respond 
differently to inter-sectoral spill-overs, which are only influential in the case of wind 
technology. They also found that public R&D stimulates innovation, particularly in solar 
technologies (Braun, Schmidt-Ehmcke, & Zloczysti, 2010). 
Public policy has been found to be an important determinant of innovation in general and RE 
innovation in particular. The importance of public policy in eco-innovation specificity is related 
to what is called the “double externality” problem. Eco-innovations produce two types of 
positive externalities, i.e. usual knowledge externalities in the research and innovation phases; 
and externalities in the adoption and diffusion phases due to the positive impact on the 
environment. The beneficial environmental impact of environmental innovations makes their 
diffusion always socially desirable. This implies the existence of a twofold market failure; first 
in the lack of incentives for firms to invest in environmental innovation since the private return 
on R&D in environmental technology is less than its social return, and second in the lack of 
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incentives for that lead firms to under-invest in environmental R&D and innovation. This 
double source of market failure justifies the needs of policy instruments and the existence of 
what Rennings (2000) calls the "regulatory push-pull" effect (Oltra, 2008). The authors 
classified the eco-innovation determinants in three categories, supply-side, demand-side, and 
policy-regulatory. These are summarised below, in Table 6:  
Table 6: Determinants of eco-innovation  
 
Regulation and Policy 
Determinants 
Implementation of environmental policy instruments: economic and 
regulatory instruments 
Existence and anticipation of environmental regulations Regulatory 
design: stringency, flexibility, time frame 
 
Supply Side  
Determinants 
Cost savings, productivity improvements 
Organizational innovations: environmental management systems, 
extended producer responsibility R&D activities 
Industrial relationships, supply chain pressure, networking activities 
 
Demand Side 
Determinants 
Environmental consciousness and consumers' preferences for 
environmentally friendly products 
Expected increase in market share or penetration of new market 
segments 
Source: Oltra, (2008) 
Given the role and importance of public policy both in theory and the existing evidence, the 
benefits of measuring eco-innovation can be described as five-fold (Arundel & Kemp, 2009):  
• Helping policy makers to understand, analyse, and benchmark the overall trend of eco-
innovation activity (increasing, decreasing, transitions in the nature of eco-innovation 
such as from end-of-pipe towards cleaner production and increased recycling and 
reuse); as well as trends in specific product categories (such as wind turbines).  
• Helping policy makers to identify drivers and barriers to eco-innovation. This 
information can inform the design of effective policies and framework conditions such 
as pollution taxes.  
• Raising awareness of eco-innovation among stakeholders and encourage companies to 
increase eco-innovation efforts based on an analysis of the benefits for companies, 
sectors and nations.  
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• Helping society to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation.  
• Making consumers aware of differences in the environmental consequences of products 
and life styles 
2.4 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I discussed the definition and key determinants of innovation, paying attention 
to at organisational and wider levels. Innovation can take place at the individual, organisational, 
cluster, and national levels and that these four levels are closely linked. In particular, Patel and 
Pavitt’s (1994) have identified organisations and their competences as well as incentives as 
important sources of innovation. Furman, et al., (2002) have employed Porter’s diamond to 
synthesise firm, regional (cluster) and national level determinants. Their definition of national 
innovative capacity helps bring together national, cluster and organisational factors. Within 
each level of analysis, the literature has identified key determinants, important among these 
being firm size, strategy, structure and competencies. Public policy was also found to be 
important determinant of innovation, particularly of the GPT type.  
A number of studies were also surveyed that focused on the determinants of (eco-) innovation.  
In this case too, public policy as well as supply-side and demand-side factors were found to be 
important.  In all the  findings point to the importance of  country level and technology class 
factors,  public policy,  demand and supply factors , and  linkages.   
In the remainder of this thesis I account for most of those key variables, at the national level 
(my focus in this thesis) in that I look at public policy, I employ both demand and supply side 
instruments and look at different country and technology related factors. I was less able to 
account for linkages as data on this is very limited, and is a common limitation in the literature. 
That said, the use of market share that shows market concentration hence, all other things being 
equal suggests fewer linkages, accounts to limited degree for that variable too. In line with 
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literature, I focus on a particular type of innovation (that is innovation in RETs) and a particular 
type of public policy, that of industrial policy (IP) and its (demand and supply side) 
instruments. As already noted RE can be seen as a type of GPT and in this sense it provides an 
excellent context for the analysis of the idea that IP can be important in fostering RE 
innovation. In addition, I develop and test for a number of other important hypotheses, that 
have not been adequately explored in literature.  
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Chapter 3  
Empirical Protocol and Methodology 
In this chapter, I discuss the choice of methodology focusing on the empirical protocol 
employed in this thesis. In terms of methodology, I employed an econometric investigation. In 
effect this involves testing with primary or secondary data the Hypotheses developed on the 
basis of a conceptual framework based upon and developing extant literature. Testing the 
Hypotheses involves first the development of an equation (see below) and then checking if 
these are borne out by the data. . This involves in turn using an extant or building an appropriate 
data base, identifying the most likely factors that help predict changes in the dependent 
variable, identify best proxies for all variables, select and employ an econometric technique 
that is best for the purpose, identify and address any problems related to the econometric 
estimation, and explain and interpret the results and their limitations.  
As it has already been explained, in IP there is very little econometric research. Robust 
econometric findings therefore can help complement and hence triangulate findings from 
qualitative or empirical case-based techniques.  
As already noted in the case of this thesis, the key dependent variable is innovation in the RE 
sector (and in particular RE technologies) and the key independent variables are RE policies 
and RE policy instruments. Below I explain the choice of the key variables, the proxies used, 
the data set, and the estimating technique. Additional control variables used in various chapters 
are explained within the relevant chapters themselves and the same applies for the presentation 
and analysis of the results.  
Starting with the data collection, for all variables (including the control variables) data was 
collected for all the OECD countries, between 1990 and 2014. The 34 OECD countries are: 
Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Chile; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; 
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France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Korea; Luxembourg; 
Mexico; the Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Poland; Portugal; the Slovak Republic; 
Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey; the United Kingdom; and the United States. 
The OECD was chosen based on the diversity of the countries, and therefore the diversity of 
the RE policy instruments (further explained below), while including the whole EU, widely 
perceived as a leader in the area of RE policy making and innovation. The year 1990 was taken 
as the starting point of this analysis to capture the effects before and after the Kyoto Protocol 
signing and ratification, which initiated the redirection of innovative activities towards RE 
(Rawlins & Allal, 2003). The end date had to be 2014 due to data restrictions related to 
patenting activity (although data do exist, it takes a few years for all the filed patents to show). 
Therefore, as advised by the OECD (2005) I avoid the use of data for the last three years. 
The resulting comprehensive data base is employed in full in Chapter 5. In Chapter 4 I 
commence with a subset that focuses on the leading countries in terms of public policy towards 
RE, namely those of the ‘old’ EU (the EU15). This is in order to focus on the frontier of extant 
practice and allow gradual comparisons. The focus on the EU 15 also restricts the years to 1995 
and 2014 (the year of the 4th enlargement). Then in Chapter 5, I first employ the full sample 
and then use sub samples for North and South EU. This is to allow for regional variations 
between old and enlarged EU, between the EU and the OECD as a whole and between North 
and South EU countries. In chapter 6, the full sample is restricted to 24 countries because of 
emergent lack of data that resulted from fine tuning the data set to identify particular REP 
instruments and RETs (few countries had very few to permit meaningful econometric 
investigation).  
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3.1 Dependent Variable (DV): Patenting Activity on the RE Sector 
A challenge in the literature is how to measure/proxy the main (dependent) variable (DV) i.e. 
RE innovation. Innovation can be measured both by means of input measures (such as R&D 
expenditure), and output (yield)-oriented measures which account for the results of the 
innovation process (Groba & Breitschopf, 2013). In line with the literature reviewed, most 
studies on this topic rely on patents as a measure of RE innovations. In this dissertation, 
innovation will also be measured using patent statistics related to RETs, in part because of data 
availability but also for reasons of comparability with other studies. 
According to OECD (2011), a patent is an intellectual property right that is related to technical 
inventions. It can be granted to a firm, individual or public body by a national patent office. 
For an application to be successful, certain criteria must be met, i.e. the novelty of the invention, 
being capable of industrial application as well as involving a (non-obvious) inventive step 
(OECD, 2001). Certain advantages and disadvantages can be identified with regards to the use 
of patents. In terms of advantages, patent data include disaggregated information on both the 
nature of the innovation and the applicant; hence, they provide alternative indicators of 
innovation and technology diffusion (Groba & Breitschopf, 2013). Furthermore, patents are 
Figure 3: Overview of measures of inputs (determinants) and outputs of innovation 
Source: Groba & Breitschopf, 2013 
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closely related to invention while covering a broad range of technologies, often in ranges were 
other data sources are limited (OECD, 2001).  
Although patent statistics are a very common empirical approach, they have been criticised in 
terms of their efficacy in proxying innovation and also for potential biases (Nelson, 2009). 
Nelson, in his study on assessing various measures of knowledge diffusion by comparing patent 
data on recombinant DNA technology, identified errors of omission and over-representation of 
measures, as well as potential biases (Nelson, 2009). In one of the most closely related studies 
to the present one by Johnstone et al (2008), the limitations of patent statistics were also 
highlighted. Three main issues were raised. First, that using unweighted patent counts attributes 
the same importance to patents that were not as successful as others. Second is the existing 
variation in the propensity to patent across countries and sectors as a result of the level of 
protection afforded by the patent, as well as the possibility of protecting monopoly rights. Third 
is the uncertainty of comparing information as a result of the differences in patent regimes for 
different countries (Johnstone et al., 2008). In addition, the various changes in the legislation 
of patent make it difficult to analyse trends over time.  
Despite the aforementioned limitations and criticisms, patent data are the most commonly used 
proxy of innovation and many argue that despite limitations, they should not be dismissed as a 
statistical indicator (OECD, 2001; Johnstone, Haščič, & Popp, 2008; Nesta, Vona, & Nicolli, 
2014; Dang & Motohashi, 2015). Importantly, Dang and Motohashi (2015) found that patent 
count is correlated with both R&D input and financial output, rendering patent statistics a good 
proxy for innovation. In addition, patents are granted for “inventive technologies with 
commercial promise” (i.e. innovation) (Smith K. , 2004, p. 159); hence, suggesting a close link 
with the definition of innovation. Last but not least, the availability of data, and their long 
history of records (patents are the only innovation indicator extending back over centuries), 
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and the classification of technologies into a detailed and slow-to-change system (Smith K. , 
2004) renders patents a suitable proxy for innovation.  
I collected data from the 2016 online free version of the European Worldwide Patent Statistical 
Office (EPO) database (PATSTAT). In line with the extant literature (Johnstone, Haščič, & 
Popp, 2008; Nesta, Vona, & Nicolli, 2014) the International Patent Classification (IPC) system 
was used, because it allows distinguishing between inventions across different RE 
technological fields in Biomass, Geothermal, Hydro, Solar, and Wind. When searching for 
patents, there are two possible errors that can occur, i.e. the inclusion of irrelevant patents, and 
the exclusion of relevant ones. However, contrary to other ‘environmental’ technologies, RETs 
have the advantage to largely minimise said errors, because their definition of relevant patent 
classifications makes it easier to identify the relevant patents (Johnstone et al., 2008). It should 
be clarified that the patents used refer to electricity generation wherever that is appropriate. In 
some instances, there is cross-use of patented technologies in sectors other than electricity but 
that comes in addition to electricity and not instead of. Furthermore, in some occasions there 
are technologies (such as in the case of upstream biomass) where the relevant patent refers to 
fuel production and processing. 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) patent applications in the international phase were considered 
and filed directly at the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO). Arguably, this also helps account for patents which are perceived to be more 
impactful, by virtue of the fact that they have been filed in multiple countries at once. The 
patents were assigned to a country on the basis of the address of the inventor. In the case where 
there were more than one assigned inventors’ country addresses, the patent was attributed to 
both countries.. Table 8, summarises the IPC codes used in this thesis, obtained from Johnstone 
et al., (2008). I note that not all IPCs returned results. 
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Table 7: International Patent Classes per Renewable Energy Technology 
 Name Class Sub-
Classes 
W
IN
D 
Wind motors with rotation axis substantially in wind direction  F03D 1/00-06 
Wind motors with rotation axis substantially at right angle to wind 
direction 
F03D 3/00-06 
Other wind motors F03D 5/00-06 
Controlling wind motors F03D 7/00-06 
Adaptations of wind motors for special use; F03D 9/00-02 
Details, component parts, or accessories not provided for in, or of 
interest apart from, the other groups of this subclass 
F03D 11/00-04 
Electric propulsion with power supply from force of nature, e.g. sun, 
wind 
B60L 8/00 
Effecting propulsion by wind motors driving water-engaging 
propulsive elements 
B63H 13/00 
SO
LA
R 
Devices for producing mechanical power from solar energy F03G 6/00-08 
Use of solar heat, e.g. solar heat collectors  F24J 2/00-54 
Machine plant or systems using particular sources of energy -sun F25B 27/00B 
Drying solid materials or objects by processes involving the 
application of heat by radiation -e.g. sun 
F26B 3/28 
Semiconductor devices sensitive to infra-red radiation -including a 
panel or array of photoelectric cells, e.g. solar cells 
H01L 31/042 
Generators in which light radiation is directly converted into 
electrical energy 
H02N 6/00 
Aspects of roofing for the collection of energy –i.e. solar panels E04D 13/18 
Electric propulsion with power supply from force of nature, e.g. sun, 
wind  
B60L 8/00 
GE
OT
HE
RM
AL
 Other production or use of heat, not derived from combustion -using 
natural or geothermal heat 
F24J 3/00-08 
Devices for producing mechanical power from geothermal energy F03G 4/00-06 
Electric motors using thermal effects H02N 10/00 
OC
EA
N 
Adaptations of machines or engines for special use -characterized by 
using wave or tide energy 
F03B 13/12-24 
Mechanical-power producing mechanisms -ocean thermal energy 
conversion 
F03G 7/05 
Mechanical-power producing mechanisms -using pressure 
differentials or thermal differences 
F03G 7/04 
Water wheels F03B 7/00 
BI
OM
AS
S 
Solid fuels based on materials of non-mineral origin -animal or 
vegetable 
C10L 5/42-44 
Engines operating on gaseous fuels from solid fuel -e.g. wood F02B 43/08 
Liquid carbonaceous fuels -organic compounds C10L 1/14 
Anion exchange -use of materials, cellulose or wood B01J 41/16 
Source: Johnstone et al., 2008 
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The data obtained from PATSTAT returned a fair number of duplicates. The reason for this (in 
the case of this thesis) were that since divisions and country of origin were included, patents 
with more than one of these parameters appeared more than once. It was therefore necessary 
to manually remove the data obtained from PATSTAT in order to keep their unique values. I 
note that a patent can be filled under more than one IPC class since it can be applicable to more 
than one technologies and hence, appear twice (or more) with different IPCs. Such patents were 
included in the analysis. 
3.1.1 Overview 
A total of 217,393 patent counts were obtained from PATSTAT, using the aforementioned 
SQL code and IPC classes. Of these, 10,603 were filed under Biomass; 3,892 under 
Geothermal; 34,393 under Hydro; 12,200 under Ocean; 73,916 under Solar; and 82,389 under 
Wind. The percentage share of the patent activity is shown in Figure 4. 
4.88
1.79
15.82
5.61
34.00
37.90
Percentage Share of RETs (1990-2014)
Biomass
Geothermal
Hydro
Ocean
Solar
Wind
Figure 4: Percentage Sharing of RET Patenting Activity 
Source: Author after data from PATSTAT, 2016 
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It can be seen that Wind technologies have the highest patenting activity (circa 38%); followed 
by solar (34%); hydro (circa 16%); ocean (circa 6%); biomass (circa 5%); and geothermal 
(circa 2%). This is not a surprise though. Hydropower, biomass, and geothermal technologies 
are considered “well-established” since they rely on widely used turbine systems contributing 
a significant share of the world’s primary energy supply (IEA, 2006). This can be better seen 
in the graph below (Figure 5) that shows the trend of patent activity over the years under 
examination (1990-2014).  
Figure 5: RET Patenting Activity per Year 
 
Source: Author after data from PATSTAT, 2016 
It can be seen that the patenting activity related to biomass and geothermal technologies seems 
to have remained constant throughout the years examined – although some increase can be 
seen after 2006 in the patenting activity of the geothermal technologies. This is not the case for 
the hydro technologies, which have been steadily increasing and peaked after 2005. Wind, has 
been gradually increasing after 1998, and peaked after 2005, and especially in 2010. Ocean and 
solar, have all both peaked after 2005 (solar), and 2007 (ocean). This has also coincided with 
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the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, which took place in 2005, and initiated the redirection 
of innovative activities towards renewables (Rawlins & Allal, 2003). 
In order to avoid some of the limitations of using patents as an indicator of innovation, two 
additional indices were constructed by the author, one adjusting for quality, and one related to 
how many patents have been granted per annum and per RET. The quality adjustment indicator 
was given by the ratio of the citations per year for a specific patent over the total count of 
citations:  
𝑄𝑄.𝐴𝐴. =  𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇  
Where, t = year (1990, …, 2014); and Te = Technology  
This index was then divided with the number of patents per year, hence providing a better idea 
of the patenting activity. The following graph (Figure 6) shows the difference between the total 
RET patents filed, and adjusted for quality: 
Figure 6: Total RET Patenting Activity and Total RET Patenting Activity Adjusted for Quality 
 
Source: Author after data from PATSTAT, 2016  
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When adjusting for quality, the distribution of patenting activity per RET remains the same, 
however, it can be seen that the resulting amount indicates the patenting quality of some RETs 
is better than others. This is especially the case for hydro, solar, and wind.  
The second indicator, related to the patents that were granted, was constructed using data 
extracted from PATSTAT and relates to the patents that were granted per RET per year. Not 
all filed patents are getting granted, and not all granted patents get citations, thus the two 
indicators cannot be used in conjunction. The following graph (Figure 7) shows the total 
number of patents filed, as well as the total number of patents granted, and their percentage. 
Figure 7: Total patents and percentage granted per RET between 1990-2014 
 
Source: Author 
Once again, wind technologies have the highest potential of being granted, with 72.3% of the 
total filed patents having been granted. This is followed by geothermal, as one may have 
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granted, as seen in the following table (Table 9) that summarises the overview of the total 
patenting activity:  
Table 8: Summary of Patenting Activity per RET and Total 
RET Total 
Patents 
Filed 
Percentage 
of Total 
Quality 
Adjusted 
(QA) 
% of 
Total 
QA  
Total 
Patents 
Granted 
% of 
Total 
Granted 
% that 
was 
Granted 
Biomass 10603 4.88 53107 3.32 5140 4.33 48.48 
Geothermal 3892 1.79 14175 0.89 1889 1.59 48.54 
Hydro 34393 15.82 268599 16.81 17353 14.60 50.46 
Ocean 12200 5.61 63415 3.97 5148 4.33 42.2 
Solar 73916 34.00 399512 25.00 29763 25.05 40.27 
Wind 82389 37.90 799022 50.01 59524 50.10 72.25 
Total 217393  1597831  118817  54.66 
Source: Author 
The data collected were further classified based on the RET, the country, and the year, as 
presented below.  
3.1.2 Biomass 
The aforementioned IPC codes resulted in a total of 10,603 filed patents related to biomass 
technologies. The three countries with the highest patenting activity were the United States 
with a total 3,860 patents filed between 1990 and 2014, followed by Germany with 1,921 
patents, and the United Kingdom with 1,603. However, the number drastically decreases 
immediately after with France ranking fourth with only 472 patents, and Turkey, Chile, and 
Slovenia being the last three with 6, 4, and 3 patents respectively throughout the years 
examined. As it can be seen in Table 10, the first three countries account for almost 70% of the 
total patenting activity among all 34 OECD members.  
When adjusted for their quality, the top three countries remain the same and in the same order, 
however, following these, the ranking changes, with Netherlands being now ranked in the 
fourth place, France being sixth after Korea, and the last three being Slovenia, Chile, and Latvia 
with 0 quality adjusted patents. The same is the case when taking into consideration the patents 
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granted; the first three countries are the same, but the last three are now Israel, Slovenia, and 
Chile.  
When examining the time trend (Figure 8), it can be seen that for the total filed and the total 
granted patents are almost identical, and relatively smooth, with no peaks, but slightly 
declining. This implies that most of the filed patents were granted and it is also evident from 
examining the actual data; there were a total of 470 patents filed in 1990, of which 300 were 
granted, the highest patenting activity took place in 1996 with 693 filed patents of which 377 
were granted, and gradually decreased following, to 205 total filed patents in 2014 of which 
only 52 were granted.  
The quality adjusted time trend (Figure 8) shows a different story: the quality of the patents 
was steadily increasing from 1990 until 1996 when it peaked, but gradually decreased 
following that and until 2002. It started to increase again after 2002, with fluctuations until 
2009, when it drastically declined, having 0 quality patents in 2014.  
Figure 8: Patenting Activity for Biomass Technologies per Year (1990-2014) 
 
Source: Author 
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3.1.3 Geothermal 
The aforementioned IPC codes resulted in a total of 3,892 filed patents related to geothermal 
technologies. The three countries with the highest patenting activity were again the United 
States with a total 1,006 patents filed between 1990 and 2014, followed by Germany with 691 
patents, and Korea with 657. Similarly, to biomass technologies the number drastically 
decreases immediately after with Japan and Switzerland ranking fourth with only 174 patents 
each, and Portugal, Mexico, and Slovenia being the last three with 1, 0, and 0 patents 
respectively throughout the years examined. As it can be seen in Table 10 the first three 
countries account for almost 60% of the total patenting activity among all 34 OECD members.  
When adjusted for their quality (Figure 9), the top three countries remain the same and in the 
same order like in the case of biomass, however, after these, the ranking does not change, and 
the last three remain the same all with 0 quality adjusted patents (the last six countries all have 
0 quality patents). When taking into consideration the patents granted the order changes. 
Although the United States remains in the first place with a total of 470 out of the 1,006 filed 
patents having been granted, Korea takes the lead with 456 out of 657 filed patents having been 
granted, followed by Germany with 298 out of 691 having been granted. Portugal having its 
one patent filed granted, is not among the last three, but Chile is.  
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Figure 9: Patenting Activity for Geothermal Technologies per Year (1990-2014) 
 
Source: Author 
When examining the time trend (Figure 9), it can be seen that the total number of filed patents 
related to geothermal technologies, along with the quality adjusted, and the granted patents per 
year, are almost collinear, implying that most of the patents filed were granted, and of high 
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in 2014, with 61 having been granted. It can be seen that between 2003 and 2009, the quality 
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31, Estonia with 28, and Slovenia being the last with 24, throughout the years examined. As it 
can be seen in Table 10 the first three countries account for almost 55% of the total patenting 
activity among all OECD members.  
When adjusted for their quality, the top three countries remain the same but not in the same 
order with Germany having better quality patents, followed by the United States and Korea. 
Similarly, New Zealand and Estonia, are no longer on the bottom, meaning despite having the 
least patent counts, these are of better quality. The lowest ranking countries are now Turkey 
with 11 quality patents, Slovenia with 9, and Latvia with 5. Regarding the granted patents, the 
top-ranking countries are the same, with the United Sates having 4,639 granted patents, 
Germany 3,572, and Korea 1,697. That is not the case for the low-ranking countries though, 
with bottom three now being Chile with 12 out of 43 having been granted, New Zealand with 
9 out of 31, and Mexico with 8 out of 55.  
When examining the time trend (Figure 10), it can be seen that the total number of filed patents 
related to hydro technologies, along with the granted patents per year, are almost collinear, 
implying that most of the patents filed were granted. Indeed, circa 50% of the patents filed 
were granted, the highest percentage after wing technologies (see Table 9). Their quality, 
despite the fluctuations, constantly increases, especially after 1999, until its peak in 2012 when 
it radically decreases. 
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Figure 10: Patenting Activity for Hydro Technologies per Year (1990-2014) 
 
Source: Author 
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now being Hungary with 2 out of 15 having been granted, Mexico with 0 out of 71, and 
Luxembourg with 0 out of 3.  
When examining the time trend (Figure 11), it can be seen that the total number of filed patents 
related to ocean technologies, along with the granted patents per year, are almost collinear, 
especially until 2007. Circa 40% of the patents filed were granted (see Table 9). In terms of 
their quality, despite the fluctuations, it constantly increases, especially after 2002, until its 
peak in 2009 when it decreases again. 
Figure 11: Patenting Activity for Ocean Technologies per Year (1990-2014) 
 
Source: Author 
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all members, and if Japan is included, that ranks fourth with 7,464 solar patent counts, the 
percentage increases by 10% to 64%. The lowest ranking countries are Chile with 54 counts, 
Estonia with 22, and Latvia with 17.  
When adjusted for their quality, the order changes, with Germany topping the list, followed by 
the United States, and Korea. The aforementioned countries with the lowest patenting activity 
also have the lowest quality. Regarding the granted patents, the top-ranking countries are the 
same, with Germany having 6,918 granted patents, the United Sates 6,478, and Korea 4,936. 
Similarly, for the case for the low-ranking countries, Latvia has 16 granted patents, Estonia 15, 
and Chile 7.  
When examining the time trend (Figure 12), it can be seen that the total number of filed patents 
related to solar technologies, along with the granted ones per year, are almost collinear, 
especially until 2007. Circa 40% of the patents filed were granted (see Table 9). In terms of 
their quality, despite the fluctuations, it constantly increases, especially after 2004, until its 
peak in 2010 when it decreases again. 
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Figure 12: Patenting Activity for Solar Technologies per Year (1990-2014) 
 
Source: Author 
3.1.7 Wind 
Finally, regarding the Wind technologies, the aforementioned IPC codes resulted in a total of 
82,389 patent counts. In this case, Germany has filed for the most patents, with a total of 22,788 
counts, by the United States with 13,626, and Denmark with 9,462. These countries account 
for circa 56% of the total patenting activity, while if Korea is added (ranking fourth after 
Denmark) this increases to almost 67% (see Table 10). Following the first four countries, the 
patenting activity drastically drops, much like in the case of Biomass activity, with the three 
countries with the least counts being Estonia with 58 counts, Slovenia with 25, and Chile with 
19.  
When adjusted for their quality, Germany remains in the first place in producing patents of the 
highest quality, followed by the United States, and Korea instead of Denmark, which now ranks 
fourth. The countries with the lowest patenting activity also have the lowest quality, but with 
Poland taking the place of Estonia in the last place, with 0 quality patents out of the 1,014. 
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Regarding the granted patents, the top-ranking countries are the same as with when adjusted 
for quality, with Germany having 11,307 granted patents, the United Sates 6,435, and Korea 
4,803. The last three countries, however, are now New Zealand with 17 granted patents out of 
95, Mexico with 16 out of 84, and Chile with 6 out of 19.  
When examining the time trend (Figure 13), it can be seen that the total number of filed patents 
related to wind technologies, along with the granted ones per year, are again almost collinear, 
especially until 2007 implying that most of the patents filed were granted. Indeed, circa 72% 
of the patents filed were granted (see Table 9). In terms of their quality, despite the fluctuations, 
it constantly increases, especially after 1998, until its peak in 2009 when it decreases again. 
Figure 13: Patenting Activity for Wind Technologies per Year (1990-2014) 
 
Source: Author 
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Table 9: Percentage share per country and per technology  
Country Biomass Geothermal Hydro Ocean Solar Wind 
Australia 0.42 1.23 1.27 3.47 2.52 0.67 
Austria 1.25 2.03 1.91 0.43 2.10 1.03 
Belgium 0.96 0.15 0.32 0.17 0.68 0.71 
Canada 1.35 4.32 3.11 3.28 2.04 1.74 
Chile 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.39 0.07 0.02 
Czech Republic 1.38 1.05 0.60 0.44 0.61 0.21 
Denmark 0.25 0.10 4.01 2.28 0.63 11.48 
Estonia 0.10 0.28 0.08 0.14 0.03 0.07 
Finland 0.94 1.05 0.41 1.82 0.42 0.56 
France 4.45 3.88 4.18 4.75 6.11 2.91 
Germany 18.12 17.75 21.20 8.07 20.83 27.66 
Greece 0.35 0.15 0.24 0.70 0.44 0.30 
Hungary 0.31 0.59 0.21 0.12 0.48 0.24 
Ireland 0.43 0.13 0.59 1.77 0.28 0.20 
Israël 0.08 2.06 0.62 1.16 1.60 0.32 
Italy 1.37 1.13 2.00 2.14 2.44 1.59 
Japan 2.90 4.47 8.64 3.39 10.10 5.90 
Korea 3.66 16.88 9.50 17.33 11.94 11.00 
Latvia 0.07 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.02 0.22 
Luxembourg 0.07 0.03 0.40 0.02 0.23 0.29 
Mexico 0.15 0.00 0.16 0.58 0.30 0.10 
Netherlands 4.23 1.77 1.69 1.62 1.78 2.09 
New Zealand 0.18 0.13 0.09 0.21 0.20 0.12 
Norway 0.55 1.44 1.54 4.38 0.57 1.32 
Poland 1.16 1.98 0.90 0.72 0.70 1.23 
Portugal 0.07 0.03 0.15 0.98 0.24 0.18 
Slovak Republic 0.10 0.21 0.28 0.16 0.16 0.11 
Slovenia 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.03 
Spain 0.50 0.87 1.90 3.74 4.12 3.96 
Sweden 1.33 2.93 1.84 2.92 0.76 1.55 
Switzerland 1.63 4.47 1.70 1.28 3.19 0.80 
Turkey 0.06 0.15 0.24 0.60 0.47 0.21 
United Kingdom 15.12 2.75 5.22 10.02 2.52 4.63 
United States 36.40 25.85 24.67 20.80 21.32 16.54 
Note: In bold, the three countries with the higher percentage share per 
technology 
Source: Author 
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3.1.8 Summary 
Overall, it can be seen that the United States, Germany, Korea, and the United Kingdom are 
ranked in the top places regardless of the nature of the technologies and the same countries are 
while Latvia, Slovenia, and Estonia occupy the bottom of the rankings. Reasons that may help 
explain this include RD&D budget allocations towards RETs, the overall patenting activity, as 
well as the overall economic state of the countries. An additional reason, which is also the focus 
of this thesis, is the extent to which the existence or not, of public industrial policy instruments 
may foster the innovative activity of a country. The following sub-chapter will present the data 
collected related to public policy instruments, for the same countries, and for the same time 
span.  
3.2 Independent Variable (IV): RE Policy (and Policy) Instruments 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, public industrial policy has been found to be an important 
determinant of innovation and particularly for RE. Given their importance, and for the purposes 
of this thesis, three key groups of policy instruments were selected to be the independent 
variable. Using the International Energy Agency (IEA)/International Renewable Energy 
Agency (IRENA) Joint Policies and Measures Database (IEA/IRENA, 2014), an advanced 
search was performed with the specifications presented in Table 11, for 34 countries and 
between 1990-2014. This resulted in a total of 226 policy instruments operated that relate to 
the RE in the electricity sector, the focus of this thesis. Table 11 summarises the specifications 
used in order to extract the relevant REPs from the IEA/IRENA (2014) database.  
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Table 10: Specifications of the Renewable Energy Policies  
Country OECD Countries 
 
Policy Type  
Economic Instruments 
Policy Support 
Regulatory Instruments 
Research, Development and Deployment (RD&D) 
 
 
Renewable 
Energy Policy 
Target  
Bioenergy 
Geothermal 
Multiple Renewable Energy Sources 
Hydropower 
Ocean 
Solar  
Wind 
Sector  Electricity 
Effective 
between 
1990-2014 
Jurisdiction  National 
 
Policy Status  
Ended 
In Force 
Planned 
Superseded 
Size Plant  Large 
Small 
Source: Author after IEA/IRENA, 2014 
 
Figure 14 shows the total number of policy instruments per country for the years under 
examination. It can be seen that, Australia and the United States have had the most policy 
instruments introduced throughout the time span examined (18 each), followed by Mexico (16). 
Switzerland and Turkey have had only one policy instrument each between the aforementioned 
years. From the total policy instruments introduced, not all were in force throughout the years 
examined. For this reason, data on policies were proxied depending on the total number of 
instruments in force per year and per country, as shown below:  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
0 = 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛1 = 𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛2 = 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛3 = 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛…
𝑛𝑛 = 𝑛𝑛 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛
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Figure 14: Total Policy Instruments Proxied per Country between 1990 and 2014 
 
Source: Author 
Secondly, not all instruments target all, or the same RETs. Therefore, the aforementioned 
policies were further classified depending on the technology they are targeting, resulting in six 
categories, one for each technology (biomass, geothermal, hydro, ocean, solar, and wind). In 
the case were one instrument was targeting more than one RET, this was attributed to both (or 
more). Based on the above two, the following graph summarizes the total instruments per 
country and per RET proxied: 
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Figure 15: Total Instruments per Country and per RET between 1990 and 2014  
 
Source: Author 
As noted in Chapter 2, there is not a uniform classification of instruments types. This is 
problematic in that it renders findings from different studies that use different classifications 
difficult to compare4. Drawing on earlier work on innovation, (see for example Rosenberg, 
1974; Nelson, 2009; and Nemet, 2009), Rogge & Reichardt (2016) have emphasised the 
importance of a consistent terminology and went on to propose that in terms of purpose served, 
three types of instruments help provide a comprehensive classification that also aids 
comparability of results. These are technology-push, demand-pull, and systemic instruments 
(Rogge & Reichardt, 2016).  
                                                          
4 For example, Johnstone et al. (2008), as well as Nesta et al. (2014) distinguished instruments in R&D; investment incentives; 
tax incentives; tariff incentives; voluntary programs; obligations; and, tradable certificates (Johnstone, Haščič, & Popp, 2008; 
Nesta, Vona, & Nicolli, 2014). Marques et al. (2013), classified instruments in terms of education and outreach, financial 
incentives - subsidies, policy processes, public investment, R&D, regulatory, tradable permits, and voluntary agreements 
(Marques & Fuinhas, 2012). Mabee and Saddler (2007), identified five groups, being feed-in tariffs, green certificates, 
tendering systems, and tax and investment incentives (Mabee & Saddler, 2007). Kim et al., (2015), distinguished instruments 
in public R&D, tariff incentives, renewables obligation, environmental taxes, and public investment (Kim K. & Kim, 2015). 
Few studies have distinguished among demand-pull and technology-push (Horbach, Rammer, & Rennings, Determinants of 
eco-innovations by type of environmental impact - The role of regulatory push/pull, technology push and market pull, 2012; 
Costantini, Crespi, Martini, & Pennacchio, 2015; Guerzoni & Raiteri, 2015) with later work adding systemic instruments as 
well (Cantner, Graf, Herrmann, & Kalthaus, 2016). 
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Technology-push are policy instruments aiming to foster technological change in RE from the 
supply side (the innovators), while demand side policies aim to foster RE innovation by 
increasing the demand for it (Nemet, 2009). Examples of technology-push include government-
sponsored R&D and tax credits for companies to invest in R&D. Proponents of technology-
push assume that advances in scientific understanding determine the rate and direction of 
innovation. This has been criticised in terms of ignoring changes in economic conditions (e.g. 
prices) that affect the profitability of an innovation, as well as ignoring feedback within the 
stages of the innovation process (Nemet, 2009). In addition, the technology-push idea has been 
argued to be dependent on the exploitable “technological opportunities” and the “strength of 
science’’ in each sector (Rosenberg, 1974; Klevorick, et al., 1995; Nelson A. J., 2009). 
Moreover, firms need to invest in scientific knowledge in order to develop their “capacity to 
absorb”5 knowledge and leverage the opportunities that emerge from advanced technologies 
(Rosenberg, 1990; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Nemet, 2009). As a result, it has been argued that 
the instruments promoting technology-push are unlikely to be as effective as demand-pull ones 
and they should be considered a complement to demand-pull instruments (Nemet, 2009; 
Mazzucato, 2013). 
The demand-pull perspective sees demand as a driver of the rate and direction of innovation, 
arguing that demand factors increase the market for and improve the incentive of firms to 
innovate. Examples of demand-pull instruments include tax credits and rebates for consumers 
of new technologies and taxes on competing technologies. In the absence of interactions, one 
could expect demand-side instruments to exert a stronger influence on RE innovation than 
technology-push ones (Nelson A. J., 2009)6.  
                                                          
5 Absorptive capacity is defined as “an ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
commercial ends” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, p. 128), and it depends on prior related knowledge and diversity of background.  
6 Nelson (2009) in his study concluded that “the array of demand-side policies that stimulated several billions of dollars of 
investment in wind power projects does not appear to have had any positive effects on invention of valuable wind power 
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Smits et al., (2004) have argued that systemic instruments act at the level of the innovation 
system as a whole instead of specific parts of innovation systems. Their aim is to align the 
instrument mix to the needs of the actors involved. They aim to promote collaboration and 
knowledge transfer, like for example cooperative R&D programs, and clusters or infrastructure 
provisions (Smiths & Kuhlmann, 2004). Some previous scholars have seen systemic 
instruments as novel means that can stimulate technological innovation for sustainability 
(Smiths & Kuhlmann, 2004; Wieczorek & Hekkert, 2012). 
Based on the above, policy instruments were classified into the aforementioned three main 
categories, by systematically reviewing the descriptions of each individual policy, in 
accordance to the examples provided in the literature (see Rogge and Reichardt, (2016, d Groba 
& Breitschopf, 2013). This description of the policy was provided by the IEA database, and in 
the few cases where it was not, related literature was consulted – mainly the original policy 
documents. This resulted in 18 total categories, three instrument types, for each one of the six 
RETs. The following graphs summarise the findings on an aggregated annual level, per country 
and per RET. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
patents” (Nelson A. J., 2009, p. 705). This highlights the need to analyse both the aggregate and more specific RET-related 
relationships.  
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Figure 16: Instrument Types for Biomass Technologies (1990-2014) 
 
Source: Author 
Regarding the biomass technologies (Figure 16), a total of 297 technology-push instruments 
have been in force throughout the years examined, 437 demand-pulls, and 497 systemic ones. 
In biomass, demand-pull instruments dominate technology-push ones. This makes sense, as 
biomass is a first-generation RET, which means that advances in its technology are more 
difficult since its progress is really all about coal-substitution in solid-fuel fired power stations. 
As a result, governments try to increase the demand for it. For example in the EU biomass is 
considered a renewable energy source and it is used to extend the life-span of older coal-fired 
power stations (Pérez-Jeldres, et al., 2017). The practice is not without controversy for a range 
of broader sustainability issues related to biomass substitution in nature and harmful 
combustion emissions (The Guardian, 2017). 
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Figure 17: Instrument Types for Geothermal Technologies (1990-2014) 
 
Source: Author 
When it comes to geothermal technologies (Figure 17), a total of 269 technology-push 
instruments have been in force, 346 demand-pull, and 503 systemic ones. Similar to biomass, 
geothermal technologies are also first-generation ones, hence the prevalence of demand pull 
instruments.  
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Figure 18: Instrument Types for Hydro Technologies (1990-2014) 
 
Source: Author 
In hydro (Figure 18), demand-pull instruments are more than the technology-push ones (420 
as opposed to 491), for the reasons explained above. A total of 491 systemic instruments have 
been in force throughout these years.  
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Figure 19: Instrument Types for Ocean Technologies (1990-2014) 
 
Source: Author 
With ocean technologies being a third-generation RET, the story is different. Technology-push 
instruments and demand-pull ones are relatively equal (216 and 295 respectively). A total of 
471 systemic instruments were also identified being in force.  
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Figure 20: Instrument Types for Solar Technologies (1990-2014) 
 
Source: Author 
A total of 343 technology-push instruments were in force related to solar technologies (Figure 
20), 518 demand-pull ones, and 536 systemic. Much like the ocean technologies, combined 
solar are a third-generation technology, albeit not a new one. This implies that although some 
technological expertise did exist, new incentives towards its technological advancement should 
be made – hence the relatively high number of technology-push instruments. However, since 
the public is already aware of the existence of this technology, but not of its new advances, 
demand and awareness should be fostered which could explain the high number of demand-
pull and systemic instruments.  
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Figure 21: Instrument Types for Wind Technologies (1990-2014) 
 
Source: Author 
Finally, wind technologies (Figure 21) are a special case. This is because, despite being a RET, 
the technological advancements do not necessarily apply to that technology only, but over a 
spectrum of technologies, including but not limited to RETs (for example the rotors used). This 
was also the case with patent counts, with the highest activity and granted patents. One should 
therefore expect a relatively high number of technology-push instruments, but a higher number 
of demand-pull ones. Indeed, there were a total of 363 technology-push instruments in force 
between 1990 and 2014, and 506 demand-pull ones. A total of 556 systemic instruments were 
in force during the same years.  
3.2.1 Summary 
RE policy instruments can be an important determinant of RE innovation. Using the 
IEA/IRENA (2014) database, a total of 226 policy instruments related to RE, for the OECD 
member countries under examination, and for the years 1990-2014, were collected. These were 
then classified into multiple sub-categories, depending on the country, the targeting RE, and 
their type, as explained. This, along with the patent data presented in sub-chapter 1.1, allows 
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for an extensive panel database, which allows for the examination of a number of hypothesis, 
as presented and supported by theory in the chapters to follow.  
3.3 Econometric Model and Estimating Procedure  
In line with the aforementioned discussion and as already noted at the beginning of this chapter, 
an econometric model has been employed for testing for the hypotheses presented in the next 
chapters. As it can be seen in Figure 22, there are multiple methodologies depending on the 
purpose and data of the study. In the case of this thesis, the aim is to explore the relationship 
among variables, while data come in the form of measurements. As mentioned previously, 
apart from the main independent variable (or explanatory/predictor), additional chapter-
specific control variables are to be employed. This in return implies that “Multiple Regression” 
analysis should be used (Corston & Coleman, 2000). A regression analysis is a simple method 
aiming to investigate the functional relationships among variables. An equation is used to 
express the relationship between the dependent (or response) variable (DV) and one or more 
independent variables. In its linear form, the above equation becomes as follows (Chatterjee & 
Hadi, 2012), while “multiple” implies more than one independent variable:  
𝑦𝑦 = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑛𝑛1,𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥1,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑛𝑛2,𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥2,𝑡𝑡 + ⋯+ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀  
    𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖: Innovations related to RE technologies (INNOV) 
a: Intersection with y-axis at x=0 (constant) 
   x: REPs 
b: Coefficients of the independent variables  
   ε: Error term (residuals) 
   t: is a time subscript 
Specifically, the use of repeated observations on the same cross-section of a variable, such as 
individuals, households, cities, or as in this case countries over time constitutes panel data (or 
longitudinal data) (Wooldridge, 2001) and requires an appropriate technique for panel data 
analysis. Panel data differ from time-series data and cross-sectional data, in the sense that the 
Where,  
in the case of this 
dissertation: 
 
 
(3-1) 
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first observes only one entity over time (e.g. max temperature), and the latter multiple entities 
at one point in time. Panel data is therefore a combination of the two (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2012). 
What is more, the use of patent data as a proxy for innovation implies count variables, which 
is defined as a non-negative integer-valued random variable (Wooldridge, 2001).  
In addition, count data can be econometrically examined either by using the Poisson Regression 
Model (PRM), or the Negative Binomial Regression Model (NBRM) (Greene, 1994). These 
methods are used in order to estimate the number of occurrences of an event (Johnstone, 
Haščič, & Popp, 2008) which, in the case of this chapter the event count is the patenting 
activity, using the PRM can result in biased results when there are a lot of zero values as well 
as over-dispersion (i.e. when the variance exceeds the mean – the case in this thesis). This can 
be overcome by using the NBRM which introduces unobserved heterogeneity across the 
Poisson means (Costantini, et al., 2015). The main way however, to choose between the two, 
is by examining the variance and the mean of the dependent variable. The variance of the 
dependent variables was found in all cases to be larger than the mean (as shown in the Table 
12 below), implying over-dispersion.  
Table 11: Comparison of the Variance and Mean Values of the Basic Variables 
Variable Variance Mean 
 
 
Dependent: 
Patenting 
Activity 
Total 388,771.20 255.76 
Biomass 1,175.06 12.47 
Geothermal 173.59 4.58 
Hydro 9,323.34 40.46 
Ocean 1,180.72 14.35 
Solar 52,155.85 86.96 
Wind 74,133.95 96.93 
Independent: 
Policy 
Instruments 
Total 46.26 4.08 
Technology-Push 5.79 1.18 
Demand-Pull 10.95 1.64 
Systemic 6.65 1.26 
Source: Author 
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Based on the above, the NBRM method was employed, which allows the variance to be greater 
than the mean, while scaling the standard errors (Hilbe, 2011; Wooldridge, 2001). 
To sum up, in this chapter I have outlined the overall methodology employed in order to address 
my research question, and test the various theory-derived hypotheses in each subsequent 
chapter. I focused on data, econometric methods and the selection or creation, measurement 
and proxy employed for the dependent variable (RE innovation) and the independent ones (RE 
policy instruments). Discussion of control variables instead was left for each particular each 
specific chapter. In addition and for reasons provided in each chapter, there are small variations 
in the method and data in specific chapters, mostly motivated by comparability data 
considerations. Based on the above, the next chapter looks at the impact of European IP 
instruments and their interactions on RE innovation. 
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Figure 22: Selection of appropriate statistical procedure 
 
Source: Corston & Coleman, 2000; Arrows added by the Author
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Chapter 4 
Industrial policy for renewable energy: The innovation impact 
of European policy instruments and their interactions7 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the impact of renewable energy policies as well as three renewable 
energy policy instruments (demand-pull, technology-push and systemic) discussed in the 
previous chapter and their interactions, on renewable energy innovation. The chapter focuses 
on the 15 European Union countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom) for the period 1995–2014. These ‘old’ EU members are widely perceived as leaders 
in this area. In particular, the EU has aimed to develop EU-wide RE and innovation policies to 
deliver the requisite targets with some degree of success (EC COM 130 final/2, 2014). Looking 
at a wider set of countries for this case of the aggregate effects, would run the risk of diluting 
the potency of the results by including countries with smaller or minimal activity on RE and 
RE policy. The period chosen is between 1995 and 2014, because that was when the fourth 
enlargement of the EU that took place, which saw Austria, Finland, and Sweden (four leading 
countries on RE and RE policy) accede to the EU.  
Following a critical literature survey, a conceptual framework and hypotheses are developed, 
which are then tested by employing a unique and comprehensive data set. It is found that RE 
policies as a whole as well as demand-pull and technology-push instruments affect RE 
innovation positively and significantly. The impact of interactions between instruments on RE 
energy innovation is also positive and significant, but that in the case of specific pairs of 
                                                          
7 This chapter is based on the published paper by Pitelis, A. T. (2018), with the same title and DOI:  
10.1177/1024529418768491 on the Competition and Change Journal 
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instrument interaction the outcome is contingent on the specification used. Reasons are 
discussed for these findings, implications for public policy, as well as limitations and 
opportunities for further research. 
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the use of fossil fuels as a primary energy source 
has been associated with environmental and climate challenges (Stern, 2006). In this context, 
a transition to RETs is widely regarded by the international community and national 
governments to be essential in addressing environmental degradation (Jacobsson & Bergek, 
2003). It is widely held however that it is unlikely for the required transition to take place 
through market forces alone. The development, diffusion, and deployment of RETs is said to 
face a number of barriers (Beck & Martinot, 2004), and market failures (Wustenhagen, et al., 
2007; Arnold, et al., 2014). Such failures in turn can require suitable government intervention 
in support of RE sources (Mazzucato, 2013; Helm, 2010; Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1980).  
Public policy intervention can take place at the international, national or regional and province 
levels. International cooperation is often deemed as important to address problems of free 
riding, for example, countries not being diligent enough to foster requisite change for cost 
and/or competitiveness considerations (Bailey et al, 2015). Important public policy 
intervention at the inter-national level aimed to redirect innovative efforts towards RE has been 
initiated by the Kyoto Protocol (Rawlins & Allal, 2003). Such international agreements can 
function as a constraint or incentive for national policy makers to adopt RE policies to reach 
agreed targets. Key questions however, are not only whether and how national governments 
can foster RE innovation but also through what types of policies and policy instruments.  
If markets alone could solve the problem of transition to RE, no international agreements and 
no government intervention would be required. Additionally, if government policies are not 
effective, or they create more problems than they solve (Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1980), the case 
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for RE policies weakens. In order to address the above, a theory is needed as to why or when 
public policy can be necessary, effective and useful. Many scholars have argued that public 
policy is indeed required to solve market failures and that the relationship between markets and 
governments is complementary and symbiotic; hence, public sector intervention can be of the 
essence in fostering RE transitions even in the absence of pervasive market failures. In this 
argument governments can help create and indeed co-create markets (Pitelis and Teece, 2009), 
with the RE market being a key candidate and paradigm (Mazzucato, 2013; Weber & 
Rohracher, 2012; Rennings, 2000; Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1980). Others however, have argued 
that governments too fail and that such failures weaken the case for interventionist public 
policy (Helm, 2010). 
A large literature body has addressed the extent to which RE policy fosters RE by focusing on 
the impact of RE policy on RE innovation. On balance this has shown that public policy fosters 
RE innovation (Jaffe & Palmer, 1996; Johnstone, et al., 2008; Nesta, et al., 2014). However, 
for public authorities, it is also important to know which type of intervention (policies and 
policy instruments) work and how do these interact (Sorrell, 2003; Sijm & van Dril, 2003). 
These issues need to be further examined to help ascertain the role of the policy instrument mix 
and provide useful information for public policy makers (Landini, et al., 2017). 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the relationship between public policy towards RE and 
RE innovation, at the aggregate level of all RE policies and all RETs, as well as at the level of 
three types of RE policy instruments and their interactions. Despite recognition of the 
importance of RE policy, and the existence of different types of RE policy instruments and 
their interactions (Boots, et al., 2001; Gunningham & Sinclair, 1998; Simões, et al., 2005; 
Oikonomou & Jepma, 2008; del Rio, et al., 2013), there exists little agreement on a common 
classification of the instruments concerned and little empirical evidence in the context of a 
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common conceptual and empirical framework. These are important gaps that this chapter aims 
to contribute in filling.  
The conceptual framework employed in the RE literature often goes little further than the 
recognition of market failures as a basis for RE policy, while the link to industrial policy (IP) 
is rarely made. This is rather paradoxical as RE is an industry where substantial public policy 
intervention (industrial policy) takes place, as mentioned in Chapter 2. Moreover, despite the 
interest in industrial policy and strategy (Bailey, et al, 2015), there is very little empirical-
econometric work in support of its alleged positive effects. The focus on IP in the RE sector 
helps address this literature8 gap.  
In the next section, a conceptual framework is developed and three hypotheses are proposed. I 
then test these. First, I examined the impact of overall RE policies, followed the impact of three 
types of RE policy instruments and their interactions on RE innovation. For testing purposes, 
a unique database has been constructed by the author, as explained in Chapter 3 – with focus 
on EU15 and for a period of 19 years (1995-2014). The results support the three hypotheses. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: The next section focuses on the 
background, conceptual and empirical literature and proposed hypotheses of the chapter, 
section three describes the empirical protocol, section four presents and discusses the results, 
and section five provides concluding remarks, limitations and opportunities for further 
research.  
                                                          
8 It is appreciated that different RETs can have different effects; hence, focus on specific RETs is also important. 
These will be examined in the next chapter. Similar considerations apply for the role of sub-national units such 
as regions and cities. These are important (s. Coenen & Truffer, 2012; Hodson & Marvin, 2010), but are beyond 
the scope of this chapter, given the lack of data at such a disaggregated level. 
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4.2 Background to the Study and Hypotheses 
Background 
The basis for an EU wide RE policy was set by the White Paper for a Community Strategy and 
Action Plan Energy for the future: Renewable sources of energy, in which a number of targets 
were proposed, including doubling the use of RE in the EU gross energy consumption 
(European Commission, 1997). Others include the Renewable Electricity 
Directive 2001/77/EC (an EU Directive is a form of legislative act, directed to the member 
states, and can be used to establish common (social) policies). It is up to the individual member 
states to form their laws to achieve the goals proposed (European Union, 2016). While the 
directive mentioned is not a policy, but a framework, the 2009 Renewable Energy 
Directive 2009/28/EC, established an overall policy for the production and promotion of energy 
from renewable sources (CIEEM, 2015). It required all EU member states to ensure that 20% 
of their gross final energy consumption, and 10% for transportation comes from RE. A further 
20% reduction of green-house gas (GHG) emission (compared to 1990 levels) was also 
suggested. The objectives proposed in the directive were legally binding (as opposed to 
indicative targets) (European Commission, 2009), which sought a 21% of total electricity to be 
produced by renewable sources by 2010 (European Commission, 2001; Scarlat, et al., 2015), 
and the introduction of emissions trading in 2005. The last two were based on environmental 
regulation (Art. 175 (1) EC) (Langsdorf, 2011). According to the latest communication from 
the European Commission to the European Parliament, the EU is close to achieving its 2020 
target of 20% reduction (with half of the member states having already achieved their targets). 
A steady increase in the use of RE has been observed which if sustained, could allow the EU 
to achieve its target of increasing the use of RE by 20% (EC COM 130 final/2, 2014). 
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Most EU national governments have adopted specific RE policies and policy instruments in 
order to satisfy the aforementioned objectives. As recently noted by Christensen et al. (2016) 
further development of innovation policy should include addressing what the most relevant 
instruments are, and how these are most appropriately designed and combined. Among other 
challenges, this requires deciding on the right taxonomy (Martin, 2016). In the above context, 
it is interesting to see the extent to which IP in the RE sector is a success or not and in particular 
what types of IP instruments (and any interactions between them) are more effective. This adds 
to the literature in meaningful ways, not least by providing econometric evidence on the 
effectiveness of IP which is lacking (Bailey, et al, 2015).  
In order to answer this and develop the conceptual framework and hypotheses one should look 
into the extant theory and evidence on these matters. 
Literature and Hypotheses 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the discussion about the nature and importance of innovation dates 
at least as far back as in the work of Joseph A. Schumpeter (1934), who defined technological 
change as new combinations pertaining to the organisation of production and distinguished 
among three different aspects of innovation; invention, innovation, and diffusion (Schumpeter, 
1934). Since then, innovation has been widely seen as a desirable generator of positive 
knowledge spill-overs, which help engender systemic benefits. Like all ‘externalities’ (factors 
whose economic impact is not reflected on market prices), however, it is widely believed that 
innovation is subject to market failures, making it likely that in the absence of supporting 
measures and policies, it will be undersupplied (Stoneman, 1995; Varian, 2003; Mazzucato, 
2013). In addition to knowledge externalities in the research and innovation phases, RE 
innovations can engender positive externalities in the adoption and diffusion phases. The 
undersupply of RE innovations, can result from the lack of incentives for firms to invest in RE 
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innovation since the private return on R&D in RETs is lower than its social return. This helps 
justify the need for public policy intervention (Rennings, 2000; Oltra, 2008)9. Moreover, 
innovation does not automatically guarantee that the development it fosters will be sustainable. 
For sustainable development, innovations in RE are required as they may facilitate the 
transition to RE. This renders important the question of the determinants of innovation that 
help foster RE transitions and sustainable development.  
There are two main theoretical perspectives concerning the determinants of innovation at the 
national level. One is the economics-based endogenous growth theory of Romer (1990) and 
the other is Nelson’s (1993) research on national innovation systems (NIS), based on 
institutionalist economics (Furman, et al., 2002). Drawing on these, Furman et al. (2002) 
proposed that national innovative performance is determined by a broad set of complementary 
influences which include institutional and policy-related factors, industry and cluster-related 
factors and their interactions. Furman et al. (2002) argued that public policy has a significant 
role in shaping a country’s national innovative capacity (for a detailed review of the innovation 
determinants see Chapter 2). This view is shared by the NIS approach which moreover 
emphasises complementarities between different actors and institutions of innovation. In the 
IS framework, innovation is seen as a complicated evolutionary process “distributed in a 
system of multiple socio-economic agents whose behaviour and interactions are governed not 
only by market forces but to a greater extent by non-market institutions” (Bleda & del Río, 
2013, p. 1039)10. This view is complemented by arguments of scholars such as Arnold, et al. 
                                                          
9 Other barriers to transition to RE include market power, information asymmetries, externalities, network 
effects, and infrastructure (Arnold, et al., 2014). Beck and Martinot (2004), also identified a number of barriers 
related to the deployment and diffusion of RETs, including the absence of up-front financing and/or the 
necessary equipment (REN21, 2015) and grid access (Fouquet, 2013). Therefore, given pervasive barriers to RE 
innovation and other market failures, government intervention has been deemed necessary in addressing 
failures and in satisfying the targets set by said accords. 
10 Market and systemic failure-based rationales are sometimes seen as two contrasting theoretical positions. 
The former is often considered as a valid, albeit insufficient justification for policy intervention, which needs to 
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(2014), Mazzucato, (2013), Rennings (2000) and others who suggest that solving market 
failures with complementary public and private policies is a good way through which we can 
achieve the requisite transition to RE. A challenge however, is how exactly and what type of 
RE public policy and instruments can be more potent in helping achieve the targets 
(Wustenhagen, et al., 2007; Beck & Martinot, 2004; Sterk, et al., 2007). 
Moreover, while it is widely recognised that markets alone cannot guarantee requisite transition 
to RE, there is also an understanding that government policies too can lead to failures (Atkinson 
& Stiglitz, 1980). These result from errors in targeting and implementation, lobbying by 
interest groups, and rent seeking (the pursuit of self-interest that can lead to corruption) of 
government officials, (Helm, 2010; Jaffe, et al., 2005; Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1980). Despite 
acknowledging government failures, there seems to be a degree of consensus in the literature 
that at the aggregate level RE policies will have a positive effect on RE innovation (Lanjouw 
& Mody, 1996; Brunnermeier & Cohen, 2003; Popp, 2006; De Vries & Withagen, 2005; 
Wagner, 2007; Dechezleprêtre & Glachant, 2014; Böhringer, et al., 2014). This however is a 
matter for empirical investigation and this is the aim in the rest of this chapter. 11.  
An important advantage of econometric investigation is that it helps gauge the extent to which 
RE policies have a positive and significant effect on RE innovation, after having controlled for 
other determinants. Hence it is mostly through an econometric investigation that the added 
value of REPs, or their “additionality”, namely “the difference between the presumed 
                                                          
be complemented by arguments from the systemic failure perspective. The latter is sometimes considered a 
more general approach than the market failure one, in that it recognises that there exist government and wider 
systemic failures that need to be accounted for (Bleda & del Río, 2013). In this context the concept of 
“additionality” becomes important (see below).  
11 While aggregate empirical analysis cannot show the exact causes of government failures, it helps find if on 
balance such failures are offset by the advantages of government intervention in solving market failures and 
“crowding in” (being complementary to) as opposed to “crowding out” (substituting for) private investments in 
RETs (Mazzucato, 2013).  
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underinvestment in RTD by firms and the actual joint investment by firms and public agencies 
in RTD prompted by the public programmes” (Luukkonen, 2000, p. 712) can be assessed. The 
aforementioned discussion is summarised in a schematic way in Figure 23. In brief the Figure 
suggests that in the context of pervasive market failures, international agreements such as the 
Kyoto Protocol operate as a constraint and incentive for governments to adopt RE policies and 
RE instruments (government intervention) aimed at fostering RE innovation. These are in 
addition to other reasons governments may have to adopt RE policies; thus, innovation in RE 
becomes the dependent variable and RE policy instruments become the main independent 
variables. RE innovation is also affected by various other factors which are used as control 
variables. 
The above discussion leads to formulation of the first hypothesis in the following way. 
Hypothesis 1: RE policy has a positive and significant effect on RE innovation. 
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Figure 23: Background to the study and conceptual framework schematic 
 
 Source: Author
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The basis of the second hypothesis lies in the fact that public authorities can use a number of 
different instruments in order to promote RE. However, there is not a uniform classification of 
instruments types. This is problematic in that it renders findings from different studies that use 
different classifications hard to compare12. Drawing on earlier work on innovation, (see for 
example Rosenberg, 1974, Nelson, 2009, and Nemet, 2009), Rogge & Reichardt (2016) have 
argued for a consistent terminology and went on to propose that in terms of purpose served, 
three types of instruments, namely technology-push, demand-pull, and systemic, are in line 
with extant theory and can help with comparability (Rogge & Reichardt, 2016) (these are 
explained in detail in Chapter 3).  
Hence, the second hypothesis takes the following form. 
Hypothesis 2: Technology-push and demand-pull policy instruments have a positive and 
significant effect on RE innovation. 
Furthermore, RE policy instruments may interact with each other, as noted before. The role of 
an interaction variable is akin to that of moderating variables, which are deemed important 
when the impact of an independent variable on the dependent one is based on a third variable, 
known as the moderator; and the fit between the independent variable and the moderator is 
                                                          
12 For example, Johnstone et al. (2008), as well as Nesta et al. (2014) distinguished instruments in R&D; 
investment incentives; tax incentives; tariff incentives; voluntary programs; obligations; and, tradable 
certificates (Johnstone, et al., 2008; Nesta, et al., 2014). Marques et al. (2013), classified instruments in terms of 
education and outreach, financial incentives - subsidies, policy processes, public investment, R&D, regulatory, 
tradable permits, and voluntary agreements (Marques & Fuinhas, 2012). Mabee and Saddler (2007), identified 
five groups, being feed-in tariffs, green certificates, tendering systems, and tax and investment incentives 
(Mabee & Saddler, 2007). Kim et al., (2015), distinguished instruments in public R&D, tariff incentives, 
renewables obligation, environmental taxes, and public investment (Kim K. & Kim, 2015). Few studies have 
distinguished among demand-pull and technology-push (Horbach, et al., 2012; Costantini, et al., 2015; Guerzoni 
& Raiteri, 2015) with later work adding systemic instruments as well (Cantner, et al., 2016). 
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what determines the dependent one (Venkatraman, 1989)13. In the case of policy instruments, 
their interactions have been argued to be potentially important in that there may exist synergies, 
overlaps or clashes between instruments (Michelsen, 2005; Mundaca & Neij, 2010; Sorrell, 
2003; Rogge & Reichardt, 2016). 
The exact type and significance of interactions can depend on numerous factors that cannot be 
known in advance. These include context, design and technology type (s. Costantini, et al., 
2015; Cantner, et al., 2016), as well as different lag structures. Cantner et al. (2016), for 
example identified differences between different examined RETs14.  
In one of the first studies conducted by Gunningham and Sinclair (1998), the authors concluded 
that the combination between different regulatory instrument combinations was important and 
that different combinations had different effects (Gunningham & Sinclair, 1998). 
This leads to the third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: The interaction between demand-pull, and technology-push policies on the one 
hand and systemic policies on the other, have a positive and significant effect on RE 
innovation. 
                                                          
13 In a formal representation, the relationship between two or more variables X and Y, is a function of the level 
of Z, i.e. Y=f(X, Z, X∙Z) where in this case, Y = RE innovation, X = RE policy instrument types, and Z = the contextual 
variable that fits with the different instrument types (Venkatraman, 1989). In essence, a moderator, is the 
interaction effect of the two variables. 
14 Technology-push and systemic instruments seemed to work better in wind power, while demand-pull 
instruments worked better in the case of photovoltaics. Systemic instruments interactions increased interaction-
especially in the wind power, and were found to be complementary to demand-pull in fostering collaboration 
(Cantner, et al., 2016). It should be noted, however, that Cantner, et al. (2016) focused on RE inventor networks 
(as opposed to RE innovation as in this chapter), making their results not directly comparable those of this 
chapter.  
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Empirical Evidence  
Below the existing empirical evidence in terms of two major categories is summarised: first 
studies on the overall impact of REPs and REP instruments on total RE innovation as well as 
on different RETs; and second, studies that looked into interactions between REP instruments. 
In the first category two classifications are made, between general studies, those focusing on 
specific RETs and those that examine the role of different institutional settings.  
Evidence on the Impact of REPs on RE Innovation  
Johnstone et al. (2008) analysed a panel of 25 countries over the period of 1978-2003. By 
employing a Poisson regression analysis and with patent counts as their dependent and the RE 
policies as their independent variable, the authors concluded that RE policy plays a significant 
role in determining patent applications, and also that different types of policy instruments are 
effective for different RE sources (Johnstone, et al., 2008). Marques and Fuinhas, (2012) 
examined the extent to which public policies towards RE are effective, using Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors estimator (PCSE) over the whole spectrum of RE technologies. They used the 
contribution of renewables to total energy supply as their dependent variable, and aggregated 
and disaggregated RE policies as their independent (Marques & Fuinhas, 2012). They 
concluded that policies of incentives/subsidies (incl. feed-in tariffs) (demand-pull instruments) 
and policy processes (systemic instruments) are significant drivers of improved RE use.  
In terms of the impact of REPs on specific RETs, Lee and Lee (2013) also supported the idea 
that REPs have a positive effect on RE innovation, by having explored patterns of innovation 
and of evolution in energy technologies (incl. solar, photovoltaic, biomass, wind, tidal (ocean), 
and geothermal), focusing in particular on similarities and differences across technologies. 
They employed two different techniques (static portfolio and dynamic portfolio analysis) and 
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patent data over the period 1991-2010, and concluded that customised policies are likely to be 
required for each technology (Lee & Lee, 2013). 
Hoppmann et al. (2013), conducted comparative case studies to a sample of nine firms globally, 
producing solar photovoltaic modules, complemented by in-depth interviews with sixteen top 
photovoltaic industry experts. They concluded that demand-pull policies have a greater impact 
when they target more mature technologies (Hoppmann, et al., 2013). Dechezleprêtre et al. 
(2014), examined the influence of both domestic and foreign REPs on innovation activity in 
wind power using patent data from 1995 to 2005 for OECD countries. They distinguished 
between demand-pull policies and technology-push policies and concluded that public R&D 
expenditures (technology-push instruments) only affect domestic inventors, contrary to 
demand-pull ones.  
Costantini et al. (2015) explored the differentiated impact of demand-pull and technology-push 
instruments in shaping technological patterns in the biofuels sector. Their empirical analysis 
was based on a database containing patents in the field of biofuels as the dependent variable, 
for 32 countries (incl. some EU) using a negative binomial regression analysis (NBR). They 
concluded that demand-pull and technology-push factors are important drivers of innovation 
in the biofuels sector. In addition, technology exploitation activities in first generation 
technologies were mainly driven by quantity and price-based demand-pull policies. In contrast, 
the pace of technology exploration efforts in advanced generation biofuels was shown to react 
positively to price based demand-pull incentives and to technology-push policy (Costantini, et 
al., 2015).  
In the third sub-category, Nesta, et al. (2014), examined the effect of various RE policies on 
innovation for different levels of competition. In line with Johnstone et al. (2008) the authors 
employed a Poisson regression analysis, with patent data as the dependent variable and the RE 
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Policy Index (sum of all implemented policies - as in Johnstone et al. (2008) - expressed as 
dummies), and the Product Market Regulation Index - PMR index for electricity and gas as the 
independent variable. They found that RE policies are more effective in forecasting green 
innovation in countries with deregulated energy markets and that public support for RE is 
crucial only for the generation of high-quality green patents while competition enhances the 
production of green patents regardless of their quality (Nesta, et al., 2014).  
Evidence on the Role of Interactions  
In 2003, the INTERACT project explored the relationships between the EU ETS and other 
climate policy instruments. A basic distinction in this study was the internal and external 
interaction. The former referred to two or more climate policy instruments while the latter to a 
climate and a non-climate policy instrument (environmental or energy policy). A typical 
example is an emission trading scheme and a carbon tax that affects the same participants, 
while for the second case an emissions trading scheme that targets electricity generators and 
an energy tax at the point of consumption, irrespective of the carbon content of the energy used 
(Sorrell, 2003; Sijm, 2003). Furthermore, an important division in the same study at the level 
of governance was horizontal and vertical interaction. Horizontal referred to the same level of 
governance (e.g., EU ETS and EU labelling for energy efficiency appliances) while vertical to 
different levels (e.g., RE Certificate System (RECS) with TGC in one-member state). Other 
types of policy interactions distinguished in this study were operational, sequencing and trading 
(Sorrell, 2003).  
In a similar vein, Oikonomou (2004) in the EU SAVE project ‘‘White and Green’’, analysed 
the issue of compatibility between different policy types and types of interactions. Simões et 
al. (2005), assessed the overlap between energy and environmental policy instruments in place 
among electricity systems. She concluded that a tangled web of policies exists, which in some 
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cases pushes towards complementary objectives but that most of the times these are 
antagonistic. The most relevant conflicts are between hidden subsidies provided to energy 
supply infrastructures and environmental command-and-control regulation. Although there are 
policy instruments acting both on the supply and the demand side, this was found not to foster 
the integration of supply and demand-side policy instruments (Simões, et al., 2005).  
Later studies have focused mainly on the interactions of various policy instruments with the 
EU-ETS (OECD, 2011a; Kautto, et al., 2012), on interactions between climate change and 
other environmental policies and the tax (fiscal) system (Goulder, 2013) or like in del Rio’s 
(2014) study, on the theoretical and methodological framework for assessing the success of 
complex policy mixes. This was in order to identify conflicts between individual instruments 
and other elements within those mixes. Del Rio (2014) concluded that instruments may lead to 
conflicts, complementarities or synergies with regards to one criterion when the addition of 
one instrument to another leads to reductions, adding or magnifying the impact of the 
combination of both instruments (del Rio, 2014). 
Guerzoni et al. (2015), concluded that supply-side subsidies (technology-push instruments) are 
not as effective as suggested in the previous literature when controlling for the interaction with 
other policies and also that innovative public procurement (a demand-pull instrument) seem to 
be more effective that other tools. Overall, technology policies were found to exert the highest 
impact when they interacted with other policies (Guerzoni & Raiteri, 2015).  
Assessment of Evidence  
Overall, and with the exception of Cantner et al. (2016) and Guerzoni et al. (2015), studies on 
instrument interactions have mainly focused on qualitative methods, by focusing on: specific 
aspects of instruments such as the scope, operations, implementation, timing (s. Sorrell, 2003), 
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mechanism, target stakeholder (s. Simoes, 2005) and objective (Sorrell, 2003; Simoes, 2005); 
on specific RETs (s. Kautto et al, 2011 who focused on biomass. Moreover, they have done so 
by employing mostly qualitative methodologies, including possible scenarios (Boots et al., 
2001; Sijm, 2001) and optimal designs (best-case scenarios) (Boots et al., 2001), case studies 
(s. Sorrell, 2003), literature reviews (Oikonomou, 2008; Goulder, 2013) and other (Kautto et 
al, 2011 (literature review and interviews); Boots, 2003 (conclusions reached by discussion). 
This renders further econometric work on this topic very important. 
In addition to the limited empirical evidence on this matter, existing studies have focused on 
different types of RE technologies, such as for example Johnstone et al. (2008) and Nesta et al. 
(2014) on Biomass, Geothermal, Ocean, Solar, Waste-to-energy, and Wind; Hoppmann et al. 
(2013) on PV modules; and Dechezleprêtre et al. (2014) on wind energy. Furthermore, there is 
lack of consistency in the RE policy instruments examined; therefore, making the comparison 
of results difficult. For public authorities, it is important to know which types of instruments 
are more effective in achieving the required targets, both in general and with regards to 
fostering particular types of technologies and with particulate types of instruments. 
In conclusion, there are various literature gaps and limitations that pertain mostly to the 
underlying theory (particularly that of industrial policy), the limited econometric evidence, and 
the comparability between the results.  
4.3 Description of the empirical protocol and results 
Empirical method, Sample, and Estimated equation  
In order to test the three hypotheses econometrically, data on the EU15 Member States were 
used in the time-span between 1995 and 2014. Five different models were employed, as 
follows:  
Page | 102  
 
In Model 1 the first hypothesis is examined, i.e. the effects of REP instruments at the aggregate 
level, on the overall RE innovation activity, using the sum of all RE patent counts as the DV, 
and sum of all instrument types as the Independent Variable (IV). A standard model setting 
was considered, in the following form:  
�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡=  𝛽𝛽1 ��𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛.
𝑡𝑡
� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3�𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽4�𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�  + 𝛽𝛽5�𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
Where, i = values per country and t = year (1995, …, 2014). 
In Model 2 the effects of the three types of RE policy instruments on RE innovation at the 
aggregate level (second hypothesis) is examined, i.e. sum of all RE patent counts as the DV, 
and sum of each type of instrument as the IV. A standard model setting is again considered, in 
the following form:  
�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡=  𝛽𝛽1�𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3�𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽4�𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽5�𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽6�𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽7�𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
Where, i = values per country and t = year (1995, …, 2014). 
In Model 3 the interaction terms15 are introduced in order to assess their effects (third 
hypothesis). The sum of all RE patent counts is used as the DV, and REP instruments 
interaction as the IV. Again, a standard model setting was considered, in the following form:  
                                                          
15 As noted by scholars such as Schoonhoven (1981) and Venkatraman (1989), when there is a relationship 
between two variables (in this case these are the policy instruments types) that can predict a third one, the role 
of the interaction between the two variables should be considered 
(4-1) 
(4-2) 
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�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡=   𝛽𝛽1�𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽3�𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+  𝛽𝛽4�𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽5�𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽6�𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽7�𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸𝑦𝑦 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽8�𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡16 
Where, i = values per country and t = year (1995, …, 2014). 
Model 4, is a variation of Model 3, its form therefore will be the addition of Eq. (2) and Eq. 
(3). It examines the effect of the aforementioned interaction terms alongside their component 
variables (the three types of RE policy instruments) on RE innovation. A standard model setting 
was again considered, where the sum of all RE patents is used as the DV, and the sum of each 
type of instrument as well as the REP instruments interactions as the IV.  
Given some differences in the results when instrument interactions were examined in isolation, 
versus alongside their components, Model 4 was rerun with the first lag of all independent 
variables (Model 5). The aim here was to test for the extent to which any observed differences 
between the two variants of Model 4 could be attributable to different lag structures.  
As mentioned in the third chapter, the use of data for various countries over various years 
implies the need for analysing panel data; while the use of patent data as a proxy for innovation 
implies count variables.  
The following sections describe the various variables employed in the estimations, a summary 
of which can be found in Table 13. The descriptive statistics of all main variables are reported 
in Table 14.  
 
                                                          
16 The asterisk symbol (*) denotes interaction variables. 
(4-3) 
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Dependent Variable: RE Innovation 
As mentioned in the methodology chapter, patent data from the latest (2016) online free version 
of European Worldwide Patent Statistical Office (EPO) database (PATSTAT, 2016) were 
collected, using the International Patent Classification (IPC) system for Biomass, Geothermal, 
Hydro, Ocean, Solar, and Wind. PCT patent applications in the international phase were 
considered, and filed directly at the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO). The patents were assigned to a country on the basis of the address of the 
inventor. The date of the patent is the earliest priority date. 
Overall, a total of 102,830 patent counts were used, with most coming from Germany, followed 
by Denmark and the United Kingdom, as shown in Figure 24, below. Figure 25, shows the 
annual trend of the patenting activity. As compared to the overall EU RE patenting activity 
(EU27 for the same years – 1995-2014), the aforementioned member states account for 98.3%, 
while for the same time-span and for the overall OECD members, EU15 accounts for 49.9%. 
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Table 12: Summary of Variables and Variables’ abbreviations (in brackets) 
Name Definition Unit Notes Variable Source 
Patents (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛) Total patent counts filed per country per year, filed under the PCT Count Values Data were collected using International Patent 
Classification, for Bioenergy; 
Geothermal; 
Hydroelectricity; Ocean 
Energy; Solar Energy; Wind 
Energy 
Dependent PATSTAT (2016) (European 
Patent Office) 
Policy Instruments (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛;  𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ, 
𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) The IEA/IRENA Global Renewable Energy Policies and Measures Database provides information on 
policies and measures taken or 
planned to encourage the uptake of 
renewable energy in all IEA and 
IRENA Member countries and 
signatories. 
Count 
Values 
OECD Countries; All Policy 
Types; All RE Policy Target; 
Only Electricity Sector; 
Effective between 1974-
2015; All Jurisdictions; All 
Policy Statuses; Large and 
Small Plant Sizes 
Independent IEA/IRENA (2014) Joint 
Policies and Measures 
Database 
Electricity Consumption (𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐) The IEA Electricity Information: OECD Electricity and Heat Supply 
and Consumption (GWh, TJ) 
database provides electricity and 
heat balance data for 35 OECD 
countries  
TWh Data was collected for EU15 
member states. Both 
observed and calculated 
balances were collected and 
averaged. 
Control OECD (2016) 
Electricity Prices (𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐) End-use energy prices in US dollars converted using average exchange 
rates per energy unit (MWh), by 
sector (industry, households and 
electricity generation). 
Thousand 
US$ 
(2015 
constant 
prices) 
Data refers to electricity 
prices. Prices for electricity 
generation were not 
available, therefore industry 
and households’ prices 
(US$/MWh) were averaged. 
These were then divided by 
1000000 to get them in 
Control IEA Energy Prices and 
Taxes: End-use energy 
prices and taxes in US 
dollars, 1978-2016 
Preliminary Edition 
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Name Definition Unit Notes Variable Source 
million US$, and divided by 
the 2015 GDP deflator.  
Total Patents (𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) Total patent application counts across all technology fields 
(estimated total patents for latest 
years), filed under the PCT 
Count 
Values 
Data were available for both 
applicants' and inventors' 
country of residence - mean 
values of both were taken 
Control OECD (2016) 
Kyoto Protocol (𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜) The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement linked to 
the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 
which commits its Parties by setting 
internationally binding emission 
reduction targets. The Kyoto 
Protocol was adopted in Kyoto, 
Japan, in 1997 and entered into 
force in 2005.  
Dummy 0 for all years prior to 2005; 
1 for the following ones 
Control Author 
GDP Deflator The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio 
of GDP in current local currency to 
GDP in constant local currency. The 
base year varies by country. 
Ratio 
(current 
to 
constant 
price 
GDP) 
Values were divided by 100.  
2015 was my selected base 
year  
Construction 
Indicator 
World Bank National 
Accounts data, and OECD 
National Accounts data 
files (2016) 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
Page | 107  
 
Table 13: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
Figure 24: Patenting Activity per EU15 Country (1995-2014) 
 
Source: Author 
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Patenting Activity per EU15 Country (1995-2014)
Variable Name Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
RE Patents  (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛) 300 324.77 657.61 0 4547 
RE Policies (all) (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛) 300 5.48 6.56 0 30 
Tech. Push Policy 
Instruments (𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ) 300 1.22 1.84 0 7 
Dem. Pull Policy 
Instruments (𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) 300 2.47 3.41 0 14 
Systemic Policy 
Instruments (𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) 300 1.79 2.88 0 14 
Kyoto Dummy (𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜) 300 0.5 0.5 0 1 
Electricity Prices (𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐) 300 0.0001225 0.0000613 0 0.0002999 
Electricity Consumption (𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐) 300 159782.9 157050.9 4905 547284 
Total Patents  (𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) 300 2656.98 3817.84 6.24 18611.81 
Source: Author 
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Figure 25: Total Patenting Activity for EU15 per Year 
 
Source: Author 
Independent Variable: RE policies and RE Policy Instruments 
For the purpose of this chapter, data on RE policies were used from the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) database for all EU members for the years 1995-2014, as explained in Chapter 
3, and classified into technology-push, demand-pull, and systemic.  
Control Variables 
Inducing green innovation is not only a matter of public policies. There is, therefore, need to 
control for factors other than policies, which may foster innovation. In line with the literature, 
it is expected that the price of electricity would amplify the incentives for innovation in 
renewable energy (Johnstone, et al., 2008). It is assumed that these prices are exogenous; given 
that RE sources have in the past and up until recently contributed fairly small shares towards 
the overall electricity production (World Bank, 2010) (although many countries have now 
reached their targets e.g. Denmark and Germany). Values per year and per country for end-use 
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electricity prices in US dollars were obtained from the IEA Energy Prices and Taxes database. 
These were converted in constant 2015 US$ using average exchange rates per energy unit 
(MWh), by sector (industry, households and electricity generation). 
Additionally, the total number of patent applications across the whole spectrum of 
technological areas per year, per country filed in the PCT was also included as a control 
variable. This variable accounts for the overall propensity of a country to innovate, while taking 
into consideration only patents filed in the PCT (Johnstone, et al., 2008; Nesta, et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, returns on innovation are affected by the potential market for this innovation. In 
the case of RE this is best reflected in trends for electricity consumption. A large growing 
market for electricity should increase incentives to innovate with respect to renewable energy 
technologies. Data on household and industry sector electricity consumption was obtained from 
the IEA/OECD Database, in GWh. 
Finally, the models were augmented by including a dummy variable set to unify for years after 
the Kyoto protocol came into force in 2005, to capture changes in expectation on both the 
context for future policy and the global market size for renewable energy (Nesta, et al., 2014). 
Year dummies were also included in order to reduce the impact of any aggregate trends. 
Significant coefficients show the importance of such effects in particular years, and it is 
sometimes suggested that even in the case of non-significance, the direction of the relationship 
can be important (Grotenhuis & Thijs, 2015). In Model 5, one year lags of all (non - dummy) 
independent variables were used to check for any specific lagged effects, as opposed to using 
an all-inclusive LDV (s. Blundell, et al., 1995). 
4.4 Empirical results and discussion 
The following table (Table 15) summarises the main results of the NBRM in which the main 
variables of interest for the first three Models (as explained in the previous section) are 
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presented. Regarding the first Model, RE innovation is found to be positively and significantly 
affected by RE policy. This supports the first Hypothesis.  
Model 2 shows that demand-pull and technology-push instruments have a positive and 
significant effect on RE innovation. The findings on demand-pull are similar to those of the 
extant literature, such as Marques et al. (2012), Wangler (2013), Peters et al. (2012) and partly 
Johnstone et al. (2010) (only for the case of tradable certificates). Constantini, et al. (2015) also 
found that demand-pull policies are dominant (in the biofuels sector). Systemic instruments 
were found to be insignificant when examined on their own. This lack of significance of 
systemic instruments when acting in isolation is explicable in terms of the argument that 
systemic policy instruments are aimed to support and align the instrument mix, i.e. support the 
other instruments, demand-pull and/or technology-push (Smiths & Kuhlmann, 2004); hence, 
the results are partly in line with what was expected. 
Regarding the interaction terms in Model 3, when examined in isolation it was found that 
technology-push and demand-pull instruments interact positively with systemic ones. This is 
in line with the literature, as systemic instruments are meant to act in support for other 
instruments. Cantner et al. (2016), have also found that systemic instruments interact positively 
with demand-pull (Cantner, et al., 2016). The interaction between demand-pull and technology-
push was found to be negative. This supports the idea that demand-pull and technology-push 
policies can have different effects and targets and the two may well be incompatible. 
Finally, it can be seen that the interaction between all three instruments has a negative and 
significant effect on RE innovation. Howlett et al. (2013) pointed out that instruments in a mix 
are consistent when they reinforce each other, and inconsistent when they work against each 
other in achieving a policy target (Howlett & Rayner, 2013; Kern & Howlett, 2009). Therefore, 
a negative interaction among policy instruments could signify an inconsistent mix (Sorrell, 
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2003). Indeed, and as mentioned earlier, while the EU has aimed at developing EU-wide RE 
and innovation policies, most EU governments, have adopted nation-specific RE policies and 
instruments, providing an extra source of potential inconsistency of the instrument mix. 
Michalena and Hills (2012) who undertook a meta-analysis of the international scientific 
literature of the European RE generation found a total 54 challenges related to the 
implementation of RE technologies on a local basis. The authors concluded that the RE policies 
in the EU partially fail as they are limited in their scope in dealing with RE on a local basis 
(Michalena & Hills, 2012); thus, being inconsistent with their targets. Fouquet (2013), argued 
that policies aimed at the 2020 target appear to be successful but, there remain challenges like 
grid access, and that some member states are reconsidering their policies, which prejudice the 
ability of the EU to meet this target (Fouquet, 2013). 
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Table 14: Estimated coefficients of the NBRM for the first four models 
Dependent Variable Model 1: 
Total RE 
Patents 
Model 1: 
Total RE 
Patents (after 
General to 
Specific) 
Model 2: 
Total RE 
Patents 
Model 2: 
Total RE 
Patents (after 
General to 
Specific) 
Model 3: 
Total RE 
Patents 
Model 3: 
Total RE 
Patents (after 
General to 
Specific) 
Model 4: 
Total RE 
Patents 
Model 4: 
Total RE 
Patents (after 
General to 
Specific) 
Ex
pl
an
at
or
y 
Va
ria
bl
es
 Total REP 
Instruments 
0.0163286*** 
(0.000) 
0.0166181*** 
(0.000) 
- - - - - - 
Technology-
push 
- - 0.0222055† 
(0.058) 
0.0306851† 
(0.070) 
- - 0.1521989*** 
(0.000) 
0.1524736*** 
(0.000) 
Demand-pull - - 0.0171185 
(0.134) 
0.0223764* 
(0.027) 
- - 0.0683901*** 
(0.000) 
0.0685266*** 
(0.000) 
Systemic - - 0.0080978 
(0.461) 
- - - 0.0495038* 
(0.030) 
0.0498035* 
(0.026) 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n 
Va
ria
bl
es
 
Technology-
push * 
Demand-pull 
- - - - 0.0028954 
(0.402) 
- -0.022023*** 
(0.000) 
-0.022088*** 
(0.000) 
Technology-
push * 
Systemic 
- - - - 0.0129876* 
(0.027) 
0.0124924* 
(0.025) 
-0.0196405* 
(0.024) 
-0.0197401* 
(0.022) 
Demand-pull 
* Systemic 
- - - - 0.0022378† 
(0.067) 
0.0022078† 
(0.063) 
-0.0066984** 
(0.009) 
-0.0067267** 
(0.008) 
Technology-
push * 
Demand-pull 
* Systemic 
- - - - -0.0015703* 
(0.025) 
-0.0012859* 
(0.028) 
0.0026381** 
(0.006) 
0.0026496** 
(0.005) 
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Dependent Variable Model 1: 
Total RE 
Patents 
Model 1: 
Total RE 
Patents (after 
General to 
Specific) 
Model 2: 
Total RE 
Patents 
Model 2: 
Total RE 
Patents (after 
General to 
Specific) 
Model 3: 
Total RE 
Patents 
Model 3: 
Total RE 
Patents (after 
General to 
Specific) 
Model 4: 
Total RE 
Patents 
Model 4: 
Total RE 
Patents (after 
General to 
Specific) 
Co
nt
ro
l V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Electricity 
Consumption  
0.0074748*** 
(0.000) 
0.0073985*** 
(0.000) 
0.0075412*** 
(0.000) 
0.0075314*** 
(0.000) 
0.0074235*** 
(0.000) 
0.0072967*** 
(0.000) 
0.0073867*** 
(0.000) 
0.0073816*** 
(0.000) 
Electricity 
Prices  
-0.4859528 
(0.434) 
- -0.6658229 
(0.299) 
- -0.5392625 
(0.404) 
 -0.0416782 
(0.948) 
 
 Total Patent 
Applications  
-0.000071*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000074*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000071*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000077*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000074*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000073*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000037* 
(0.020) 
-0.000038* 
(0.020) 
Kyoto 
Dummy 
0.129225 
(0.380) 
- 0.1562084 
(0.292) 
- 0.1832747 
(0.219) 
 0.0214215 
(0.877) 
 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; †p<0.1 
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Table 15: Estimated coefficients of the NBRM for Model 5 
Dependent Variable Model 5: Total 
RE Patents 
Model 5: Total 
RE Patents 
(after General 
to Specific) 
Ex
pl
an
at
or
y 
Va
ria
bl
es
 Total REP Instruments - - 
Technology-push 0.0994381* 
(0.022) 
0.0856244*** 
(0.000) 
Demand-pull -0.0013922 
(0.961) 
- 
Systemic 0.0185584 
(0.576) 
- 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n 
Va
ria
bl
es
 
Technology-push * Demand-pull -0.0022102 
(0.693) 
- 
Technology-push * Systemic -0.0079169 
(0.488) 
- 
Demand-pull * Systemic 0.0021029 
(0.473) 
- 
Technology-push * Demand-pull * Systemic 0.0002364 
(0.856) 
- 
Co
nt
ro
l V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Electricity Consumption  0.0099927*** 
(0.000) 
0.0061606*** 
(0.000) 
Electricity Prices  -0.5532112 
(0.514) 
- 
 Total Patent Applications  -0.00000503 
(0.919) 
- 
Kyoto Dummy -0.0254068 
(0.872) 
- 
Lagged Technology-push  -0.0009425 
(0.983) 
- 
Lagged Demand-pull 0.0799585** 
(0.004) 
0.0580948*** 
(0.000) 
Lagged Systemic 0.0314545 
(0.386) 
- 
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Dependent Variable Model 5: Total 
RE Patents 
Model 5: Total 
RE Patents 
(after General 
to Specific) 
Lagged Technology-push * Demand-pull -0.0154224† 
(0.052) 
-0.012961*** 
(0.000) 
Lagged Technology-push * Systemic 0.0093841 
(0.461) 
- 
Lagged Demand-pull * Systemic -0.0100225 
(0.027) 
- 
Lagged Technology-push * Demand-pull * Systemic 0.0003102 
(0.828) 
- 
Lagged Energy Prices 1.043982 
(0.294) 
- 
Lagged Electricity Consumption -0.0025104 
(0.322) 
- 
Lagged Total Patents -0.000028 
(0.372) 
- 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; †p<0.1 
 
In Model 4 all interactions alongside their individual components have been included. The 
results are interesting in that now all three instruments are positive and significant and only the 
interaction of all three instruments is positive and significant. The pairs of the three interactions 
instead are negative and significant. This could suggest that when components as well as 
interactions are included, the positive effects are fully captured by the components (and in this 
case by the interaction of all three components). One potential source of incompatibility that 
could explain the findings could involve different lag structures of the IVs. For this reason, 
Model 4 was rerun with all IVs lagged by one period (Model 5). The results are interesting 
(Table 16) in that now only technology-push is significant and positive at its level, while the 
demand-pull ones are positive when lagged by one period. The interaction between the two is 
negative as in Model 3. These findings suggest that lag effects can be a source of 
incompatibility between the various instruments and their interactions. In all models a general 
to specific specification was run that involved removing gradually the least significant 
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variables in order to identify the model preferred by the data (Pesaran, 1974; Campos, Ericsson, 
& Hendry, 2005).  
Quantitatively it was found that technology-push policies are slightly larger in all cases than 
demand-pull ones which in turn are larger than systemic, which in turn are larger than the 
effects of the interactions. In more detail, from Model 1, it can be seen that the expected number 
of RE Patents will increase by 1.7% (this is derived from the exponential of the constant, i.e. 
exp(0.0166181) when REP instrument also increase. From Model 2 however, it can be seen 
that not all instruments are equally potent with systemic instruments having no effect on RE 
patenting activity, while technology-push will increase RE patenting activity by 3.1%, and 
demand-pull instruments, by 2.3%. Model 3 indicates that the effect of the technology-push 
instruments increases by when they interact with the systemic instruments, and demand-pull 
instruments increase by 0.2%, when they interact with the systemic instruments. Model 4 
indicates that technology-push instruments increase patenting activity by 16.5%, demand-pull 
instruments by 7.1%, and systemic instruments by 5.1%. While different specifications and lag 
structures can lead to some changes in the observed effects, on balance the findings for the key 
variables were fairly close in most specifications. 
With regards to control variables, electricity prices are found to be of no statistical significance, 
(possibly suggesting that higher electricity prices do not provide an incentive for increased 
patenting activity). There are various reasons for this: first, that such prices can sometimes be 
influenced by public policy considerations to keep them low, (Cherni & Kentish, 2007); 
second, that RE contributes to electricity generation (14.3% of the final EU energy use in 2012 
(EEA, 2016); third, that, certain REP instruments, and specifically that of feed-in tariffs, 
require grid companies to pay for electricity generated from renewable energies higher prices, 
as compared to those from fossil-fuel generated (Zhao & Jiarong, 1998). 
Page | 117  
 
The estimated coefficient of the total number of PCT filings is negative and significant, 
suggesting that total patenting propensity negatively affects the variation in RE patenting 
activity. It could be argued that the RE sector is less responsive to changes in the patenting 
propensity. This may relate to the issue of “lock-in”, namely that countries that have a history 
in non-RE patents are “locked-in” these types of innovations; thus, having no impact on RE 
innovations (Beck & Martinot, 2004).  
The Kyoto protocol dummy was also found to be insignificant. As noted, the Kyoto Protocol 
has increased the expected size of the global market for clean energy, redirecting the innovative 
efforts of the EU15 member states towards renewables. Such treaties usually create incentive 
frameworks for the diffusion of energy technologies, yet most are not designed to specifically 
foster energy technology innovation (Aguayo, et al., 2012). Only one other study had controlled 
for the Kyoto Protocol (s. Nesta et al. (2014) who also found it to be insignificant.  
The coefficient of the final energy consumption has a positive and significant sign and is 
statistically significant at 1% in all Models. This is in line with the literature suggesting that 
RE innovations are more likely to take place when there exist a market for them. Previous 
studies argued that growing electricity consumption can be used to control for possible 
dimension of the possible market for RE (Johnstone et al., 2008; Nesta et al., 2014).  
In terms of the year dummies, for Models 1 to 4 and from 1995 to 1998, the coefficients were 
found to be negative and significant. From 1996 to 2005, the coefficients were mostly 
insignificant and in most cases negative. In Model 5, the coefficients were mostly insignificant 
and varied in terms of their direction. From 2006 to 2013, the coefficients were in all Models 
positive and significant. This could be attributed to aggregate trend effects becoming more 
potent during that period. From a number of possible aggregate trend triggers, it is noted that 
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it coincided with the adoption of the Kyoto protocol. Overall the use of year dummies seemed 
to be helpful and value adding.  
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
The effects of RE policy on RE innovation at the aggregate level have been examined but also 
in terms of three different policy instruments (technology-push, demand-pull, and systemic) 
and their interactions on RE innovation, in a cross-section of 15 EU countries17 over the period 
1995-2014. Building on existing literature a conceptual framework and Hypotheses have been 
developed. Evidence in support of all three hypotheses has been found.  
This chapter’s research adds to the literature in a number of ways. The first is related to the 
focus on the three types of instruments. This classification seems appropriate in terms of theory 
(Rosenberg, 1974; Nelson, 2009; Nemet, 2009; Rogge et. al., 2017) and has been adopted in 
some recent studies (Costantini, et al., 2015). The second relates to the examination of 
instrument interactions. It was found that RE policy has a positive and significant effect on RE 
innovation as a whole, and that RE policy instruments also have significant effect on RE 
innovation. It was also found that the interactions between instruments (especially those 
between technology-push and demand-pull on the one hand and systemic on the other) are 
positive and significant when analysed on their own. However, when examined alongside their 
components, it was found all component instruments as well as the interaction of all three to 
be positive and significant, while the interaction between the three individual pairs was 
negative and significant.  
                                                          
17It is worth noting that some recent scholars have started shifting their views of energy and sustainability 
transitions from a national level to a more city-centred approach (Coenen & Truffer, 2012; Hodson & Marvin, 
2010; Knight, 2012), which could produce some useful insights when considering regional RE policies.  
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Reasons for these, including the possibility of different lag structures, have been examined, a 
suggestion supported by the results. Quantitatively it was found that the coefficients of 
technology-push were larger than those of demand-pull which in turn were found to be larger 
than those of systemic effects and of interaction effects. While reluctant to place much weight 
on precise quantitative effects given some sensitivity of results to lag structures and 
specifications, the results were found to be on balance robust in terms of the direction of the 
key relationships and in line with theory and the theory-informed Hypotheses of this chapter, 
albeit not with all specific suggestions by scholars. For example, the effects of the usually 
favoured demand side policies were found not to be larger than those of technology-push, while 
the two were not found to be complementary to each other. In general, the results supported 
the ideas that RE policy has a positive effect on RE innovation and that REP instruments can 
have different but important roles, and that interactions are important. Although the precise 
effects can depend on whether they are examined in isolation or alongside their individual 
components and the lag structures of the variables. 
All the above have important implications for policy makers. They highlight that different 
instruments matter, their interactions matter and the way in which they interact and how they 
interact (for example alongside their component instruments or not) also matter. This is also 
the case for lag structures. Accordingly, much care should be taken to identify and leverage 
complementarities, while eschewing from potential inconsistencies and interactions. Such 
interactions between these instruments have not been properly taken into account in the existing 
literature, depriving policy-makers from a significant source of information (Magro & Wilson, 
2013). Based on the above, it would appear that the optimal approach is for a government to 
employ policy instruments that complement, and are consistent with, each other, and that this 
is a matter for empirical design and can be contingent on each specific case. This in turn calls 
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for further research, more disaggregated findings and triangulation, including case studies to 
support the quantitative econometric findings.  
As with other studies, this research has limitations. The first limitation relates to the use of 
patent data as a proxy for innovation, which can be problematic. Nevertheless, in the absence 
of suitable and comparable alternative measures, it remains the most plausible and highly used 
indicator for this type of study. The second limitation relates to the fact that there are more 
determinants of RE innovation than accounted for in this chapter. However, a more 
comprehensive set of determinants than other studies was used, not least the separate 
instruments and their interactions. This and the consistency of the results with the literature and 
the Hypotheses render confidence in the findings. Overall the results seemed to be rather robust 
to various specifications used, and in line with theory and previous evidence.  
To conclude in this chapter, I have sought to add to the literature in a number of novel ways, 
including the unique data base, the conceptual framework, the instrument types, the 
comprehensive coverage of possible relationships and their interactions. In the next chapter I 
aim to examine the extent to which Industrial Policy (IP) can help to pick wining RETs (an 
important longstanding concern in the IP literature). This is achieved by cross fertilising 
scholarly work on IP and RE.  
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Chapter 5 
Can Industrial Policy Pick Winning Renewable Energy 
Technologies?18 
As mentioned already, debates on IP have relied mainly relied on conceptual arguments and 
case examples with minimum econometric support. Research on public policy towards RE has 
employed econometric analyses but it has not cross fertilised adequately with IP debates, 
despite the RE industry having over the years being the recipient of substantial public support. 
A lasting debate in IP concerns whether government support to sectors and firms can help ‘pick 
winners’. More recent developments have shifted attention to picking winning policies, policy 
instruments and/or technologies, especially General Purpose Technologies (GPTs). In this 
chapter, I submit that RE can qualify as GPT that consists of more specific RETs. Having 
developed theory and Hypotheses, econometric evidence for the impact of three IP policy 
instruments on different RETs is provided, followed by the unexplored role of country 
experience in mediating this relationship and for regional variations. Continuing from the 
previous chapter, I first test for the case of the EU. Going further, and in order to test for 
regional variations, I have controlled for North and South EU regions. This allows for better 
understanding on which policy instrument types work best per region. Last I employ an 
expanded more comprehensive sample that includes all OECD members. This is in order in 
order to test for regional variations between leaders and newcomers, as well as the old EU. And 
the new EU, EU north and south and EU versus the rest of the OECD. The expanded sample 
also allows us to extend the period under examination to between 1990 and 2014, as explained 
in Chapter 3. In addition, I examine whether the quality of the innovation outcomes is affected 
by IP.   
                                                          
18 Based on the forthcoming paper by Pitelis, A. T., Chalvatzis, K., Vasilakos, N., and Pitelis C. N. (2019), in the 
Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, with the same title.  
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5.1 Introduction 
At the timing of writing this chapter, Europe together with most of the northern hemisphere are 
experiencing one of the hottest summers in their history (WorldWeatherAttribution, 2018), 
widely believed to be a result of ongoing anthropogenic climate change. It is also widely 
accepted that eliminating anthropogenic emissions especially those from energy use is the first 
step to climate change mitigation (Rockström, et al., 2017). To this end, there has hardly been 
a more opportune timing to explore the renewable energy (RE) transition and the role of public 
policy in fostering such a transition - the aim in this chapter.  
The need for transition from non-RE sources to RE has long been recognised (Smil, 2010). 
That recognition has led to debates about the role of the relative advantages of markets and 
governments-public policy in bringing about desired change. In the process of growing from a 
nascent sector into a major contributor of power generation, RE has benefited from both direct 
public support (e.g. subsidies) and indirect one (e.g. training and awareness programmes). 
Despite that being a clear case of Industrial Policy (IP), namely policies and policy instruments 
that aim to direct industry towards achieving a particular desired objective (Bailey, et al, 2015), 
links between IP, RE and RETs have been underexplored. This is acknowledged by the 
European Union (EU), who has recently enriched its “New Industrial Policy Strategy” with the 
Launch of the EU clean energy industrial competitiveness and innovation forum for renewables 
(European Commission, 2017; European Commission, 2018). 
IPs can be any type of government policy that affects industry, often delineated to those policies 
that seek specifically to improve manufacturing competitiveness, usually in its link and 
interactions with other sectors such as services and even agriculture (Pitelis, 2015). They can 
aim to substitute or complement market forces by reinforcing or counteracting the allocative 
and other effects that existing markets would otherwise bring about. In case of missing markets, 
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IPs can also serve as market creation and co-creation devises – the creation of carbon markets 
being a case in point. They are sometimes seen as a discovery process where firms and 
governments learn about underlying costs and opportunities and engage in strategic 
cooperation. Both the government and the private sector have imperfect information. This 
engenders information externalities and implies that the two would benefit by engaging with 
each other. At the same time however, such an engagement can foster additional negative 
externalities such as regulatory capture, corruption and rent-seeking – the pursuit of rents from 
firms, sectors and/or policy makers (Rodrik, 2004). In this case instead of government policy 
solving market failures, it can help accentuate existing and/or create new ones.  
The debate between market versus government failure has been central in IP discourse 
throughout its history (Pitelis, 1994). In brief, mainstream neoclassical economic theory would 
recommend public sector intervention only in cases of market failures (such as externalities, 
monopolistic restrictions and public goods), and provided that the public sector intervention 
does not cause more damage than it helps avoid. More recently scholars in the “new IP” 
tradition, have claimed that missing linkages and connections, filling gaps and learning can be 
important reasons for government IP interventions. Scholars such as Stiglitz (1989) have 
pointed to the ubiquity of market failures but have also highlighted causes and instances of 
government failures – hence leaving the question of the effectiveness of public IP not fully 
resolved. Importantly, the various arguments by the aforementioned IP scholars are rarely 
backed by econometric evidence.  
In this chapter, the aim is to address this gap by looking at IP in the context of the RE sector. 
The exercise is important because the RE sector has been the recipient of public sector support 
and can serve as a first ambitious step to decarbonisation. Moreover, the RE sector lends itself 
to econometric work in part as a result of data availability. Despite that the link between IP and 
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RE has remained elusive (Pitelis, 2018). In this context, it is of particular interest to know what 
type of IP and policy instruments as well as which degree of targeting are likely to be more or 
less successful. 
Traditionally the idea of targetting focuses to specific sectors and/or firms, see Bailey, Coffey, 
Gavris, & Thornley, 2018. Support for RE can in itself be seen as a form of targetting in that it 
privileges a particular sector. More recently, however the idea behind targetting and picking 
winners has been extended beyond that of sectors and firms, to picking winning policies and/or 
winning technologies (Helm, 2010). This form of targetting is relevant to RE since there is a 
range of technologies suitable for the exploitation of different RE sources. In the RE literature 
there have been a number of studies that have looked at different policy instrumernts as well 
as different RETs. None of these studies however has been conceptualised and/or formulated 
in the context of IP, and/or as a test of the picking winners view. Addresing this limitation is 
an intended contributions in this chapter.  
In the above context, the aims of this chapter are as follows; apply the notion of targetted IP-
picking winners to the case of different RE policy instruments and to specific RETs (in 
particular biomass, geothermal, hydro, wind, and solar), as well as to cross-fertilise IP and RE 
literature. In this context theory and Hypotheses are developed and provide econometric 
evidence (in particular by testing for the role of IP instruments in fostering RE and specific 
RETs). Three more innovations are made: The first is to explore the issue of “country 
experience” and hence “learning” as a factor that mediates the relationship between RE policy 
and RE innovation. The second is to control for regional variations. A third is to look at the 
extent to which public policy affects the quality of innovations. All these are conceptually 
plausible relationships to explore in the context of extant debates (see below) but have not been 
discussed before.  
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: The next section focuses on theory and 
hypotheses development; section three describes the empirical model, method, data and 
variables; section four presents and discusses the results and section five provides concluding 
remarks, limitations and opportunities for further research.  
5.2 Theory and Hypotheses Development  
Industrial Policy (IP) and Renewable Energy (RE) 
As noted, the use of fossil fuels as the primary source of energy worldwide has been associated 
with environmental and climate challenges. With international agreements such as the Kyoto 
Protocol (United Nations, 1998) and more recently the Paris Agreement (United Nations, 2015) 
many governments have been pursuing ambitious RE targets and pursuing decarbonisation 
pathways, with varied degrees of success (see Flamos, 2010; Honegger & Reiner, 2018; 
Viñuales, Depletze, Reiner, & Lees, 2016). Within liberalised power markets the realisation of 
such targets often requires public policies and actions that help to trigger corporate interest and 
leverage private funding for large-scale RE projects (The Research Council of Norway, 2017). 
While some suggest that such policies work only in the case of clear and pervasive market 
failures, and provided government failures are not as damaging, others point out to that 
government IP can be complementary to, and supporting of, market forces (Bailey, et al., 
2015). Instead of crowding out private investment in this view, government policy and 
intervention can instead help crowd investment in (Holland, 2014).  
History-wise IP has been argued to have had three generations; the vertical IP that focused on 
backward linkages as justification for picking winners, the horizontal IP that focused on across 
the board market failures as justification for economy-wide not targeted policies, and the open 
market IP that focused on missing linkages and connections (Kuznetsov & Sabel, 2011). The 
first phase took place between the 1940s and 1960s, the second between the 1970s and 1990s, 
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and the third one from the 2000s to date. The reasons are varied and include developments in 
economic theory and changes in political ideas about the role of markets and governments  
(Warwick, 2013). To these a fourth more recent generation could be added, that of the market 
and business ecosystem co-creation view that focuses on the complementary roles of the 
private-public interface as regards particularly co-creating markets and supporting business 
ecosystems (Pitelis & Teece, 2016), alongside its cousin place-based approach that has a 
similar ecosystem focus while also emphasising the role of geography and place/space (Bailey, 
et al, 2018).  
In the case of the vertical IP, the focus was sectoral and at the microlevel (Kuznetsov & Sabel, 
2011), something that Burton (1983) had identified as accelerative IP. In particular Burton 
argued that IP have had two classes – accelerative and decelerative. The first most commonly 
known as “picking winners” aimed to “stimulate the birth rate of new business ventures” 
(Burton, 1983, p. 8) while the latter aimed at reducing the “death rate of senescent companies 
and industries” (ibid, p. 8). Regarding the picking winners approach, the main weakness was 
felt to be that it is almost impossible for a government to pick a winner – since there are no 
means of prediction, neither in standard economic theory nor by everyday experience. All the 
same, the picking winners approach had been used with a degree of success in Japan and other 
industrialising countries (Chang, 1993) while a variant of it employed by China is arguably 
bearing fruits (Pitelis, 2015). It is also arguably in part because of such succeses that following 
a long period of focus on “horizontal policies” that focused on education, infractruture and 
public sector efficiency, sectoral and targetting policies are now back with a vengeance (Bailey, 
et al., 2015). 
In recent years, EU industrial and regional policy has employed the concept of “smart 
specialisation strategies” (3S thereafter). In this 3S view, sectors and specific regions can build 
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on their extant comparative advantages to generate novel competitive ones in new areas of 
specialisation. This is said to entail a process of discovery of local concentration and 
agglomeration of resources and competencies in novel domains of opportunity (Foray, 2015). 
In line with the market failure argument, this view suggests that in many cases market and 
systemic failures lead to under-investment in such processes and activities by the private sector. 
In such cases the public sector can go beyond horizontal policies with the aim to assist regional 
players to identify, shape and take advantage of new opportunities (Foray, 2015). This, in turn 
can help regions to become more dynamic and more “sticky”-namely with unique and 
embedded advantages vis-a-vis other regions. In their essence, place-based IP and 3S-type 
approaches are about auditing and appreciating the nature and dynamics of the regional eco-
system, and nurturing and leveraging potentially promising opportunities that can foster 
regional advantage. In addition to proximity within an eco-system, ‘relational embeddedness’ 
of firms and other regional actors within ecosystems, help create and diffuse new knowledge 
and foster innovation (Bailey et al, 2018).  
Identifying suitable 3S-type cases requires strategic collaboration between private and public 
sector actors that involves sharing of information around potential opportunities and critical 
evaluation of policies. This entails policy learning in a process of an ‘embedded autonomy’ 
(Bailey, et al, 2018) – this practically means the exercise mutually beneficial collaboration 
without however this leading to collusion. This of course is easier said than done and depends 
among others on institutional, cultural and historical factors-hence the need to also look at both 
policy learning and regional variations.  
In terms of EU RE, the basis for a Europe-wide RE policy was set by the White Paper for a 
Community Strategy and Action Plan Energy for the future: Renewable sources of energy, 
which sets out the EU strategy on RE and set a number of targets, including doubling the use 
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of RE in the EU gross energy consumption (European Commission, 1997) The Renewable 
Electricity Directives 2001/77/EC and 2009/28/EC (European Parliament, 2009), set RE 
targets for 2010 and 2020 (European Commission, 2001; Scarlat, et al., 2015), and the 
introduction of The Emissions Trading Scheme in 2005 (European Commission, 2015). More 
recently the European Commission (EC, 2017), has set out proposals for a new Directive for 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (European Commission, 2016). 
As regards particular measures, and echoing the more general debate on IP and the specific RE 
policy instruments, some argued that technology blind instruments, like sector-wide subsidies, 
are adequate to foster innovation (Nordhaus, 2009). In this view, targeting specific RETs can 
distort the functioning of carbon markets and hinder efforts to decarbonise the economy 
(Moselle & Moore, 2011; Less, 2012), while the ensuing social costs might be higher than their 
benefits due to rent-seeking, transaction costs and information problems (Kalkuhl, Edenhofer, 
& Lessmann, 2012). Indeed, on one hand, it can be argued that targeting a particular RET for 
support can help achieve a policy target more effectively in that it facilitates better focus and 
allocation of often limited resources. On the other hand, however, targeting specific RETs 
involves the opportunity costs of not pursuing other actions, and increases the costs of any 
failures in that other potentially more effective measures have not been pursued. While public 
policy in general can involve the possibility of government failures, it is arguable that more 
targeted policies are likely to involve a higher possibility of failure both in identifying the target 
and in ensuring that targeting one technology does not have negative impact on other 
technologies. These problems are likely to be more acute the more targeted the policies are, 
leading to circumstances when governments trying to pick winners, may instead end up picking 
losers (Helm, 2010).  
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Other scholars have argued that a policy mix that incorporates support for specific RETs may 
still be preferable (Stern, 2006; Fischer & Newell, 2007; Kalkuhl et al., 2012). This is not least 
as it fosters learning. Questions and challenges remain, however, including what can be 
counted as a renewable form of energy – and therefore being eligible for support, and how does 
one choose the weights to be placed upon the different RETs (Helm, 2010). This, according to 
Helm has resulted in the ‘renewables pork barrel’ for lobbyists to compete for, and therefore a 
major problem in rent-seeking. Theory aside, in practice the current policy mix in the EU 
implements both general support and technology specific instruments. This renders the need 
for evidence all the more pressing.  
In terms of extant evidence, in IP there is an abundance of case study-based anecdotal evidence 
(e.g. Chang et al., 2016) but very little in terms of econometrically-supported research. This is 
not the case in RE literature where econometric work is not uncommon. In such work general 
policies and policy instruments have been found on balance to have a positive and significant 
effect in fostering innovation in RE (Johnstone, et al., 2008; Nesta, et al., 2014; Pitelis, 2018). 
On the other hand, RE-related research has mostly failed to cross fertilise literature on IP and 
tends to be overly evidence (with limited theory) focused.  
Important is also that despite significant progress with IP thinking, especially in its fourth 
generation of 3S, place-based and ecosystem-based IP, there remain many unresolved and even 
non-questioned issues. One is whether country experience and hence learning can moderate the 
degree of effectiveness of IP in general and targeted IP in particular. While learning is a critical 
part of the 3S approach and also the work on IP of Joseph Stiglitz, Giovanni Dosi and others 
(see Cimoli, Dosi, & Stiglitz, 2009) it has never to my knowledge been tested. Besides learning 
from cooperation as per the 3S view, countries can also learn from trying, failing and/or 
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succeeding in terms of particular policies, instruments and targeting. All these promising ideas 
can benefit from empirical testing.  
Another argument concerns regional variations. EU regions differ in terms of their RE-related 
advantages and experiences. A 3S-type view takes extant advantages as a basis. Accordingly, 
one would anticipate that there will exist regional variations in the degree of effectiveness of 
RE policies, not just because of learning but also because of history and path dependency as 
such (see Aghion, P. et al., 2012 for more on path dependency). One for example might 
hypothesise that ‘Southern’ countries that have been plagued with higher degree of market and 
government failures might tend to perform worse, ceteris paribus. This is precisely because of 
public-private cooperation and hence mutual learning failures and also because of prevalence 
of more traditional rent seeking, transaction costs regulatory capture and corruption-type cases 
(Pitelis, 2017). Despite a large body of literature on learning in policy diffusion (Stiglitz, 1989, 
Nelson, 1993, Rodrik, 2004) the idea has not to my knowledge been tested econometrically.  
The last important question is about quality and it relates to whether challenges of targeting are 
not reflected (merely) in terms of failure to foster innovation, but (also or instead) in terms of 
fostering the wrong type of innovations- for example lower quality ones. The “picking 
winners” hypothesis critics have not entertained such a possibility to my knowledge which 
consequently has also not been tested before. It is however both a plausible deduction from a 
government failure-market distortion point of view, arguably worthy of further exploration and 
testing. 
Hypotheses Building  
Considering the mixed record of targeting sectors, the case for targeting RE needs justification. 
As already noted, in recent years the case for targeting has shifted from sectors to policy 
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instruments and/or technologies, not to specific sectors as such. The debate concerning General 
Purpose Technologies can provide an answer. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) introduced 
the concept of “General Purpose Technologies” (GPTs), as in effect epoch-making ones. The 
authors proposed three criteria for a GPT: (1) being pervasive; (2) being capable of ongoing 
technical improvement; and (3) enabling complementary innovations in other sectors 
(Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995). In other words, GPTs have economy-wide effects, can 
improve over time, and can help trigger a raft of further innovations. It is arguable that RE 
qualifies as a GPT. Its adoption can be applicable in virtually every economic activity-from 
construction to manufacturing, to agriculture (consider energy self -sufficient greenhouses). 
This is because of scale flexibility and the potential for electricity transmission. Specifically, 
almost all types of renewables come in various sizes either without any loss in technical 
efficiency; they achieve that either by modular design (solar PV) or by engineering 
configuration (small and large turbines for hydro, geothermal and wind energy). It is 
particularly this attribute of renewables that has given rise to distributed energy systems 
(Alstone, Gershenson, & Kammen, 2015; Parag & Sovacool, 2016), offering efficiency without 
the need for a large-scale grid, and making renewables applicable almost everywhere. Even 
beyond scale flexibility, the existing power grid and virtual power markets allow physical and 
logistical power transmission between producers and consumers. This enables large power 
consumers to sign private Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) with wind or solar farms (see 
Google, Facebook etc.) or residential consumers to sign up for RE tariffs (Bird, et al., 2017). 
RE technologies also improve over time both in terms of their efficiency in energy generation 
and in terms of their own manufacturing - solar PV cost for example has gone down over twelve 
times during the last decade (LAZARD, 2017). Innovation and growth of RE applications has 
triggered further innovation in a range of adjacent sectors; for example, long-distance High 
Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) transmission systems were developed to take RE from remote 
Page | 132  
 
offshore wind farms to urban consumption centres (Elliott, et al., 2016); smart grid applications 
were developed to facilitate grid services and power multi-directionality (Batista, Melício, & 
Mendes, 2017) and grid-scale batteries were developed to improve demand and supply timing 
with intermittent output renewables (Zafirakis, et al., 2016).  
Pitelis and Teece (2016) have argued that as regards IP, it is plausible and in line with historical 
experience to suggest that public support is likely to be more effective when it targets GPTs. 
This is in part because it is easier to appreciate their significance, albeit imperfectly (consider 
electricity and the internet), and in part because private initiatives are unlikely to be 
forthcoming and or effective in such cases due to the scale of requisite investments and the 
uncertainty over any future returns (the internet being a case in point). According to the authors, 
on the other hand, private business may well in turn be best to capitalise and commercialise on 
these publicly funded GPTs/innovations (consider Microsoft) (Pitelis & Teece, 2016).  
Moreover, in line with the more recent shift of attention, the focus here is on particular RE 
policy instruments. The debate on RE policy instruments is long standing but it is arguable that 
following a healthy and extensive debate over the years, the literature seems to have reached a 
consensus in terms of three key categories of RE policy instruments, namely technology-push 
(such as RD&D grants and loans, and tax incentives), demand-pull (such as feed-in tariffs, and 
subsidies), and systemic (such as tax and subsidy reforms, and education system) (see Pitelis, 
2018, for more extensive discussion). The first group refer to those that impact on the supply 
side, in particular the willingness and capability of firms to innovate: the second impact on the 
demand for RE, in particular they boost demand for RE; the third are systemic instruments that 
operate at the economy-wide level and help boost the effectiveness of both technology-push 
and demand-pull.  
Based on these arguments it is plausible to derive the following Hypothesis (H).  
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H1: RE policy instruments have a positive effect on RE Technologies 
The basis of this hypothesis is that RETs as a whole are easier to target and support than 
particular firms; hence, on balance one would expect that RE policy instruments will have a 
positive and significant effect on RETs.  
While overall positive, the impact of REP instruments on RETs is likely to be variable between 
different REP instruments and different RETs, for instrument, technology and country specific 
reasons. This leads to the second Hypothesis.  
H2. The effect of RE policy instruments on RETs varies between specific instruments and 
RETs. 
The first two hypotheses are similar to those from Chapter 4 but for the expanded sample. In 
addition, reflecting on the additional literature, my control variables are different. Overall, the 
expanded sample and the new control variables allow for comparisons between the findings of 
the two chapters, (specifically among the EU15, the whole of the EU, (that is the more 
experienced and the newcomers) and the OECD as a whole. 
The next Hypothesis follows on from the above and submits that one factor that can help 
mediate the aforementioned relationship is country experience and hence learning. In 
particular, the more experienced a country will be in supporting RETs the more likely it will 
be to be successful. Hence, it is anticipated that more experienced countries will be more 
successful in terms of fostering RETs.  
H3: The impact of targeting particular RETs on RE innovation is mediated by a country’s 
experience. 
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The fourth hypothesis in effect states that not all regions are equally qualified to target 
effectively. Countries differ in terms of their capacity to design or implement RE policies. An 
apparently politically incorrect but pragmatically plausible argument is that the degree of 
development (including institutional and governance development) of a country serves as a 
proxy for its capability to design and implement RE policies. If so, one would expect the 
Southern regions (countries) of the EU to be less effective than the Northern ones, as a result 
of their legacy in failures by both the public and private sectors (see Pitelis, 2017). Hence  
H4: The efficacy of targeting RETs differs across regional blocks 
The fifth Hypothesis is essentially an extension of the argument that a government cannot pick 
winners but with a twist or two. First the focus is on technologies not firms or sectors. Second 
it suggests that any failures in picking winners is in terms of fostering lower quality of RE 
innovations. This is in line with both theory and practice (for example the prevalence of 
investments aimed at taking advantage of a particular government programmes). This would 
imply the need to adjust for quality of innovations emanating from public sector support. 
Accordingly  
H5: Public support for particular RETs impairs (has a negative effect on) the quality of the 
RET innovations 
It is worth noting that while the first two hypotheses have both been made and tested before in 
the RE literature (even if not sufficiently cross-fertilised and informed by advances in IP 
literature), the other three have not been tested and/or hypothesised before. This is arguably in 
part because of the failure to employ and develop theory and in part because of the requirement 
for a comprehensive data set and sophisticated econometric techniques. Below those 
limitations are addressed.  
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5.3 The Model and Variables 
Following the specifications in Chapter 3, a panel consisting of all the OECD members for 
between 1990 and 2014 was constructed. Reasons for the choice of countries and time span 
have been explained in said chapter, while the reasons for going from the EU15 in Chapter 4, 
to OECD in this one, are given in the beginning of this chapter.  
5.3.1 Dependent Variable: RE Innovation 
Following the review in Chapter 3, the DV in this chapter is RE innovation proxied by patents. 
Overall, a total of 217,393 patent counts were obtained and proxied. 
5.3.2 Independent Variable: RE policies and REP Instruments 
For the purpose of this chapter, data on RE policies were proxied. Furthermore, in order to test 
for the third Hypothesis an additional index for experience and learning was created. It was 
also hypothesised that experience and learning can be proxied in terms of the extent of 
intervention (high and low policy intervention of countries) and used it to test for the impact 
of experience on the efficacy of targeting. Following that, two more regional dummies for the 
North and South European countries were created, in order to test the fourth hypothesis. Last, 
the quality of innovations was also examined (as explained in Chapter 3), in order to explore 
whether targeting impacts upon/distorts the innovation outcome.  
5.3.3 Control Variables 
RE innovation is likely to be affected by a raft of other factors, besides public policies. 
Therefore additional controls are in need for such other key factors. Returns on innovation are 
affected by the potential market for this innovation. In the case of RE this is best reflected in 
trends for electricity consumption. A large growing market for electricity should increase 
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incentives to innovate with respect to RETs. Data on household and industry sector electricity 
consumption was obtained from the IEA/OECD database, in GWh. Both observed and 
calculated balances exist, which in this chapter were averaged. An index developed by the 
EuroSTAT (2016) related to the market share of the largest generator in the electricity market 
was employed. This is in order to control for market power. It is expected that this should have 
a negative effect on RE innovation, as the higher it is (tending to monopoly), the less the 
incentive to innovate will be as a result of the fear of appropriating the returns from innovations 
due to monopolistic restrictions (Teece, 1986). In addition, total Government Budget 
Allocations for R&D (GBARD) by socio-economic objective (SEO) was also included. This 
controls for the overall tendency of a government to support innovation. Its precise sign is hard 
to predict, in that while overall the more pro-innovation a government is, the more this is likely 
to incentivise RE innovations, on the other hand governments can also support non-RE 
innovations rendering the interactions tricky to hypothesise on an a priori bases. Data was 
extracted from the OECD database for the years under examination (1990-2014), and converted 
to constant 2010 USD prices and purchasing power parity by the authors. Finally, the model 
has been augmented by including a dummy variable set to unity for the years after the Kyoto 
protocol came into force in 2005, in order to capture changes in expectation on both the context 
for future policy and the global market size for RE (Nesta, et al., 2014). 
In terms of procedure firstly the impact of RE policy instruments on RE innovation in the 
OECD and European countries as a whole were compared and contrasted.  
In terms of IP intervention, the average annual number of REP policies implemented over the 
period 1990-2014 was taken and have created two groups on this basis, as follows: 
High policy intervention group: countries that have implemented more than the average 
number of REP of all countries over the sample period (i.e. 4 REP per year). 
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Low policy intervention group: countries that have implemented less than the average number 
of REP of all countries over the sample period.  
Membership rule:   
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5.3.4 Methodology 
Considering the nature of the dependent variable (number of patent, which is a count variable), 
and as mentioned in Chapter 3, a conditional negative binomial model for panel data was 
employed which follows the classic model of Hausman, Hall and Grilliches (1984) and 
augments the basic negative binomial model to include fixed effects. Typically, negative 
binomial regressions are suitable for use with over-dispersed count variables -commonly when 
the conditional variance of the outcome variable exceeds the conditional mean, as is the case 
for all innovation measures that is used in this chapter. For instance, in the case of total non-
quality adjusted patents, the conditional variance is found to be 6.8, which is greater than the 
corresponding conditional mean of 4.8. Figure 26 illustrates the distributional properties of the 
patent data by renewable technology. 
The sample is drawn from the OECD database and it includes information on all 34 OECD 
countries, over the period 1990-2014. The model is designed to evaluate the effectiveness of 
policy support instruments on the innovation activity of five core renewable technologies: 
biomass, geothermal, hydroelectric, solar and wind related technologies. The dependent 
variable of the regression is, therefore, a vector of length 5, depicting patent counts by 
renewable technology. In particular, the core estimation model takes the following form:  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖, 𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 𝛽𝛽+ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝛾𝛾 +  𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 
(5-1) 
(5-2) 
(5-3) 
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Where, “i” denotes the values per country, “t” the year (1990, …, 2014), and “j” the technology; 
“REP” is the vector of policy variables, “X” the vector of control variables, and “v” and “u” 
the country and time fixed effects respectively. 
In order to test for the quality of innovations, an index derived from the ratio of the citations 
over the average citation performance for that year/country for each technology was 
constructed and used. The importance of controlling for quality of innovation when assessing 
policy effectiveness has been raised in several recent papers (Flanagan and Uyarra, 2016; 
Blind, 2016; Athey and Imbens, 2017) but not tested in this context.  
5.4 Results 
Starting with all OECD countries (columns on the left of Table 17), it can be seen that the 
effects are quite varied and that policy instruments have different levels of success in 
Source: Author 
Figure 26: Distributional properties of patent data by renewable technology  
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stimulating innovation, depending on the instrument and technology. Overall, all five 
hypotheses were supported, and some very interesting findings a propos control variables 
(notably market concentration hindering RE innovation) were also derived. As evidence has 
been found for the first hypothesis for both EU (Chapter 4) as well as the extant literature, in 
this Chapter the focus was on the disaggregated variant only.  
In more detail, REP instruments have different effects on RETs. As in this chapter additional 
control variables were used, the effects of RE policy instruments on RE innovation for the 
whole OECD were rerun, for comparability (within this chapter) reasons. It can be seen that in 
the case of Biomass, technology-push instruments have a positive and significant effect on 
innovation at 1%, and demand-pull have a positive and significant effect at 5%. Quantitatively 
this means that an increase in technology-push instruments will result in a 1.25% increase in 
the patenting activity, while an increase in the demand-pull ones, will result into a 1.18% 
increase. With regards to geothermal technologies, no policy instruments were found to be of 
significance. Hydro innovation was found to be fostered by both the technology-push 
instruments (positive and significant at 1%), and the demand-pull ones (positive and significant 
at 0.1%). Quantitatively, this translates into a 1.27% increase in the patenting activity from the 
technology-push instruments, and a 1.39% from the demand-pull ones. Solar technologies, 
were found to be fostered by only technology-push instruments, at a significance level of 5%. 
Finally, innovations in wind technologies are due to demand-pull instruments, at 0.1%, while 
a negative but significant level was also found for systemic instruments at 5%. In a 
quantitatively sense, these imply a 1.25% increase in the innovative activity as demand-pull 
instruments increase, while an increase in the systemic instruments will result in a 0.92% 
decrease. Differences between these findings and the results of the previous chapter can be 
attributed to the different control variables, and especially the total government budget 
allocations, which makes more sense for the cases to follow.  
Page | 140  
 
Regarding the control variables, marker concentration was found to be negative and significant 
for the cases of hydro (at 5%) and Solar (at 0.1). The negative sign implies that the greater the 
concentration the less is the incentives to innovate, as mentioned in the previous chapters, and 
quantitatively, these imply that an increase in concentration will decrease the innovative 
activity by 0.99% in both cases. The electricity market size, was found to be positive and 
significant for all RETs apart from solar, at 0.1% for biomass, hydro, and wind, and at 1% for 
geothermal. The dummy for the Kyoto protocol was also found to be positive and significant 
with the exception of biomass technology, at 0.1% for geothermal, solar, and wind, and at 1% 
for the hydro technology. Finally, the total government budget allocations were found to be 
insignificant in all but the case of wind technologies, were a negative but significant at 5% sign 
was found.  
When it comes to the countries with high policy intervention however, the story is different. 
Technology-push instruments are only found to be positive and significant for the cases of 
geothermal and hydro technologies, both at 5%, while it was insignificant for the rest. 
Quantitatively, an increase in technology-push instruments will result in a 1.73% increase in 
the geothermal patenting activity, and a 1.36% increase in the case of hydro. Demand-pull 
instruments on the other hand, were found to be positive and significant at 0.1% for all cases 
except biomass, where it was positive and significant at 1%, which is also in line with the 
theory discussed in the previous chapters. On a quantitative manner, and increase in the 
demand-pull instruments will result in a 1.5% increase in the innovative activity for the case 
of biomass, 2.83% increase in the case of geothermal, 1.78% for the case of hydro, 1.38 for the 
case of solar, and 1.37% for the case of wind. Regarding the systemic instruments, they were 
found to be negative and significant in the cases of all RETs under examination, at 5% for 
biomass and 0.75% decrease in the patenting activity as systemic instruments increased, at 1% 
for geothermal and 0.7% decrease, at 1% for hydro and a 0.8% decrease, at 1% for solar and 
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0.88% decrease, and at 5% for wind and 0.89% decrease. These are again in line with the theory 
and expected.  
Contrary to the previous case, market concentration was found to have no significant effects 
on the innovative activity of the RETs for the high intervention counties, while the same is true 
for the total government budget allocations. Regarding the electricity market size, it was found 
to be positive and significant in all cases except the solar technology, at a 0.1% for the case of 
biomass, 5% for geothermal and hydro, and 1% for wind. Finally, Kyoto protocol was found 
to be positive and significant for the cases of hydro at 5%, and for solar and wind at 1%.  
Again, the results change when considering countries with low policy intervention. It seems 
that in these countries, technology-push instruments are more important than demand-pull ones 
in fostering innovation. Specifically, innovations in biomass technologies are fostered by 
technology-push instruments which were found to be positive and significant at 5% (implying 
a quantitatively increase of 1.26% in patenting activity), and for solar and wind at 1% (implying 
a 1.23% and 1.2% increase respectively). For hydro technologies, both technology-push, and 
demand-pull instruments were found to be positive and significant at 0.1% and 5% 
respectively, which in quantitative terms translate into a 1.36% and 1.22% increase in the 
patenting activity respectively. None of the RETs seem to be affected by the introduction of 
systemic instruments.  
As expected, market concentration was found to be negative and significant but only for the 
cases of hydro (at 5%) and solar (at 1%) technologies, while the electricity market size have 
had an effect only in the cases of hydro (positive and significant at 5%) and wind (again, 
positive and significant at 5%). The Kyoto protocol dummy was found to be positive and 
significant at 0.1% in the cases of geothermal, solar, and wind, while it was of no significance 
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for the cases of biomass and hydro. Finally, the total government budget allocations were found 
to be insignificant in all cases.  
Overall, technology-push policy instruments had an overall positive and significant effect on 
innovation, except for geothermal and wind technologies. Similarly, demand-pull policy 
instruments were rather effective in boosting innovation for biomass, hydro and wind-related 
technologies, but not so for geothermal and solar. Systemic policy instruments had no 
significant effect on innovation outcomes for all but one technology (wind) - for which the 
effect was marginally negative. On balance the overall reflects are positive and in line with 
previous research that has employed aggregate RE policies as independent variable (Pitelis, 
2018), hence supportive of the first Hypothesis. As the aggregate relationship masks the 
disaggregated effects here the focus was on the latter. The results lent support to the second 
Hypothesis.  
Given that OECD is a group of countries with largely different approaches to regulatory policy, 
it is quite possible that pulling together all OECD data may average away some of the key 
effects that should be explained. This potential concern was addressed by splitting my dataset 
to two smaller groups: high policy intervention and low policy intervention member countries, 
following again the methodology that was described earlier in Chapter 3 (Table 17, columns 
on the right). The magnitude and significance of the estimated coefficients was now quite 
different: technology-push policy instruments were found to be largely ineffective in promoting 
innovation, when used by high intervention OECD countries; unlike demand-pull policy 
instruments which were found to be the most effective for this group. The exact opposite was 
true for low-intervention countries for which (demand)- technology- (pull) push policy 
instruments were found to be rather (in)effective. Systemic policy instruments did not have a 
significant positive effect for either of the two groups – in particular, the effect of these policy 
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instruments is negative and significant for the high intervention group and positive but not 
significant for the low intervention group, across the entire spectrum of renewable 
technologies. This supports the third hypothesis. 
The findings about policy instruments are in line with theory and earlier studies (Pitelis, 2018). 
As regards in particular the systemic ones, it is arguable that the finding of an insignificant 
effect is not very surprising. The very aim of systemic instruments is to support the efficacy of 
demand-pull and technology-push ones. In this context their effects are likely to be exhausted 
in terms of their impact on the other two. Differently put, the observed coefficients for systemic 
policies show the differential impact such policies may have in addition to that they have 
through the other two. It is this additional impact that is found to be insignificant.  
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Table 16: Results for the OECD Specification 
 All OECD High Intervention OECD Low Intervention OECD 
Policy and 
control 
variables\Innova
tion intensity 
Biofuel Geo-
thermal 
Hydro Solar Wind  Biofuel Geo-
thermal 
Hydro Solar Wind  Biofuel Geo-
thermal 
Hydro Solar Wind  
Technology-push 
PI 
0.229** 
(-2.58) 
0.219 
(-1.52) 
0.240** 
(-3.26) 
0.139* 
(-2.39) 
0.086 
(-1.57) 
0.231 
(-1.21) 
0.548* 
(-2.14) 
0.306* 
(-2.36) 
-0.0524 
(-0.45) 
-0.059 
(-0.61) 
0.230* 
(-1.98) 
0.0776 
(-0.4) 
0.306*** 
(-3.84) 
0.210** 
(-3.13) 
0.184** 
(-3.01) 
Demand-pull PI 0.168* 
(-2.1) 
0.215 
(-1.58) 
0.329*** 
(-4.57) 
0.102 
(-1.73) 
0.226*** 
(-4.1) 
0.405** 
(-2.86) 
1.041*** 
(-4.55) 
0.577*** 
(-6.51) 
0.323*** 
(-3.46) 
0.316*** 
(-4.37) 
0.156 
(-1.52) 
-0.0255 
(-0.14) 
0.204* 
(-2.18) 
-0.0036 
(-0.05) 
0.0927 
(-1.1) 
Systemic PI -0.0527 
(-0.72) 
-0.000604 
(-0.01) 
-0.0187 
(-0.40) 
-0.0278 
(-0.85) 
-0.0832* 
(-2.41) 
-0.276* 
(-2.07) 
-0.350** 
(-2.91) 
-0.217** 
(-3.20) 
-0.123** 
(-2.65) 
-0.111* 
(-2.42) 
0.119 
(-1.11) 
0.273 
(-1.95) 
0.116 
(-1.74) 
0.0902 
(-1.31) 
0.0331 
(-0.56) 
Market 
Concentration 
-0.00612 
(-1.37) 
0.00697 
(-1.00) 
-0.00659* 
(-2.00) 
-0.013*** 
(-3.82) 
-0.00609 
(-1.93) 
-0.0151 
(-1.40) 
0.0212 
(-1.91) 
-0.00809 
(-1.69) 
-0.0143 
(-1.95) 
-0.00795 
(-1.47) 
-0.00587 
(-0.90) 
0.0165 
(-1.5) 
-0.00950* 
(-2.27) 
-0.0116** 
(-2.81) 
-0.0053 
(-1.23) 
Electricity 
Market Size 
0.0000068*** 
(-4.45) 
0.0000061** 
(-3.21) 
0.0000053*** 
(-4.42) 
1.42E-06 
(-1.14) 
0.0000053*** 
(-5.05) 
0.0000079*** 
(-3.96) 
0.0000074* 
(-1.99) 
0.0000038* 
(-2.31) 
7.48E-07 
(-0.46) 
0.000005** 
(-3.05) 
0.0000011 
(-0.34) 
0.0000026 
(-0.71) 
0.0000048* 
(-2.43) 
0.0000021 
(-0.88) 
0.0000053* 
(-2.47) 
Kyoto dummy 0.154 
(-1.2) 
0.879*** 
(-5.39) 
0.242** 
(-2.65) 
0.647*** 
(-6.96) 
0.450*** 
(-5.64) 
-0.0178 
(-0.11) 
0.222 
(-1.13) 
0.279* 
(-2.21) 
0.413** 
(-2.6) 
0.429** 
(-3.04) 
0.27 
(-1.57) 
0.940*** 
(-4.28) 
0.156 
(-1.37) 
0.664*** 
(-5.19) 
0.386*** 
(-3.74) 
Total 
Government 
Budget 
Allocations  
-0.0000373 
(-1.34) 
-0.0000324 
(-1.07) 
-0.0000407 
(-1.90) 
0.0000039 
(-0.17) 
-0.0000488* 
(-2.50) 
-0.0000473 
(-1.31) 
-0.0000415 
(-1.04) 
-0.0000495 
(-1.72) 
0.0000025 
(-0.09) 
-0.0000363 
(-1.38) 
0.000106 
(-1.64) 
0.000019 
(-0.26) 
0.0000148 
(-0.38) 
-4.93E-06 
(-0.10) 
-0.0000364 
(-0.78) 
All specifications include country fixed effects and year dummies. t-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 17: Results for the OECD Specification, Adjusted for Quality 
 High Intervention OECD Low Intervention OECD 
Policy and 
control 
variables\Inno
vation 
intensity 
Biofuel Geo-
thermal 
Hydro Solar Wind  Biofuel Geo-
thermal 
Hydro Solar Wind  
Technology-
push PI 
0.448 
(-1.56) 
0.319 
(-0.59) 
0.998*** 
(-3.43) 
0.162 
(-0.62) 
0.607** 
(-2.81) 
0.188 
(-0.7) 
-1.322* 
(-1.97) 
-0.174 
(-0.65) 
-0.204 
(-0.81) 
-0.153 
(-0.90) 
Demand-pull 
PI 
0.385 
(-1.71) 
1.221* 
(-2.45) 
1.037*** 
(-5.44) 
0.0758 
(-0.38) 
0.451* 
(-2.36) 
0.244 
-1.28 
0.0943 
-0.27 
0.0997 
-0.46 
-0.416* 
(-2.00) 
0.0147 
-0.08 
Systemic PI -0.151 
(-0.75) 
-0.48 
(-1.13) 
-0.996*** 
(-6.06) 
-0.363** 
(-2.60) 
-0.614** 
(-3.00) 
-0.195 
(-1.07) 
-0.362 
(-1.50) 
-0.252 
(-1.48) 
-0.133 
(-0.74) 
-0.207 
(-1.55) 
Market 
Concentration 
-0.00552 
(-0.37) 
0.0535** 
(-2.78) 
0.0156 
(-1.36) 
-0.0133 
(-1.09) 
-0.0114 
(-1.02) 
-0.00104 
(-0.12) 
0.0185 
(-1.32) 
-0.0225*** 
(-3.68) 
-0.0142* 
(-2.08) 
-0.0232*** 
(-3.57) 
Electricity 
Market Size 
0.0000123** 
(-3.02) 
0.0000182*** 
(-3.37) 
6.82E-06 
(-1.86) 
5.16E-06 
(-1.61) 
0.00000716* 
(-1.97) 
-6.78E-06 
(-1.25) 
-2.75E-06 
(-0.42) 
3.89E-06 
(-0.84) 
2.28E-06 
(-0.5) 
-2.48E-07 
(-0.06) 
Kyoto dummy -0.113 
(-0.37) 
0.163 
(-0.46) 
-0.0521 
(-0.19) 
0.137 
(-0.46) 
0.173 
(-0.8) 
-0.309 
(-1.09) 
1.209** 
(-3.2) 
-0.715** 
(-3.22) 
-0.158 
(-0.60) 
-0.448* 
(-2.22) 
Total 
Government 
Budget 
Allocations 
-0.000176* 
(-2.23) 
-0.000292** 
(-2.79) 
-0.000183* 
(-2.17) 
-0.0000613 
(-1.00) 
-0.000192** 
(-2.95) 
0.00019 
(-1.67) 
0.000233 
(-1.78) 
3.93E-06 
(-0.04) 
0.0000082 
(-0.08) 
0.000104 
(-1.1) 
All specifications include country fixed effects and year dummies. t-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 18 shows a similar set of estimations, but this time using a quality-adjusted measure of 
innovation. This quality adjustment enables for the evaluation of the effect of policy 
intervention on impactful innovation, rather than just the mere quantity of it. To the best of my 
knowledge this is the first chapter to take into consideration such differences when assessing 
OECD policy effectiveness in the current context. Since it has already been established from 
the earlier analysis that there are significant differences between high- and low- intervention 
OECD members, the focus of the estimations is on within rather than between groups. It is 
clear from the results that when controlling for quality of innovation many of the effects that 
were described earlier for either group became insignificant (although the signs of the 
coefficients remain largely unchanged). This means that the use of policy support instruments 
in the OECD over the sample period has been much less effective in encouraging impactful 
innovation in RE technologies than it had in stimulating activity per se. This supports the fifth 
hypothesis.  
Statistically speaking, the findings are significantly different in both high and low policy 
intervention countries. With regards to the former, no policy instruments have had any 
significant effects, positive or negative on the innovation activity of the biomass technologies. 
In the case of geothermal, demand-pull instruments were found to be positive and significant 
at 5%, and with a quantitative impact of 3.39% increase in the innovative activity as the 
demand-pull instruments increase. Regarding hydro, both technology-push and demand-pull 
policy instruments were found to be positive and significant at 0.1%, and the systemic negative 
and significant at 0.1%. Quantitatively, this implies that as technology-push instrument 
increase, the innovative activity for hydro technologies will increase by 2.71%, by 2.82% as 
demand-pull increase, while the innovative activity will decrease by 0.37% as the systemic 
instruments increase. Systemic were the only instruments that have had a negative and 
significant effect on solar technologies at 1% (0.7% decrease). As with hydro, in wind too all 
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instruments were found to be significant and positive for the technology-push and demand-pull 
ones (significant at 1% and 5% respectively) and negative for the case of systemic at 1%. 
Quantitatively, an increase in the technology-push instruments will result in a 1.83% increase 
in the patenting activity, an increase in the demand-pull instruments will result in 1.57% 
increase, and as the systemic instruments decrease, innovative activity will decrease by 0.54%.  
Market concentration was found to be positive and significant at 1% in case of geothermal 
while it was of no significance for the remaining RETs. The electricity market size was found 
to be positive and significant in the cases of biomass (at 1%), geothermal (at 0.1%), and wind 
(at 5%), and insignificant for hydro and solar. The total government budget allocations were 
found to be negative and significant for all RETs (biomass and hydro at 5%, and geothermal 
and wind at 1%) but insignificant for the case of solar. The dummy for the Kyoto protocol have 
had no significant in any of the RETs examined.  
In low policy intervention countries with a quality adjusted innovation activity, technology-
push instruments were found to be significant but negative for the case of geothermal, at 5%, 
with a quantitative effect of 3.75% decrease, while demand-pull instruments were significant 
but again negative for the case of solar at 5%, and with quantitative effect of 0.66% decrease. 
No other policy instruments were found to be of statistical significance, and for none of the 
RETs.  
The market concentration was found to be negative and significant for the cases hydro and 
wind at 0.1%, and for solar at 1%, which is in line with the theory, and the dummy for the 
Kyoto protocol was found to be positive and significant for the case of geothermal at 1%, and 
negative and significant for the cases of hydro and wind at 1% and 5% respectively. The size 
of the electricity market, as well as the total government budget allocations were found to be 
of no statistical significance.  
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Overall, the control variables were mostly in line with theory. In particular, market 
concentration was found to be negative and significant in the majority of cases, the electricity 
market size was found to be on balance positive and significant with varying degrees of 
significance, the dummy for the Kyoto protocol was found to be variable but often positive and 
significant, the total government budget allocations were found to be highly contingent and 
variable, and the same with the electricity market size and the dummy for the Kyoto protocol.  
Next the sample was narrowed down to the EU member states only (Table 18), to evaluate the 
effect of the same policy instruments on EU energy innovation outcomes (with and without 
quality adjustments, like before). The argument for doing this is twofold: first, the EU as a 
group has been in the forefront of using policy support instruments to stimulate innovation in 
the renewable energy sector (Schubert, et al., 2016; Sahu, 2015). Second, the EU is a much 
more homogeneous group of countries than the OECD is from a regulatory perspective, which 
may make it easier to identify links between energy innovation and policy support. The results 
are very similar to the ones obtained in earlier analysis.  
When examining the EU alone, results are comparable to the OECD, even when accounting 
for policy intervention, with only the significance levels changing. In this case however, it is 
interesting to examine the controls introduced for the North and South of Europe. It can be seen 
that in the Northern Europe and for countries with high policy intervention, biofuel and wind 
technologies are positive and significant at 1% and solar technology positive and significant at 
0.1% implying that these countries are more likely to innovate in these technologies. In South 
Europe with policy intervention, the technologies more likely to innovate are solar (at 1%) and 
wind at 0.1%.  
In the Northern Europe countries with low policy intervention, the results show that biomass 
and wind are the technologies that are less likely for innovation to occur (negative and 
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significant at 1% and 5% respectively), and similarly, in the southern Europe solar (negative 
and significant at 0.1%) and wind (at 1%) are the RETs where innovation is less likely to take 
place.  
Similarly, when adjusted for quality (Table 20), in the case of high policy intervention 
countries, results are similar to those found for the case of the whole OECD, with only the 
significance levels having changed. However, it is interesting to see that for low policy 
intervention countries no policy instruments were found to be of any significance. For high 
policy intervention countries in Northern Europe, the RETs more likely for innovation to take 
place are hydro, solar, and wind (positive and significant at 1%). For Southern Europe, these 
RETs are hydro (at 5%) and wind (1%). For low policy intervention countries, Northern Europe 
is more likely to innovate on biomass (positive and significant at 5%), while the Southern part 
of Europe is less likely to innovate on hydro, solar, and wind (positive and significant at 1%).  
To sum up, the use of policy support has had an overall positive effect in terms of quantity of 
innovation, which, however, was watered down significantly when controlling for quality. In 
addition policy intervention is often more effective in northern than in southern member states 
– for both high and low intervention groups. These differences became more pronounced when 
adjusting for quality and they may partly reflect climatic and geological differences between 
north and south (for instance, the North of the EU is host to higher capacity of hydroelectric 
generation technologies than the South, which affects both the funding and intensity of 
innovation on these technologies). The results support the fourth Hypothesis. 
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Table 18: Results for the Europe Specification 
 All Europe High Intervention Europe Low Intervention Europe 
Policy and 
control 
variables\Inn
ovation 
intensity 
Biofuel Geo-
thermal 
Hydro Solar Wind  Biofuel Geo-
thermal 
Hydro Solar Wind  Biofuel Geo-
thermal 
Hydro Solar Wind  
Technology-
push PI 
0.223* 
(-2.55) 
0.215 
(-1.55) 
0.226** 
(-3.08) 
0.138* 
(-2.36) 
0.101 
(-1.81) 
0.24 
(-1.75) 
0.576* 
(-2.27) 
0.369*** 
(-3.33) 
-0.113 
(-1.30) 
0.145 
(-1.66) 
0.232* 
(-2.19) 
0.0787 
(-0.5) 
0.285*** 
(-3.79) 
0.178** 
(-2.83) 
0.180*** 
(-3.32) 
Demand-pull 
PI 
0.172* 
(-2.19) 
0.214 
(-1.58) 
0.363*** 
(-5.07) 
0.107 
(-1.81) 
0.221*** 
(-3.91) 
0.275* 
(-2.01) 
0.866*** 
(-4.26) 
0.577*** 
(-6.53) 
0.338*** 
(-4.63) 
0.333*** 
(-5.06) 
0.124 
(-1.25) 
-0.0622 
(-0.37) 
0.218* 
(-2.34) 
0.00262 
(-0.03) 
0.0213 
(-0.26) 
Systemic PI -0.0665 
(-0.90) 
0.00649 
(-0.08) 
-0.00813 
(-0.18) 
-0.0252 
(-0.77) 
-0.0696* 
(-2.00) 
-0.281* 
(-2.04) 
-0.388** 
(-3.08) 
-0.169* 
(-2.44) 
-0.139*** 
(-3.38) 
-0.166*** 
(-3.86) 
0.0595 
(-0.56) 
0.257 
(-1.84) 
0.130* 
(-2.06) 
0.0978 
(-1.5) 
0.0454 
(-0.78_ 
Market 
Concentratio
n 
-0.00713 
(-1.60) 
0.00489 
(-0.7) 
-0.00681* 
(-2.06) 
-0.0125*** 
(-3.72) 
-0.00552 
(-1.73) 
0.00108 
(-0.12) 
0.0233* 
(-2.06) 
-0.00427 
(-0.91) 
-0.0131* 
(-2.44) 
-0.00717 
(-1.34) 
-0.0126 
(-1.82) 
0.0126 
(-1.1) 
-0.00832 
(-1.96) 
-0.0107* 
(-2.56) 
-0.000681 
(-0.16) 
Electricity 
Market Size 
0.00001**
* 
(-4.54) 
0.000006*
* 
(-2.9) 
0.00001**
* 
(-4.42) 
1.43E-06 
(-1.15) 
0.00001**
* 
(-5.09) 
0.00001**
* 
(-4.64) 
4.95E-06 
(-0.86) 
0.000006*
* 
(-2.87) 
2.2E-06 
(-1.28) 
0.000005*
* 
(-2.79) 
-2.02E-06 
(-0.47) 
0.00001* 
(-2.35) 
0.000008*
* 
(-3.03) 
0.000009*
* 
(-3.08) 
0.00001**
* 
(-4.06) 
Kyoto 
dummy 
0.13 
(-1.03) 
0.830*** 
(-5.1) 
0.248** 
(-2.64) 
0.637*** 
(-6.7) 
0.427*** 
(-5.21) 
-0.135 
(-0.94) 
0.268 
(-1.35) 
 0.585*** 
(-4.19) 
0.526*** 
(-3.96) 
0.344* 
(-1.98) 
0.731** 
(-3.19) 
 0.580*** 
(-4.81) 
0.401*** 
(-4.11) 
Total 
Government 
Budget 
Allocations  
-3.93E-05 
(-1.42) 
-3.48E-05 
(-1.14) 
-0.000044* 
(-2.05) 
3.94E-06 
(-0.17) 
-0.000045* 
(-2.54) 
-1.3E-05 
(-0.32) 
 -3.17E-05 
(-1.01) 
1.87E-05 
(-0.62) 
-1.23E-05 
(-0.42) 
0.0000648 
(-1.00) 
 1.23E-05 
(-0.32) 
0.000014 
(-0.3) 
-2.33E-05 
(-0.53) 
North of 
Europe 
     3.590** 
(-2.85) 
13.07 
(-0.02) 
1.177 
(-1.68) 
2.054*** 
(-3.39) 
1.586** 
(-3.07) 
-1.166** 
(-2.78) 
-0.915 
(-1.15) 
-0.535 
(-1.80) 
-0.373 
(-1.26) 
-0.644* 
(-2.24) 
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All specifications include country fixed effects and year dummies. t-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 All Europe High Intervention Europe Low Intervention Europe 
Policy and 
control 
variables\Inn
ovation 
intensity 
Biofuel Geo-
thermal 
Hydro Solar Wind  Biofuel Geo-
thermal 
Hydro Solar Wind  Biofuel Geo-
thermal 
Hydro Solar Wind  
South of 
Europe 
     1.988 
(-1.78) 
-1.423 
(-0.86) 
1.133 
(-1.52) 
1.897** 
(-2.84) 
2.364*** 
(-3.93) 
1.817 
(-0.93) 
-3.004 
(-1.95) 
-1.315 
(-1.52) 
-2.746*** 
(-3.35) 
-2.666** 
(-3.16) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page | 152  
 
Table 19: Results for the Europe Specification, Adjusted for Quality 
 High Intervention Europe Low Intervention Europe 
Policy and control 
variables\Innovation 
intensity 
Biofuel Geothermal Hydro Solar Wind  Biofuel Geothermal Hydro Solar Wind  
Technology-push PI 0.505 
(-1.75) 
0.585 
(-1.21) 
0.609* 
(-2.34) 
0.236 
(-0.97) 
0.958*** 
(-4.19) 
0.251 
(-0.87) 
-1.194 
(-1.57) 
-0.359 
(-1.32) 
-0.462 
(-1.61) 
-0.271 
(-1.53) 
Demand-pull PI 0.431 
(-1.77) 
1.162** 
(-2.8) 
0.461* 
(-2.08) 
0.0376 
(-0.18) 
0.326* 
(-2.31) 
0.273 
(-1.35) 
0.196 
(-0.53) 
0.0599 
(-0.28) 
-0.26 
(-1.22) 
0.0421 
(-0.23) 
Systemic PI -0.221 
(-1.04) 
-0.643 
(-1.95) 
-0.589*** 
(-3.75) 
-0.405* 
(-2.38) 
-0.613*** 
(-3.80) 
-0.0692 
(-0.35) 
-0.305 
(-1.31) 
-0.173 
(-0.99) 
-0.109 
(-0.62) 
-0.218 
(-1.69) 
Market 
Concentration 
-0.00731 
(-0.40) 
0.0639*** 
(-3.52) 
0.00742 
(-0.56) 
0.00613 
(-0.45) 
-0.00401 
(-0.27) 
0.00511 
(-0.54) 
0.0286 
(-1.69) 
-0.0223*** 
(-3.47) 
-0.0190* 
(-2.49) 
-0.0246*** 
(-3.66) 
Electricity Market 
Size 
0.0000122** 
(-2.83) 
1.65E-05 
(-1.35) 
0.00000808* 
(-2.34) 
5.48E-06 
(-1.69) 
0.00000812* 
(-2.21) 
-9.33E-06 
(-1.48) 
-8.85E-07 
(-0.07) 
9.8E-06 
(-1.87) 
3.74E-06 
(-0.71) 
5.5E-06 
(-1.17) 
Kyoto dummy -0.119 
(-0.39) 
0.216 
(-0.61) 
0.189 
(-0.6) 
0.155 
(-0.51) 
0.148 
(-0.68) 
-0.326 
(-1.13) 
1.192** 
(-3.22) 
-0.815*** 
(-3.87) 
-0.248 
(-1.00) 
-0.449* 
(-2.31) 
Total Government 
Budget Allocations 
(all categories) 
-0.00015 
(-1.71) 
-0.000237* 
(-2.26) 
-7.8E-05 
(-1.03) 
-0.0000122 
(-0.18) 
-0.00013 
(-1.85) 
0.000242 
(-1.86) 
0.000332* 
(-2.45) 
0.000106 
(-0.96) 
0.000199 
(-1.67) 
0.000168 
(-1.69) 
North of Europe 0.399 
(-0.35) 
15.21 
(-0.01) 
2.564** 
(-3.26) 
2.029** 
(-2.82) 
2.357** 
(-2.91) 
1.226* 
(-2.07) 
1.411 
(-1.56) 
0.198 
(-0.46) 
0.395 
(-0.81) 
-0.0863 
(-0.20) 
South of Europe 1.067 
(-0.92) 
-1.378 
(-0.35) 
3.707* 
(-2.5) 
0.647 
(-0.85) 
2.714** 
(-2.89) 
0.573 
(-0.3) 
-1.245 
(-0.47) 
-3.512** 
(-3.01) 
-3.050** 
(-2.58) 
-3.151** 
(-3.05) 
All specifications include country fixed effects and year dummies. t-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Overall the estimation results are statistically significant and free from the econometric 
problems that are often associated with count data estimators. Given moreover the novelty of 
different instruments and RETs a more detailed description might well be beyond the scope of 
this chapter which aimed at as developing and accessing some general novel ideas as opposed 
to the very specifics of each case. These would require further investigation and represent a 
major opportunity for further research 
5.5 Summary, Conclusions and Discussion 
In summary, in this chapter, I have:  
1. Cross fertilised RE and IP 
2. Developed the argument that RE can qualify as a GPT 
3. Applied the concept of picking winners to policy instruments and RE Technologies 
4. Provided fresh econometric evidence for IP 
5. Explored regional variations 
6. Adjusted RE innovation for quality of innovations 
Based on the conceptual analysis, five Hypotheses have been developed and tested by 
employing a unique and comprehensive data set. Overall and on balance my Hypotheses were 
supported by the econometric evidence. More specifically, the results showed that  
• IP instruments have a positive and significant effect on RETs with demand-pull ones 
being more potent, especially in high intervention countries.  
• Targeting RETs is contingent upon country experience with more experienced 
countries being more effective. 
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• There exist regional disparities with Southern countries being less effective in fostering 
innovation in different RETs. 
• Public policy support is found to induce innovation of lower quality.  
In addition to the above there were some very interesting findings a propos control variables-
notably market shares (that can be seen as a proxy for market power) hindering RE innovation. 
These are all fairly significant advances in a rather important field. All these have rather clear, 
strong and even self-evident policy implications-not least that policy experience and 
competence matter and that public policy interventions can help distort incentives and induce 
lower quality innovations.  
There are limitations in this research which present opportunities for further research. These 
include the use of patent data with their limitations that I have already discussed. Other 
limitations include fine tuning my proxies for experience, quality and regional blocks (e.g. 
European OECD, non-Europe OECD). In addition, for the first Hypothesis I relied on the 
balance of the evidence on the impact of REP instruments on specific RETs as opposed to a 
regression with the aggregate effects of all REPs instruments on all RE innovation. That was 
in part because of earlier extant evidence on this (see Chapter 4 and Pitelis, 2018), and because 
the aggregated effect masks the nuances of the relationships.  
In the next chapter I look at the impact of specific instruments on specific RETs. This is because 
there are policy instruments that can target one specific RET, and other that target multiple. 
This helps us select right instrument for the relevant RET, based on its effectiveness.  
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Chapter 6  
Fostering Innovation in Renewable Energy Technologies: 
Choice of policy instruments and effectiveness 
In this chapter, the effectiveness of different types of RE policy instruments (demand-pull, 
technology-push and systemic) on innovation have been tested for an array of RETs. The 
novelty in this chapter lies in examining the degree of policy instruments targeting, i.e. whether 
instruments are more effective when targeting one specific RET, or more.  
6.1 Introduction 
As  already mentioned, the environmental and climate challenges relating to the use of fossil 
fuels, has motivated a number of governments to adopt REPs. These are currently an important 
feature of the global energy landscape (Kieffer & Couture, 2015), and have motivated debates 
about the role of public policy towards RE. . 
At a practical level, the proliferation of REPs and REP instruments poses a number of 
challenges for scientific research. These include the adoption of widely agreed classifications 
but also the analysis of which policy instrument is more or less effective in impacting upon 
which particular RET. Common classifications permit better comparisons while identification 
of the instrument that is good for purpose (effective in fostering a particular RET) provides 
more detailed knowledge and hence helps with more informed policy making.  
As already noted, an important question for policy makers, pertains to the optimal degree of 
targeting of RETs. On one hand, it can be argued that targeting a particular RET for support 
can help achieve a policy target more effectively. On the other hand, targeting specific RETs 
can involve higher costs and scope for failures, partly because of possible interaction effects 
with other policies (Pitelis, 2018). The issue of targeting has not featured in the RE literature 
but has been a staple of academic debate in the literature on IP and Industrial Strategy which 
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is currently a topic of extensive debate and very high in the policy Agenda of the UK 
government (Rhodes, 2014; Bailey, et al., 2018).  
In the context of this longstanding debate, public policy in general can involve the possibility 
of government failures, for example as a result of lobbying, rent-seeking and lock-ins (Bailey, 
et al., 2015). Specifically for the case of RE, some scholars have argued that targeting RE 
distorts the functioning of carbon markets and therefore hinders efforts to decarbonise the 
economy (Moselle & Moore, 2011; Less, 2012; Nordhaus, 2009). It is then arguable that more 
targeted policies are likely to involve a higher possibility of failure both in identifying the target 
and in ensuring that targeting one type of technology does not have a negative repercussion on 
other technologies. On the other hand, however, some scholars have argued that a policy mix 
that targets specific technologies to foster RE innovation, alongside carbon pricing policies, 
may be preferable (Stern, 2006; Grimaud & Lafforgue, 2008). However finding which 
particular RE instruments foster particular RETs requires empirical evidence. This is my 
intended contribution in this chapter.  
In the above context, the aim of this chapter is to examine the extent to which RET specific 
policy instruments are more (or less) effective than RET-neutral ones, by examining their 
respective effects on RE innovation. A common classification of REP instruments (s. Chapter 
3) will be adopted, focusing on all key RETs, that are Biomass, Geothermal, Hydro, Solar, and 
Wind energy technologies, for the electricity sector, and looking at a large sample of 21 
countries that are actively involved in the adoption of REPs19. The reason for limiting of my 
sample to 21 countries, and for dropping one RET (Ocean Energy), was by data restrictions. In 
particular, the re-classification of the RE instruments into those that target multiple RETs and 
                                                          
19 These are the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the 
United States. 
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those that target just one RET, resulted in cases of countries with very few REP values that 
render their statistical analysis impossible. The same applied for the case of RETs.  While the 
more restricted sample makes comparisons less straightforward, I note that this exercise has 
not been undertaken before and is necessary for reasons already explained. Future research is 
likely to encounter the same data restrictions hence allowing better comparisons with my 
results.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: The next section focuses on the 
background and proposed hypotheses of the chapter; section three describes the model and 
variables; section four presents the results and their discussion; and section five concludes.  
6.2 Background  
AS discussed earlier in the thesis, the early 1990s witnessed a new wave of RE policies aimed 
at mitigating the impact to climate change. The UNFCCC triggered regular COP meetings, 
with a key meeting being COP3 (1997) where the Kyoto Protocol was adopted.  
By way of example, in 2015, as many as 164 countries worldwide had adopted at least one type 
of policy associated with RE. Since their emergence in the 1970s, REPs have taken different 
forms, ranging from government announcements to legally binding obligations (Kieffer & 
Couture, 2015). The OECD distinguishes between two waves of REPs. The first wave took 
place in the aftermath of the two oil crises of the 1970s, which stimulated policy adoption in 
most developed countries, but was phased out in the early 1980s when the oil price started 
falling. The second wave, which is also the focus of this chapter, emerged in the early 1990s 
in response to the increased concerns for climate change mitigation (Nicolli & Vona, 2012). 
Different phases can also be observed in the adoption of policies as such. The first phase saw 
the adoption of RD&D (Research, Demonstration and Development) subsidies and grants. The 
second phase focused mainly on the use of market-based instruments (such as taxes, incentives, 
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and tradable permits), which also resulted in policy diversification, since early adopted policies 
were kept in use jointly with new ones (Nicolli & Vona, 2012).  
As aforementioned, it has been claimed that such policies, among others, help foster 
innovation, and in the specific case of this thesis, RE innovation. The idea however that 
environmental policy can help foster RE innovation is not new (see for example Porter & Van 
Der Linde, 1995). For the specific case of RE however, interest has emerged mostly over the 
last decade; see for example Johnstone et al. (2008); Chalvatzis, (2009); Popp et al. (2009); 
Nesta, et al. (2014); Pitelis, (2018).  
As with the previous chapters, I employ the classification proposed in Chapter three. This 
draws on earlier leading contributions on innovation, (Rosenberg, 1974; Nelson, 2009; Nemet, 
2009), and includes three types of instruments: technology-push, demand-pull instruments, and 
systemic. .  
Few studies have addressed the effects of specific REPs on inducing innovation in RETs and 
none to my knowledge on a comprehensive account of the impact of specific REP instruments 
on specific RETs. As an example of one of the earlier studies in the literature, Loitera & 
Norberg-Bohmb (1999), reviewed the technological and policy history of the development of 
wind power in the United States. They found that demand-side policies are needed to encourage 
not only diffusion of wind energy, but innovation in the technology itself, as well as that weak 
demand-side policies for wind energy risks wasting the expenditure of public resources on 
research programs aimed at technological innovation. Wangler (2013), Peters, et al. (2012) and 
partly Johnstone, et al. (2008) (only for the case of tradable certificates), also found demand-
pull instruments to have an important role in facilitating inventive activity. Marques and 
Fuinhas (2012), examined the extent to which public policies towards RE are successful over 
the whole spectrum of RE technologies and concluded that incentive and subsidy policies 
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(including feed-in tariffs) (demand-pull instruments) and policy processes (systemic 
instruments) were significant drivers of the use of RE. Constantini, et al. (2015), found that 
demand-pull policies are dominant (in the biofuel sector). They suggested this is because other 
complementary technology-push support mechanisms are needed to increase the availability of 
scientific and technological capabilities and foster innovation. Palmer, et al. (2015) who 
examined the evolution of residential PV systems in Italy for 2006-2026, found that the feed-
in tariff scheme (demand-pull instrument) had again a positive effect on their rapid growth, 
beyond an initial stage (Palmer, Sorba, & Madlener, 2015). Hoppmann, et al. (2013), who 
examined solar photovoltaic modules producing firms globally, also concluded that demand-
pull policies have a greater impact when they target more mature technologies. 
Lee and Lee (2013) explored patterns of innovation and evolution in energy technologies 
(including solar PV, biomass, wind, tidal and geothermal), particularly by focusing on 
similarities and differences across technologies. They concluded that customised policies are 
likely to be required for each technology. Hoppmann, et al. (2013), conducted comparative 
case studies to a sample of nine global solar PV producers and concluded that demand-pull 
policies have a greater impact when they target more mature technologies. Dechezleprêtre and 
Matthieu (2014), analysed the influence of domestic and foreign demand-pull policies (e.g., 
guaranteed tariffs, investment and production tax credits) in wind power across OECD 
countries on the rate of innovation in said technology. They concluded that wind technology 
improvements responded positively to policies both home and abroad.  
Crespi, et al. (2015) used data from Eurostat and the OECD to empirically test for the role of 
policy in inducing the adoption of environmental innovation by firms. They concluded that 
policies are found to play a crucial role in supporting or even spurring the adoption of 
environmental innovations. They also differentiated between (i) typologies of policy 
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instruments and (ii) typologies of innovations and found that the inducement effects depend on 
the type of instrument under scrutiny. In this way they provided empirical support to linking 
inducement effects of a policy and the specific type of environmental innovation, since the 
latter reacted differently to the array of policy instruments scrutinized. Costantini, et al. (2015) 
explored the differentiated impact of demand-pull and technology-push instruments in shaping 
technological patterns in the biofuels sector. They concluded that demand-pull and technology-
push factors are important drivers of innovation in the biofuels sector. 
Lindman and Söderholm (2016), analysed patent data for four western European countries over 
the period 1977–2009, with different model specifications and found that both public R&D 
support (technology-push policy) and feed-in tariffs (demand-pull policy) have positively 
affected patent application counts in the wind power sector. In addition, they argued that the 
impact of feed-in tariffs became more profound as the technology has matured, and the impact 
of public R&D support was greater if it is accompanied by feed-in tariffs. Nicolli and Vona 
(2016), studied the effect of REPs on innovation activity in different RETs for the EU countries 
and the years 1980 to 2007. They found that the inducement effect of REPs is heterogeneous 
and more pronounced for wind, which for the period of their study was the only technology 
with developed mature and high technological potential. In a broader sense, Grafström, et al. 
(2017) who examined the technological patterns (i.e. invention, innovation, and diffusion) of 
the European wind energy sector, also found the feed-in tariffs (demand-pull instruments) to 
be vital factors of said patterns (Grafström & Lindmand, 2017). 
As it can be seen, currently literature provides some, albeit limited conclusions regarding to 
which type of policy instruments work better. Especially when it comes to the degree of 
targeting, as a result of the narrow focus of the studies, either in terms of the policy 
classification, the RETs and/or in terms of the countries examined. The policy classification 
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adopted in this study allows for the examination of all policy instruments, not only examples 
(i.e. public R&D support for technology-push policies and feed-in tariffs for demand-pull 
policies) and alongside the selected RETs, it also allows to account for the degree of targeting 
(by distinguishing into two policy instruments, those that target only one RET, and those 
targeting at least two).  
Based on the above two Hypotheses are tested: 
H1: The impact of REP instruments on RE innovation is contingent on the instrument used  
and 
H2: REP instrument that target specific RETs have a stronger effect on RE innovation of the 
targeted RETs 
6.3 Methodology and Data Description 
Following the propositions in Chapter 3, a panel has been constructed to consist of 21 countries, 
from 1990 to 2014. All the countries in the sample have used and/or are currently using a range 
of policy instruments to support development of their RE sector. These also include some key 
members of the EU (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom) widely perceived as a leader in the area 
of RE policy making and innovation. Year 1990 was used as the starting point as this is when 
the second wave of RE policy adoption took place, while it also captures the effects before and 
after the adoption of Kyoto Protocol, which helped redirect innovative activities towards 
renewables (Rawlins & Allal, 2003). Year 2014 was chosen as the end date of this analysis due 
to data availability. Table 21 provides a summary of the definitions and source of the main 
variables.  
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6.3.1 Measuring RE Innovation 
For this chapter, patent data for the Biomass, Geothermal, Hydro, Solar, and Wind technologies 
were used. Overall, a total of 217,393 patent counts were obtained.  
6.3.2 RE policies and REP Instruments 
Policies can target one or more RETs, as well as one or more RE sector(s). For example, in 
2000 the UK introduced the Renewable Energy Obligation, which targeted all RETs and was 
applicable across all sectors (e.g. electricity, heating and cooling, and transport). In the same 
year, the UK also introduced the Energy Crops Scheme, which targeted only biomass related 
technologies, and was only relevant to sectors related to power and heat. In a similar manner, 
in 1990 Germany introduced the Environment and Energy Saving Programme which provided 
loans specifically for onshore and offshore wind technologies, for biomass technologies related 
to power, heat, and transportation, and for solar technologies related to the heating sector. 
Germany’s Integrated Climate Change and Energy Programme (2007) however, targeted all 
RETs across all sectors. For this chapter, collected data on RE policy instruments were used 
that only target the electricity sector, and five RETs20.  
In this chapter, the data on RE policy instruments collected were divided in two categories, 
those targeting multiple RETs, and those targeting one specific RET. They were also classified 
into technology-push, demand-pull, and systemic, by thoroughly reviewing the specifics of 
each individual policy, as explained in Chapter 3.  
This is in line with the practice followed by other studies in the literature, which also use the 
total number of all implemented policies (s. Johnstone et al., 2008; Nesta et al., 2014). My 
                                                          
20 These are: biomass, geothermal, hydro, solar, and wind 
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adopted classifications allowed for the treatment of the resulting variables as count variables, 
as they were not diverse in character.  
6.3.3 Control Variables 
Inducing green innovation is not just a matter of public policy. There is need therefore to 
control for factors other than policies, which may foster innovation. In line with the literature, 
returns on innovation are affected by the potential market for this innovation. In the case of RE 
this is best reflected in trends for electricity consumption. A large market for electricity should 
increase the incentives to innovate in RE. Data on household and industry sector electricity 
consumption was obtained from the IEA/OECD Database, in GWh. Both observed and 
calculated balances exist, which as in previous cases, they were averaged.  
Another index developed by the EuroSTAT related to the market share of the largest generator 
in the electricity market was used. The expectation is that this should have a negative effect on 
RE innovation, as the higher the market concentration is, the less the incentive to innovate 
(Sandulli, et al., 2012). Data were obtained for most countries from the Eurostat database. As 
in Nesta, et al (2014), I used a dummy variable to pick up any effects of the Kyoto protocol, 
which came into effect in 2005. 
A new indicator was also included, that of “renewable energy innovation intensity”, which is 
the ratio of individual RET patenting activity over the total RET patenting activity. Finally, to 
remove the country-specific time invariant components from the error term, country dummies 
are used in the form of fixed effects. A vector of year dummies (u) was also used to pick up 
time effects (trend). 
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Table 20: Definitions of main variables 
Name Definition Unit Notes Variable Source 
Patents Total patent counts filed per country per year, 
filed under the PCT 
Count Values Data were collected using 
International Patent 
Classification, for Bioenergy; 
Geothermal; Hydroelectricity; 
Ocean Energy; Solar Energy; 
Wind Energy 
Dependent PATSTAT 
(European 
Patent 
Office) 
Policy 
Instruments 
The IEA/IRENA Global Renewable Energy Policies 
and Measures Database provides information on 
policies and measures taken or planned to 
encourage the uptake of renewable energy in all 
IEA and IRENA Member countries and signatories. 
Count Values OECD Countries; All Policy 
Types; All RE Policy Target; Only 
Electricity Sector; Effective 
between 1974-2015; All 
Jurisdictions; All Policy Statuses; 
Large and Small Plant Sizes 
Independent IEA/IRENA 
Joint Policies 
and 
Measures 
Database 
Market Share Market share of the largest generator in the 
electricity market 
Percentage of 
the total 
generation 
Data exist for most countries 
and from 1999 to 2015 
Control Eurostat 
Kyoto Protocol The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement 
linked to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, which commits 
its Parties by setting internationally binding 
emission reduction targets. The Kyoto Protocol 
was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997 and 
entered into force in 2005.  
Dummy 0 for all years prior to 2005; 1 
for the following ones 
Control Authors 
Electricity 
Consumption 
The IEA Electricity Information: OECD Electricity 
and Heat Supply and Consumption (GWh, TJ) 
database provides electricity and heat balance 
data for 35 OECD countries  
GWh Data were collected for EU15 
member states. Both observed 
and calculated balances were 
collected and averaged. 
Control IEA/OECD 
RE Innovation 
Intensity 
 Ratio  Control Authors 
Source: Author 
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6.3.4 Methodology 
As explained in the methodology chapter, count data – the case of this chapter – can be 
econometrically examined either by using the Poisson Regression Model (PRM), or the 
Negative Binomial Regression Model (NBRM) (Greene, 1994). For reasons explained in the 
aforementioned chapter, the NBRM has been adopted in this chapter too. 
Three different models were employed, each with five different specifications (one for each 
RET examined) in order to assess the two hypotheses, as described below.  
Model 1 examines the total RE Innovation per year per country as being equal to the three types 
of RE policy instruments i.e. the effects of technology-push, demand-pull, and systemic 
instruments on the overall RE innovation activity, a standard fixed effects model setting was 
considered, in the following form:  
�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡=  𝛽𝛽1 ��𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ.𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ
𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽2 ��𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛.𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽3 ��𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽4�𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽5�𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽6�𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽7�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛. 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇� + 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖+ 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
Where, i = values per country, and t = year (1990, …, 2014), and v and u are vectors of country and 
time dummies, respectively. 
Model 2 examines the effects of the three types of RE policy instruments on RE innovation on 
the multiple level, i.e. those policies that target more than one technology, but not necessarily 
all of them. RE patent counts per RET is the DV, and the sum of policy instrument per type 
and per technology is the IV. A standard model setting is again considered, in the following 
form:  
(6-1) 
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𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇=  𝛽𝛽1�𝑀𝑀.𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝑀𝑀.𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇�+ 𝛽𝛽3�𝑀𝑀. 𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇�+ 𝛽𝛽5�𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇� + 𝛽𝛽6�𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇�+ 𝛽𝛽7�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛. 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇� + 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
Where, i = values per country, t = year (1990, …, 2014), and Te=Technology. M implies “multiple”. 
Model 3 examines the effects of the three types of RE policy instruments on RE innovation 
when targeting one specific RET. RE patent counts per RET is the DV, and the sum of policy 
instruments per type and per technology is the IV. A standard model setting is again considered, 
in the following form:  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇=  𝛽𝛽1�𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇�+ 𝛽𝛽3�𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇� + 𝛽𝛽5�𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇�+ 𝛽𝛽6�𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇�+ 𝛽𝛽7�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛. 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇� + 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
Where, i = values per country, t = year (1990, …, 2014), and Te=Technology. 
 
6.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
A summary of the main estimation results can be found in Tables 22 and 23. 
 
 
 
(6-2) 
(6-3) 
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Table 21: NBRM Results for Model 1 and Model 2 
  
Model 1 
Model 2 
Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Total RE 
Patents 
Biomass 
Patents 
Geothermal 
Patents 
Hydro 
Patents 
Solar 
Patents 
Wind 
Patents 
Total 
Technology-Push 
Instruments 
0.0153 
(-0.58) 
     
Total Demand-
Pull Instruments 
0.113*** 
(-6.71) 
     
Total Systemic 
Instruments 
-0.0316* 
(-2.00) 
     
Multiple 
Technology-Push 
Instruments 
(Biomass)  
 0.212 
(-1.73) 
    
Multiple 
Demand-Pull 
Instruments 
(Biomass) 
 0.236** 
(-2.88) 
    
Multiple 
Systemic 
Instruments 
(Biomass) 
 -0.151* 
(-1.99) 
    
RE Innovation 
Intensity 
(Biomass) 
 3.931*** 
(-10.78) 
    
Multiple 
Technology-Push 
Instruments 
(Geothermal)  
  0.361 
(-1.6) 
   
Multiple 
Demand-Pull 
Instruments 
(Geothermal) 
  0.399** 
(-2.91) 
   
Multiple 
Systemic 
  -0.138 
(-1.68) 
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Model 1 
Model 2 
Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Total RE 
Patents 
Biomass 
Patents 
Geothermal 
Patents 
Hydro 
Patents 
Solar 
Patents 
Wind 
Patents 
Instruments 
(Geothermal) 
RE Innovation 
Intensity 
(Geothermal) 
  18.38*** 
(-11.19) 
   
Multiple 
Technology-Push 
Instruments 
(Hydro)  
   0.265* 
(-2.43) 
  
Multiple 
Demand-Pull 
Instruments 
(Hydro) 
   0.410*** 
(-4.62) 
  
Multiple 
Systemic 
Instruments 
(Hydro) 
   -0.122* 
(-2.11) 
  
RE Innovation 
Intensity (Hydro) 
   2.441*** 
(-7.35) 
  
Multiple 
Technology-Push 
Instruments 
(Solar)  
    0.167 
(-1.83) 
 
Multiple 
Demand-Pull 
Instruments 
(Solar) 
    0.145 
(-1.92) 
 
Multiple 
Systemic 
Instruments 
(Solar) 
    -0.0535 
(-1.34) 
 
RE Innovation 
Intensity (Solar) 
    3.038*** 
(-9.92) 
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Model 1 
Model 2 
Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Total RE 
Patents 
Biomass 
Patents 
Geothermal 
Patents 
Hydro 
Patents 
Solar 
Patents 
Wind 
Patents 
Multiple 
Technology-Push 
Instruments 
(Wind)  
     0.221** 
(-2.6) 
Multiple 
Demand-Pull 
Instruments 
(Wind) 
     0.326*** 
(-5.2) 
Multiple 
Systemic 
Instruments 
(Wind) 
     -0.181*** 
(-4.19) 
RE Innovation 
Intensity (Wind) 
     3.459*** 
(-12.02) 
Market Share -
0.0109**
* 
(-3.32) 
-0.00599 
(-1.33) 
-0.00302 
(-0.52) 
-
0.00883*
* 
(-2.62) 
-
0.0177*** 
(-4.51) 
-0.00866* 
(-2.40) 
Kyoto Protocol 
Dummy 
0.175* 
(-2.1) 
-0.0587 
(-0.46) 
0.670*** 
(-4.35) 
0.158 
-1.69 
0.443*** 
(-4.01) 
0.343*** 
(-3.99) 
Electricity 
Consumption 
0.000003
25*** 
(-4.74) 
0.0000057
5*** 
(-7.8) 
0.00000578
*** 
(-5.75) 
0.000004
39*** 
(-6.46) 
0.0000030
2*** 
(-3.86) 
0.000002
32** 
(-2.75) 
All specifications include country fixed effects and year dummies. t-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Table 22: NBRM Results for Model 3 
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Model 3 
 Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Biomass 
Patents 
Geothermal 
Patents 
Hydro Patents Solar 
Patents 
Wind Patents 
Technology-
Push 
Instruments 
(Biomass only)  
0.315 
(-1.9) 
    
Demand-Pull 
Instruments 
(Biomass only) 
0.179* 
(-2.19) 
    
Systemic 
Instruments 
(Biomass only) 
-0.224 
(-1.27) 
    
RE Innovation 
Intensity 
(Biomass) 
3.861*** 
(-10.64) 
    
Technology-
Push 
Instruments 
(Geothermal 
only)  
 0.574 
(-1.85) 
   
Demand-Pull 
Instruments 
(Geothermal 
only) 
 0.421** 
(-2.94) 
   
Systemic 
Instruments 
(Geothermal 
only) 
 -0.122 
(-0.68) 
   
RE Innovation 
Intensity 
(Geothermal) 
 18.90*** 
(-11.65) 
   
Technology-
Push 
Instruments 
(Hydro only)  
  0.115 
(-0.77) 
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Model 3 
 Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Biomass 
Patents 
Geothermal 
Patents 
Hydro Patents Solar 
Patents 
Wind Patents 
Demand-Pull 
Instruments 
(Hydro only) 
  0.530*** 
(-5.5) 
  
Systemic 
Instruments 
(Hydro only) 
  -0.0916 
(-0.76) 
  
RE Innovation 
Intensity 
(Hydro) 
  2.456*** 
(-7.44) 
  
Technology-
Push 
Instruments 
(Solar only)  
   0.145 
(-1.26) 
 
Demand-Pull 
Instruments 
(Solar only) 
   0.242** 
(-2.86) 
 
Systemic 
Instruments 
(Solar only) 
   -0.1 
(-1.35) 
 
RE Innovation 
Intensity 
(Solar) 
   2.951*** 
(-9.79) 
 
Technology-
Push 
Instruments 
(Wind only)  
    0.121 
(-1.21) 
Demand-Pull 
Instruments 
(Wind only) 
    0.376*** 
(-5.81) 
Systemic 
Instruments 
(Wind only) 
    -0.154* 
(-2.31) 
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Model 3 
 Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Biomass 
Patents 
Geothermal 
Patents 
Hydro Patents Solar 
Patents 
Wind Patents 
RE Innovation 
Intensity 
(Wind) 
    3.245*** 
(-11.48) 
Market Share -0.00481 
(-1.02) 
-0.00244 
(-0.44) 
-0.00977** 
(-2.78) 
-0.0169*** 
(-4.21) 
-0.00868* 
(-2.41) 
Kyoto 
Protocol 
Dummy 
-0.0488 
(-0.38) 
0.651*** 
(-4.46) 
0.108 
(-1.17) 
0.393*** 
(-3.57) 
0.232** 
(-2.63) 
Electricity 
Consumption 
0.00000589*
** 
(-7.86) 
0.00000599**
* 
(-6.43) 
0.00000466**
* 
(-6.55) 
0.00000312*
** 
(-3.98) 
0.00000302**
* 
(-3.51) 
All specifications include country fixed effects and year dummies. t-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
As expected, the aggregated effect of policy instruments varies according to their type. 
Specifically, the technology-push instruments have an insignificant effect on the overall RE 
innovation which is in line with the extant literature and theory (Pitelis, 2018; Nemet, 2009; 
Rosenburgh, 1979). Demand-pull policies however, have a positive effect on RE innovation, 
significant at 1%, which quantitatively means that the expected number of RE patents will 
increase by 1.12% when demand-pull instruments also increase. Systemic instruments are 
found to have a significant but negative effect on RE innovation, which is also in line with the 
existing literature and theory, since systemic instruments are aimed to support and align the 
existing instrument mix, i.e. support the demand-pull and/or technology-push (Smiths & 
Kuhlmann, 2004). Hence when acting in isolation, it is expected to have a negative effect when 
significant, and an insignificant effect otherwise. The same result hold true in the second set of 
estimations presented in Table 22; i.e. the one examining policy instruments targeting multiple 
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RETs, as well as in the third set of estimations (Table 22 – Model 3), i.e. the one examining 
policy instruments targeting one specific RET.  
In terms of control variables, the market share is found to be negative and significant, in both 
models (at 1%). This is in line with the theory, since the higher it is, the lower the need for 
competitive advantage (Sandulli, et al., 2012); hence the incentive to innovate is reduced. 
Instead of innovation, electricity suppliers often deploy consumer-facing strategies to increase 
their market share (Rutter, et al., 2017). The dummy for the Kyoto protocol was found to be 
positive and significant in both models (at 5%), suggesting that RE patenting activity can be 
influenced by constraints and incentives provided by international accords and that the Kyoto 
protocol has indeed had noticeable impact. Finally, electricity consumption was found to be 
positive and significant (at 1%) suggesting that RE innovations are more likely to take place 
when there exists a market for them21.  
In the case of biomass technologies, technology-push instruments have an insignificant effect 
on driving innovative activity regardless of whether they concern policy instruments that target 
multiple RETs or only biomass technologies. In both model specifications, demand-pull policy 
instruments have had a positive and significant effect. However, in the second model, where 
multiple RETs were targeted, the significance was higher (at 1%) than when only biomass 
technologies were targeted (significant at 5%). An explanation for this can be the fact that in 
the first scenario, systemic instruments are significant (5%) but have a negative effect on the 
biomass innovative effect, while in the latter, their effects are insignificant. In quantitative 
                                                          
21 Previous studies argued that growing electricity consumption can be used to control for possible dimension 
of the possible market for RE (Johnstone et al., 2008; Nesta et al., 2014). Despite efficiency gains electricity 
consumption is expected to grow as it substitutes other forms of energy in deep decarbonisation scenarios (IPCC, 
2014). For example, even if slowly electricity already claims a share of transport energy supply with the growing 
use of electric vehicles. At a market, rather than national level, electricity share of individual utilities is 
threatened by active consumers at industrial (Zafirakis, et al., 2014) or household levels (Pothitou, et al., 2017) 
who invest in energy generation and management technologies. 
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terms, the aforementioned translate in a 1.27% increase in the innovative activities of biomass 
technologies as demand-pull policy instruments increase in the first case, and a 1.2% increase 
in the second.  
In terms of the control variables, only electricity consumption is found to be of significance 
and positive in both models. Market share and the Kyoto protocol seem to not have an impact 
on the biomass innovative activity. In the case of market share, this can be because biomass 
belongs to the first-generation, already mature technologies (IEA, 2006). Essentially, 
technologies for power generation from solid biomass are very similar to those widely used for 
coal. Linked to that is that very often biomass has been used either in coal and biomass co-
firing power stations or in retired coal-fired stations which were converted to biomass only. 
Therefore, some of the largest biomass facilities are in fact operated by market incumbents who 
have previously burnt coal.  
Similarly, for both models geothermal technologies are significantly impacted by only demand-
pull instruments (at 1%). However, as systemic instruments are insignificant in both models, 
an increase in the constant of the demand-pull policies is observed in the second model, 
implying that the instruments targeting a specific RET have a greater effect on their innovative 
activity. This corresponds to a 1.49% increase in the innovative activity as demand-pull policies 
increase in the first case, and 1.52% increase in the second case.  
Market share has no effect on the innovative activity of geothermal technologies. As with 
biomass technologies, geothermal is also a first-generation technology which has reached 
maturity (IEA, 2006) by using tried and tested turbine systems. Kyoto protocol and energy 
consumption are positive and significant in both model specifications at 1%.  
Page | 175  
 
Hydro and wind technologies differ from the biomass and geothermal, in the sense that both 
specifications have all instruments, i.e. technology-push, demand-pull and systemic, 
significant. In hydro, technology-push instruments are positive and significant at 5%, with a 
quantitative increase of 1.3% in their innovative activity as these policy instruments increase. 
Demand-pull instruments are positive and significant at 1%, with a qualitative increase of 
1.51% in their innovative activity as these policy instruments increase. Systemic instruments 
are negative and significant at 1%. Technology-push instruments for wind technologies are 
positive and significant at 1%, and demand-pull instruments at 1%. Quantitatively, the first will 
result in 1.25% increase in innovative activity, and the latter in 1.39% increase. Systemic 
instruments are negative and significant at 1%.  
However, as policy instruments become more targeted (model 3) (Table 23), the effects of 
policy instruments change. For hydro technologies only demand-pull instruments are positive 
and of statistical significance at 1%, with a quantitative impact of 1.7%. This is also partially 
true for wind technologies, which in the second case have a higher constant for demand-pull 
instruments, which translates in a quantitative impact of 1.46%, while maintaining the same 
significance, at 1%, and sign. Contrary to hydro, systemic instruments for wind technologies 
are negative but significant at 5%.  
In terms of control variables, energy consumption is positive and significant, at 1%, for both 
wind and hydro energy. Market share is negative and of statistical significance as expected, at 
1% in the case of hydro technologies and 5% in the case of wind energy. Kyoto protocol was 
only of statistical significance (and positive) in the case of wind, at 1%. Clearly, for most 
regions hydro power is established and heavily reliant on specific geography. Wind energy, on 
the other hand is a challenger technology that removes incumbent market share (Green & 
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Vasilakos, 2011) and has been greatly benefitted by the advancement of the climate change 
agenda.  
Solar energy technology is completely different from the above examined technologies. In the 
first case it can be seen that no policy instruments are of statistical significance while in terms 
of control variables, the market share is negative and significant at 5%, the Kyoto protocol 
dummy is positive and significant at 1%, and the electricity consumption positive and 
significant at 1%. However, when policy instruments target specifically solar technologies, 
demand-pull instruments have a positive and significant effect of 1% and a quantitative impact 
of 1.27%. A possible explanation for this is that solar energy is a second-generation technology 
which despite the fact that it undergoes rapid development when policy instruments allow for 
a choice in the RET to be employed, other technologies may be chosen. In terms of the control 
variable, the market share is negative and significant at 5%, the Kyoto protocol dummy is 
positive and significant at 1%, and the electricity consumption positive and significant at 1%. 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter examined the effects of RE policy on RE innovation for the case of technology-
push, demand-pull, and systemic policy instruments on RE innovation, in a cross-section of 21 
countries over the period 1990-2014. Existing literature has been used to build the hypotheses 
which evidence supports.  
The research adds to the literature in a number of ways. Firstly, it adds to the weight of evidence 
found by recent studies that have employed the same classification of policy instruments 
(Costantini et al., 2015; Pitelis, 2018). I found that the choice of policy instruments matters and 
this varies depending on the particular RET.  
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Three different models were used to examine the effects of the three different types of policy 
instruments on renewable energy innovation, the policy instrument targeting more than one 
RET (but not necessarily all), and policy instruments targeting one specific RET. Model 1 was 
in accordance to the first hypothesis, namely that the impact of REP on the RE innovation 
varies between the instruments used. In the second model, I found that the different types of 
policy instruments have different effects on the innovative activity of RETs. Demand-pull 
policy instruments were found to be positive and significant in all cases with the exception of 
solar energy technologies - for which technology no instrument type had any effect, something 
that can be explained in terms of the technology’s maturity. Technology-push instruments were 
significant only for the cases of hydro and wind energy technologies, while systemic were 
found to be significant for the cases of biomass, hydro, and wind energy technologies, but 
negative in all other cases. By observing the third model, it was concluded that when it comes 
to targeting one specific technology, only demand-pull policies seem to be effective – 
something that was also true for the case of solar energy technologies. This was further 
supported by the existing literature as well as previous studies.  
In terms of policy implications, it is apparent that different technologies require different types 
of policy instruments to induce innovation. It seems that demand-pull policies are stronger. 
This can be because of their horizontal nature (namely that they impact upon all). Another 
reason could be their strong design (like feed-in tariffs in Germany) alongside being introduced 
earlier; thus, creating a degree of path-dependency. The results also show that the Kyoto 
protocol has had minimal to no effect on RE innovation. Such treaties, usually create incentive 
frameworks for the diffusion of energy technologies, yet often they are not designed to foster 
the commercialisation of energy technology innovation (Aguayo, et al., 2012).  
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Chapter 7  
The Interrelationship Between Subsidies to Fossil Fuels and to 
Renewable Energy Sources in the OECD 
7.1 Introduction 
As noted earlier in the thesis, the need for energy transition from fossil fuel-based sources of 
energy to RE has long been recognised (Smil, 2010). However, despite the talk and public 
support to RE over the past years, the composition of energy sources between RE and non-RE 
remains almost unchanged. Quantitatively, in 2015, 86.3% of the world’s total primary energy 
supply came from fossil fuels (including nuclear power), relatively unchanged from 87.6% in 
1973. In the OECD countries, in 2016 fossil fuels contributed 89.8% to the total primary energy 
supply (including nuclear power, down from 95.4% in 1973) (IEA, 2017). While better than 
that for the world as a whole, this is hardly dramatic. What is more, according to the 
International Energy Outlook (2016), the projected contribution of fossil fuels to the global 
energy use in 2040 is anticipated to be as high as 78% (US Energy Information Administration, 
2016). Narrowing this down to the case of the OECD, the years under examination of this 
chapter (2000-2014), and for the case of electricity generation, the following figure (Figure 27) 
shows the share of fossil fuels in electricity generation. It can be seen that in most countries 
electricity is still produced using mainly fossil fuels, in some cases nearly 100%.  
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Figure 27: Share of fossil-fuels in electricity generation (2000-2014) 
 
Source: Author using OECD data  
From the various possible reasons for the apparently paradoxical relative stability in the 
composition of energy sources, one is the potential imperfect substitutability between them. 
Clearly if new energy sources are poor substitutes, advances in RE are unlikely to translate into 
RE adoptions in practice. Another reason that has gained a degree of notoriety concerns the 
persistence of public support to fossil fuels. Indeed, one might expect that with all the 
discussion and public sector support to RE, public sector support to fossil fuels would be on 
the decline. Paradoxically however, support to RE has been going hand in hand with support 
to fossil fuels leading scholars and international organisations to suggest that this could hamper 
efforts to transition to clean energy (European Commission, 2016, p. 17).  
While the issue of substitutability between energy sources has received interest by leading 
scholars, the argument that public support to fossils fuels will hamper energy transitions, has 
been taken as self-evident and has generated to my knowledge little scholarly debate. However, 
the relationship between subsidies to RE and to fossil fuels is more nuanced. In theory the two 
types of support can be substitutes, unrelated or even complements. Evidently, the impact on 
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energy transition will depend on the exact relationship; one that has never been tested before. 
The aim of this chapter is to explore this idea both conceptually and econometrically.  
In particular, the next section first discusses extant debates about the relationship (degree of 
substitutability) between energy sources. Following on from this focuses on the totally 
unexplored question of the relationship between subsidies to fossil fuels and subsidies to RE. 
The relationship is conceptualised and Hypotheses are developed that pertain to three 
possibilities – substitutability, complementarity, or independence. The next section discusses 
the methodology, data, and econometric results. The last section provides conclusions and 
discussion.  
7.2 The ‘Paradox’ and the Role of Public Policy  
Substitutability between energy sources and Public Policy  
According to one observer, “industrial economies have been locked into fossil fuel-based 
energy systems through a process of technological and institutional co-evolution driven by 
path-dependent increasing returns to scale” (Unruh, 2000, p. 817). Below some reasons are 
explored that have been advanced in order to explain the apparent paradox of slow progress 
towards a more RE-based composition of energy sources.  
Acemolgu, Aghion, Bursztyn and Hemous (2012) constructed a model which emphasized three 
factors that can affect the direction of technological change at the sectoral level; the price effect 
(i.e. higher prices encourage innovation); the market size (i.e. bigger market such as demand, 
encourage innovation); and the direct productivity effect (i.e. innovation is more likely to take 
place in technologies with higher productivity or existing stock of knowledge (Acemoglu, et 
al. 2012). They applied this analysis to the case of energy and concluded that in the case where 
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the clean and ‘dirty’ technologies22 are strong substitutes, the market size and initial 
productivity advantage of dirty technologies will direct innovation towards these. They also 
found that a high macroeconomic elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty 
technologies constituted a crucial condition for green growth and depended on the substitution 
between clean and dirty fuels and substitution between fuels and other inputs. Pelli (2012) 
extended the aforementioned study by Acemoglu, et al. (2012) to include multiple sectors. With 
regards to the electricity sector, a number of assumptions were made in order to calibrate the 
non-US elasticities from the US elasticities, and found that for the electricity sector, the 
calibrated elasticities were circa 0.51. Papageogiou, et al. (2016) also built on Acemoglu, et al. 
(2012) framework. The authors used a novel panel of cross-country sectoral data and examined 
the elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty energy inputs, which was found to be 
about 1.8, implying that “long-term clean growth of the electricity sector is technologically 
feasible” (Papageorgiou, Saam, & Schulte, 2017, p. 21). They also found evidence for 
substitutability between RETs and fossil fuels.  
By developing a dynamic model in which the energy demand is covered by both renewable 
and fossil-fuel energy, Lanzi and Sue Wing (2010) examined the direct technical change in the 
energy sector. Using panel data for the OECD member countries, and assuming a steady-state 
model of directed technical change, they examined the relationship between the relative 
patenting activity for both clean and dirty energy production and the relative fossil fuel prices. 
They concluded that RE and fossil-fuel technologies are good substitutes in electricity 
production (Lanzi, et al., 2010), a conclusion that was also reached by Baker and Shittu (2006).  
                                                          
22 ‘Dirty’ technologies are defined as those associated with high GHG pollution (such as coal power plants), while 
clean technologies are alternative technologies that can replace them (such as solar energy) (Dechezleprêtre, et 
al., 2017) 
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Aghion et al. (2012) also built on the Acemoglu, et al. (2012) framework in order to study 
whether firms in the automobile sector will invest (or not) more on clean (such as electric and 
hybrid) as opposed to dirty (such as internal combustion engine) technologies, based on the 
carbon taxes and the firms’ past knowledge stocks (Aghion, et al., 2012). In the same year, 
Popp and Newell (2012) conducted a study in which they examined the trade-offs between 
clean and dirty innovation. By examining the patenting activity of large publicly traded firms, 
they concluded that such firms will switch their research on alternative energies based on 
market incentives, i.e. the more profitable the research on alternative energy gets, the more 
such firms will innovate. However, no evidence was found that this is also the result of such 
firms being financially constrained.  
The assumption that RE and energy from fossil fuels are substitutes have resulted to the notion 
that higher energy prices and taxes foster innovation in RETs. This however would be the case 
“[…] provided it [renewable energy], can be stored and transported efficiently, would be highly 
substitutable with energy derived from fossil fuels. This reasoning would suggest a (very) high 
degree of substitution between dirty and clean inputs, since the same production services can 
be obtained from alternative energy with less pollution” (Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn, & 
Hemous, 2012, p. 135).  
An important reason why the composition of energy sources changes so slowly can be that 
energy sources are not complete substitutes or at least they are perceived not to be. In cases of 
full lack of substitutability for example, higher availability of alternative RE sources of energy 
are unlikely to have an appreciable effect on the composition of energy use. In this context, the 
question of substitutability is important. In the literature this question has acquired some 
prominence in the late 1970s, arguably as a response to the need to understand how the 
economy reacts to the oil crisis (see for example Atkinson and Halvorsen, 1976; Griffin, 1977; 
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and Pindyck, 1979). The focus of these early studies was on the extent to which coal, gas, and 
electricity can substitute for oil. Later studies focused mainly on substitution elasticity 
estimates. Jones (1995) analysed interfuel substitution in the U.S. industrial sector and found 
that “excluding fuels used for non - energy purposes yields larger estimates of the price 
elasticities for coal and oil and indicates generally greater potential for interfuel substitution 
than when using aggregate data” (Jones, 1995, p. 459). Steinbuks (2010), classified fuel use 
for the provision of energy into different manufacturing processes and found that fuels aiming 
at heating accounted for more than two thirds of the total energy consumption in 
manufacturing. In these processes, positive shares of all four energy inputs (petroleum, coal, 
gas, electricity) were observed, while other processes required specific fuels (Steinbuks, 2010).  
A potentially important reason concerning the composition of energy sources is public policy, 
in particular taxes and subsidies. Both can impact on incentives to consumers and producers 
and hence have the potential to engender changes in the said composition.  
In the context, Lazkano and Pham (2016) distinguished among the different fossil fuel 
technologies and evaluated the role of fossil fuel tax and R&D subsidies in directing the 
innovation activity from fossil fuel to RETs focusing on the electricity sector. By employing a 
global firm-level electricity patent database for the years between 1978 and 2011, they 
concluded that the overall impact of taxing the fossil fuels on RE innovation depended on the 
type of fossil fuel. In more detail, they found that taxing coal reduces innovation in both fossil 
fuel and RE technologies, while the impact of taxing natural gas was statistically insignificant. 
They also suggested that if natural gas is taxed while research on RETs is sufficiently 
subsidised, innovation activity on the electricity sector can be shifted from fossil fuels to 
renewables. Although, a coal or a carbon tax that may increase coal price, is likely to have a 
negative effect on RE innovation. The authors have also claimed that electricity is a distinct 
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sector since electricity must be consumed at the same time as it is produced. It is therefore of 
great importance to adjust the electricity supply as soon as possible in order to meet the 
demand. In order to overcome this, electricity producers produce a base electricity load which 
meets the minimum demand, while peak electricity loads are added to meet excess demand. 
While this power generation model is gradually challenged by the emergence of large-scale 
electricity storage it remains the dominant paradigm. This makes RETs an imperfect substitute 
to fossil-fuel technologies since the electricity is supplied intermittently (this is especially the 
case for wind and solar technologies), and in such cases where is not (see for example the 
hydropower technologies which are able to provide base-load) are geographically dependent 
and their capacity expansion is usually limited. This also implies the following: firstly, RETs 
are not a suitable substitute for fossil-fuels; secondly that RETs are still unable to replace coal-
based technologies for the production of base loads, and finally that electricity generated from 
RETs relies on coal-firing plants to meet the electricity demand (Lazkano, et al., 2016). 
To summarise, it is apparent that the degree of substitutability between energy sources is not 
perfect and in this context the role of taxes and energy prices have a distinct upper limit. This 
can in part explain why the composition of energy sources has been so difficult to shift. 
The Relationship between Subsidies 
Another factor potentially explaining the slow transition concerns the fact that direct support 
to RE sources (subsidies) has been going hand in hand with support to fossil fuels. According 
to a joint paper from the International Monetary Fund, and the University of California that 
estimated fossil fuel subsidies along with the economic and environmental benefits from 
reforming them, it was found that in 2013 and 2015 6.5% of global GDP was spent on such 
subsidies (Coady, et al., 2016). In a similar report by the International Energy Agency (2016), 
for 2015, fossil fuel subsidies amounted to 325 billion USD (from almost 500 billion USD in 
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2014), while for the same year subsidies for RE sources was 150 billion USD. For 2000-2015, 
70% of the total capital investments in energy supply went to fossil fuels (IEA, 2016). As of 
2016, fossil fuel support in the OECD countries had flattened to around 82 billion annually, 
however the main reason was argued to be the low oil price rather than policy reforms (OECD, 
2018). As noted by the European Commission, such support initiatives are “particularly 
problematic, as they disadvantage clean energy and hamper the transition to a low-carbon 
economy” (European Commission, 2016, p. 17). 
The aforementioned argument takes as a given fact that the relationship between subsidies is 
one of (perfect) substitutability. While in the context of fixed budgets it appears reasonable to 
assume that if the public sector supports dirty energy that will imply less support to RE, this 
need not always be the case as over time, budgets may change. Importantly, for reasons 
addressed below, the relationship between fossil fuels and RE subsidies can be negative 
(substitutability), unrelated (independence) and even positive (complementarity). Additionally, 
the degree of substitutability or complementarity can vary. These arguments are explored, and 
possibilities in turn. 
The case for substitutability between subsidies is predicated on the idea that with fixed budgets 
for energy support, whatever goes to one source is taken away from the other. In this context 
subsidies to dirty sources would imply an equal amount taken away from clean energy; hence, 
the two types of subsidies would be perfect substitutes. However, budgets need not be fixed. 
Governments can shift resources between categories and indeed they can create new funding 
through taxation or borrowing. If so the two types of subsidies can be independent from each 
other – for example any addition to RE subsidies can be funded by increasing the share of the 
total budget allocated to energy. This would imply independence between the two types. 
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A third possibility, is fully underexplored and arguably more interesting. This is when the two 
types of subsidies are complementary. As already noted this has not been hypothesised before 
but it is quite possible and even theoretically plausible. For instance, when government 
subsidises dirty energy, it may feel compelled to also increase support to RE. The reasons can 
vary from moral considerations and interest in RE as such, to consumer support for clean 
energy; thus, potential votes for the incumbent government. On the other hand, suppliers of 
dirty energy are usually large corporates with market power and many resources, including 
lobbyists to hand. They are likely to demand support stating their own arguments in favour 
(often raising doubts about the negative environmental impact of their energy sources). With 
resources to also fund political parties, and one has an explanation as to why many governments 
still subsidise fossil fuels while also preaching for, and indeed, supporting clean energy. In 
broader terms it could be argued that if policy makers go for votes in support of clean energy, 
then they will increase the subsidies for RE, while if they are “captured” by special corporate 
interest groups representing dirty sources, they will subsidise fossil fuels. If the latter is more 
subsidised, they may feel pressure to increase the former as well in order to compensate, 
implying complementarity. In fact, in public economics the so-called Wagner’s law (the 
argument that the share of the government spending to GDP increases over time, is based on 
precisely this type of arguments (Mueller, 2003).  
In both cases of substitutability and complementarity, the degree matters too. This can range 
from very low to very high. In the case of substitutability, the relation can take values between 
zero (no substitutability) and one (perfect substitutability). In the case of complementarity, the 
upper limit is theoretically not bound, although in practice one would not expect it to be higher 
than one (implying a one to one-dollar increase in subsidies for the two respective sources). As 
the factors that impact on the relationship can operate in different directions, in practice the 
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observed relationship will tend to be the outcome of the respective strength of all extant forces 
hence not possible to determine on a priori grounds. 
What can be hypothesised conceptually however is that, similarly to the case of taxes examined 
above, in the case of subsidies to the relationship can vary according to the type of fossil fuel 
subsidised. For example, subsidies for coal could exhibit a higher degree of substitutability 
than those to natural gas, in case the former is seen as dirtier hence more likely to emanate from 
a government with a lower degree of environmental sensitivities.  
It follows that the case for perfect substitutability between subsidies is far from being a 
foregone conclusion. The policy implications that emanate from the actual precise relationship 
could not be overemphasised. Taking the case of complementarity for example, support to 
fossil fuels could even be regarded as good news for RE producers in that it would also increase 
support to RE. The precise relationship is mostly an empirical matter. Yet there has been to my 
knowledge no study to test this.  
Based on the above my aim is to test for the following four Hypotheses:  
H1a: Higher subsidies to fossil fuels lead to lower subsidies to RE (substitutability) 
H1b: Higher subsidies to fossil fuels lead to higher subsidies to RE (complementarity) 
H1c: Higher Subsidies to fossil fuels lead to no change in subsidies to RE (independence) 
H2: The relationship between subsidies for fossil fuels and RE is mediated by the type of 
fossil fuel technology. 
The aim of the next section is to test the aforementioned Hypotheses. 
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7.3 Empirical Protocol 
An econometric model has been employed to test the aforementioned Hypotheses. Both 
dependent and the key independent variable are subsidies to RE and to fossil fuels respectively, 
measured through government budgets on Research, Development and Demonstration 
(RD&D) allocated to the respective energy sources. While there are two R&D indicators, the 
aforementioned, as well as the Government Budget Allocations for Research and Development 
(GBARD), the latter covers only basic and applied research and experimental development (i.e. 
R&D), while the former (i.e. RD&D) includes “demonstration” (such as prototyping, field 
tests, or lab trials) (Sun & Kim, 2017). 
Data were collected for all OECD countries (except Chile, Israel, Latvia, Mexico, and Slovenia, 
as no data existed for these countries) and for the years between 2000 (additional data on fossil 
fuel subsidies exist, as explained below, but for 2000 onwards) and 2014.  
7.3.1 Dependent Variables: RD&D Allocations on Renewable Energy Technologies 
Data on RD&D allocations on the OECD database and on RETs exist for biomass, geothermal, 
hydroelectricity, ocean energy, solar energy, wind energy, as well as an additional category for 
“unallocated” (RE) budgets. For the case of this chapter, data were collected for all RETs, but 
(i) for the case of biofuels only data related to applications for heat and electricity were 
collected, as the focus is on electricity (and not for example on transportation), and (ii) 
“unallocated” RE budgets were completely exempt since the focus of the thesis is specifically 
on six RETs (i.e. biomass, geothermal, hydro, ocean, solar, and wind), while “unallocated” 
may also include sectors other than electricity. Overall, a total of 29,311.85 million 2015 USD 
and PPP were allocated on RETS during the years under examination in the OECD member 
countries. Table 24 shows the total RD&D budgets for RETs as a total:  
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Table 23: Total RD&D Allocations for the RETs under examination 
Country Total RD&D for RETs  
United States 10,482.58 
Japan 2,702.84 
Germany 2,377.76 
France 1,598.73 
Korea 1,432.07 
Italy 1,215.27 
Canada 1,208.96 
United Kingdom 1,116.10 
Netherlands 1,075.76 
Spain 963.53 
Australia 881.62 
Denmark 670.04 
Sweden 645.74 
Switzerland 575.86 
Finland 525.05 
Norway 436.88 
Austria 396.54 
Poland 254.99 
Ireland 129.40 
Belgium 119.63 
Hungary 105.15 
Slovak Republic 102.35 
New Zealand 96.23 
Czech Republic 92.20 
Turkey 52.90 
Portugal 35.36 
Estonia 12.41 
Luxembourg 5.89 
Greece 0.00 
Source: Author after OECD data 
As it can be seen, the United States allocate the by far the most on RD&D for RETs, almost 
four times more than the following country, Japan. Overall, the United States account for 
almost 36% of the total allocations, followed by Japan with approximately 9%, and Germany 
with circa 8%. These countries account for 53.1% of the total allocation, while the first ten 
countries account for 82.5%. Greece has allocated no budgets at all on RETs over the time span 
examined. 
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7.3.2 Independent Variables: RD&D Allocations on Fossil Fuels  
As with the RETs, additional data on RD&D allocations for fossil fuels were collected from 
the same database, countries, and years. Data existed and collected for different fossil fuel 
technologies, namely, oil and gas (as one indicator), coal, CO2 capture and storage23, nuclear 
fusion, and nuclear fission24. Similarly to budget allocations collected for the RETs, these too 
were converted into million 2015 USD and PPP. Unsurprisingly, a total of 95,566.19 million 
2015 USD and PPP were allocated for RD&D for fossil fuel technologies, almost three times 
more than for RETs. Table 25 summarises the total allocations per country:  
Table 24: RD&D Allocations in Million US$ (2010 prices and PPP) per Fossil Fuel Technology and per Country 
Country RD&D - Oil 
and gas 
RD&D - 
Coal 
RD&D - CO2 
capture and 
storage 
RD&D - 
Nuclear 
fission 
RD&D - 
Nuclear 
fusion 
Australia 434.79 322.08 759.92 104.32 0.91 
Austria 13.19 5.28 3.97 2.59 61.99 
Belgium 3.32 0.00 4.36 473.58 53.74 
Canada 1,359.19 780.30 1,259.96 2,071.32 41.48 
Czech Republic 10.81 22.41 7.68 231.36 1.97 
Denmark 31.38 3.72 9.25 24.89 18.04 
Estonia 3.02 2.45 1.01 0.86 0.00 
Finland 31.56 73.61 0.00 176.15 45.29 
France 1,971.82 1.80 464.72 8,854.46 709.17 
Germany 31.11 232.82 117.45 926.18 2631.48 
Greece 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 
Hungary 14.10 1.30 0.00 20.30 0.00 
Ireland 2.90 0.75 0.05 0.15 5.42 
Italy 192.28 182.31 39.97 647.93 812.01 
Japan 2,820.33 999.19 828.63 3,1694.82 2,846.78 
Korea 308.28 248.55 233.64 2,020.02 41.66 
Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Netherlands 146.21 15.20 130.93 185.35 111.96 
                                                          
23 Although classified as a fossil fuel technology by the OECD, its purpose is to reduce carbon emissions to the 
atmosphere from fossil fuels. It “is considered a crucial strategy for meeting CO2 emission reduction targets” 
(Leung, Caramanna, & Maroto-Valer, 2014) but not without controversy over its suitability to deliver results 
timely.  
24 Nuclear fission is defined as “the splitting of a heavy nucleus into two lighter ones and is the standard process 
providing nuclear energy. Nuclear fusion is “the joining of two nuclei to form on heavier nuclei” (Murtanu, 2016) 
and has never been used for sustained power generation in laboratory or commercial settings. 
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Country RD&D - Oil 
and gas 
RD&D - 
Coal 
RD&D - CO2 
capture and 
storage 
RD&D - 
Nuclear 
fission 
RD&D - 
Nuclear 
fusion 
New Zealand 51.11 3.28 3.84 0.00 0.00 
Norway 665.29 0.00 815.85 144.87 0.00 
Poland 119.87 243.44 66.29 55.16 25 
Portugal 2.28 3.21 2.84 0.09 14.60 
Slovak Republic 0.00 7.42 1.24 22.18 26.00 
Spain 23.22 44.71 18.02 168.33 274.09 
Sweden 0.00 1.74 5.15 62.26 25.10 
Switzerland 136.96 0.00 16.09 319.62 289.56 
Turkey 23.45 18.47 0.75 3.30 0.15 
United Kingdom 30.99 68.62 353.67 241.80 544.32 
United States 1,094.70 6,876.82 2,254.72 5,817.48 5,659.32 
Source: Author after OECD data 
In terms of allocations for oil and gas, Japan accounts for almost 30% of the total, followed by 
France with circa 21%, Canada with approximately 14%, and the United States with 11.5%. 
Those four countries, account for 76.1% of the total allocations. The United States allocate the 
most on RD&D on coal, accounting on its own for almost 68% of the total allocations. Japan 
follows with approximately 10%, and Canada with circa 8%. Overall, the first three countries 
account for 85.2% of the total coal allocations. When it comes to CO2 capture and storage, the 
United States comes first again, allocating the most, with 30.5% of the total allocations. Canada 
follows with 17%, Japan and Norway with 11%, and Australia with 10%. Overall, these 
countries account for 80% of the total CO2 capture and storage allocations.  
Regarding the nuclear fission, Japan allocates the most with 58% of the total allocations coming 
from there. France follows with 16% and United States with 11%. These three countries 
contribute a total of 85.4% of the total allocations. United States once again allocate the most 
when it comes to nuclear fusion, accounting for almost 40% of the total budget allocations. 
                                                          
25 Data not available  
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Japan follows with 20%, and Germany with 18%. The first three countries account for 78% of 
the total allocations.  
Overall, Japan allocated the most when it comes to fossil fuels, accounting for 41%. United 
States follows, allocating almost half of what Japan does, with approximately 23%, of the total 
allocations, and France with 12.5%. It is interesting to see that the first three countries are of 
different geographic areas. It is also interesting to see that when comparing the budget 
allocations for RETs and fossil fuels, all countries allocate more on the latter than the former. 
Japan, allocates 14.5 times more on fossil fuels, while France allocates 7.5 times more, Canada 
4.6, Belgium 4.5, Norway 3.7. An interesting case is that of Greece, which allocates nothing 
on RETs, but it does allocate on fossil fuels (albeit a small fraction, and only on nuclear fission).  
7.3.3 Control Variables 
Subsidies to RE are influenced by a number of other factors than subsidies to fossil fuels. Based 
on the literature discussed earlier in this chapter, a number of control variables have been 
included in the estimation model.  
Firstly, fossils are the main fuel for electricity generation. It can therefore be assumed that, in 
case the incumbent electricity provider monopolises the market, more subsidies will be placed 
in support of fossil fuels. The first control variable is therefore a newly developed index by 
EuroStat related to the market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (Market 
Share). It is a percentage of the total of the total generation of the largest generator in the 
electricity market, and it is expected to have a negative effect on RE subsidies. A dummy 
variable set to unity for years after the Kyoto protocol came into force in 2005 was included, 
in order to capture changes in expectation on both the context for future policy and the global 
market size for renewable energy (Nesta, et al., 2014) (Kyoto). 
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It has also been claimed that the price of electricity amplifies the incentives for innovation in 
renewable energy (Johnstone, et al., 2008). Therefore, it can be assumed that a government 
would allocate more budgets in RETs RD&D, to amplify said incentives. It is assumed that 
these prices are exogenous; given that RE sources have in the past and up until recently 
contributed fairly small percentages towards the overall share of electricity production (World 
Bank, 2010). Data on end-use energy by sector (industry, households and electricity 
generation) were collected from the IEA database (Electricity Prices). In a similar manner, a 
large growing market for electricity should increase incentives to innovate with respect to RE 
technologies, which is best reflected in trends for electricity consumption. As a result, it can be 
argued that the higher the electricity consumption, the higher the propensity to innovate on 
RETs, and hence for a government to invest more on RD&D for RETs. Data on household and 
industry sector electricity consumption was obtained from the IEA/OECD database, in GWh. 
Both observed and calculated balances exist, which were averaged (Electricity Consumption). 
Additionally, the total RD&D budget allocations across the whole spectrum of all sectors per 
year and per country were also included as a control variable. This variable accounts for the 
overall propensity of a country to allocate budgets in RD&D (Total RD&D Budgets). 
Additional data on GBARD were also collected and used, for similar reasons. GBARD data 
are classified by socio-economic objective, and in this case, the energy objective was employed 
(GBARD). Data on direct fossil fuel budgetary transfers were also collected from the 
OECD/IEA iLibrary (2018). These data only account for a small part of the overall data on 
transfers (the rest is data on tax expenditures, and outside the reach of this chapter), and come 
from three areas, “(i) support for energy purchases by low-income households; (ii) government 
expenditure on research, development and demonstration projects, both through government 
laboratories and through grants to non-governmental bodies; and (iii) transfers to help redeploy 
resources in declining fossil-fuel industries, namely coal” (OECD, 2013). Data are available 
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for coal, natural gas, petroleum, and electricity, and for the years 2000 onwards (hence the 
starting date of this chapter). Data per year were aggregated due to data limitations and treated 
as a single indicator, after being converted into constant Million USD 2015 and PPP for 
uniformity reasons (Other Fossil Fuel Subsidies). Finally, the model specifications were 
augmented by including the lagged by one-year dependent variable, which is equivalent to 
controlling for persistency in past activities (Blundell, et al., 1995) (Lagged DV). 
7.3.4 Methodology 
Since the data of this chapter is not count data as with the previous cases, a different estimation 
model was used. While the principle is the same as the one of the previous chapters (as 
explained in Chapter 3), an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model for panel data was 
used. Contrary to the rest however, to decide between fixed-effects and random-effects, one 
must use the Hausman specification test. In brief, the Hausman specification test “[…] 
compares an estimator 𝜃𝜃�1 that is known to be consistent with an estimator 𝜃𝜃�2 that is efficient 
under the assumption being tested. The null hypothesis is that the estimator 𝜃𝜃�2 is indeed an 
efficient (and consistent) estimator of the true parameters. If this is the case, there should be no 
systematic difference between the two estimators. If there exists a systematic difference in the 
estimates, there is reason to doubt the assumptions on which the efficient estimator is based” 
(STATA, n/a, p. 3). What this means in this case is that if the systematic difference is 
statistically significant (indicated by the probability of chi squared (x2) being statistically 
significant), the fixed-effects model should be preferred. In this case, the Hausman test showed 
no statistical significance (Prob > x2 = 0.2124) and therefore the random effects model was 
preferred.  
In order to test for the first three hypotheses, a standard model setting was considered, in the 
following form (specification 1):  
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�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡=  𝛽𝛽1 ��𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷&𝐷𝐷 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 
𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽3�𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽5�𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷&𝐷𝐷 𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽6�𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽7(𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐) + 𝛽𝛽8�𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽9�𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
Where, i = values per country and t = year (2000, …, 2014). 
In order to test for the fourth hypothesis, a standard model setting was again considered. Two 
different specifications were examined, each time disaggregating the independent variable 
more, i.e. in the first case (specification 2), the total fossil fuel subsidies were disaggregated 
into two variables, into total fossil fuel allocations except nuclear, and one for nuclear, and in 
the second case (specification 3), a complete disaggregation of the fossil fuel allocation, as 
follows:  
Specification 3:  
�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡=  𝛽𝛽1�𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷&𝐷𝐷 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆 𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽2�𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷&𝐷𝐷 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽3�𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷&𝐷𝐷 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽4�𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷&𝐷𝐷 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽5�𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷&𝐷𝐷 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽6�𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽7�𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽8�𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽9�𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷&𝐷𝐷 𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽10�𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽11(𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐) + 𝛽𝛽12�𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽13�𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
Following that, for each specification, the elasticities were also calculated. In a linear function 
form, like in this case (see chapter 3), the elasticity is given by the following equation: 
∈= 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑
𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋
𝑋𝑋
𝑑𝑑
= 𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋
𝑑𝑑
 
Where, “b” is the change in “Y” from a unit increase in “X”. 
The descriptive statistics of all the main variables are reported in the following table (Table 
26): 
(7-1) 
(7-2) 
(7-3) 
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Table 25: Descriptive Statistics of all variables  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on Renewable Energy 
Technologies 
365 80.30679 184.0123 0 2,442.68 
Total RD&D Budget 
Allocations on Fossil Fuels 
363 267.4203 618.9738 0 4,650.6 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
(excl. nuclear) 
363 76.94609 228.9653 0 3,717.16 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on Nuclear 
366 188.9139 489.5285 0 2,872.18 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on Oil and Gas 
343 27.7616 53.69259 0 280.77 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on Coal 
337 30.14697 180.7782 0 3141.37 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on CO2 Capture and 
Storage 
343 21.57452 57.65521 0 497.17 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on Nuclear Fission 
353 153.7385 450.2544 0 2746 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on Nuclear Fusion 
335 42.43328 92.70548 0 538.14 
Market Share 284 52.78486 25.26739 15.3 100 
Kyoto Protocol 435 0.666667 0.4719473 0 1 
Energy Prices 435 0.0001143 0.0000625 0 0.0002999 
Total RD&D Budget 
Allocations 
362 602.0853 1264.567 1.93 10863.6 
Electricity Consumption 435 309998.7 692183.6 5421 3921940 
Fossil Fuel Subsidies 344 2.61E+10 1.22E+11 0 1.51E+12 
Lagged DV 340 79.02341 186.0737 0 2442.68 
Energy GBAORD 382 458.5255 699.4411 0 5202.715 
Source: Author 
 
7.4 Empirical Results 
Table 27, summarizes the results of all specifications as mentioned earlier in this chapter. As 
expected, at the aggregated level, subsidizing fossil fuels affect negatively and significantly (at 
0.1%) RD&D budget allocations on RETs. The first hypothesis is therefore supported, 
implying substitutability between the variables. Quantitatively, the subsidies of RETs will 
decrease by 0.79% (this is derived from the exponential of the constant, i.e. exp(-0.2362383)) 
as more budgets are allocated on fossil fuels. 
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Regarding the second specification, again, the aggregated variables of RD&D subsidies on 
fossil fuels excluding nuclear, and on nuclear, were both found to have a negative and 
significant effect on RETs innovation, both at 0.1%. Again, the first hypothesis is found to be 
true, with subsidies on fossil fuels, substituting those on RETs. Quantitatively, the findings 
imply that as higher budgets are allocated on RD&D related to fossil fuels (excluding nuclear), 
RD&D budgets on RETs will decrease by 0.84%, while if they are allocated on nuclear, this 
will decrease RETs budgets by 0.75%.  
The final specification is interesting, as it totally disaggregates the fossil fuel technologies; 
thus, allowing to effectively assess which subsidised fossil fuel technologies affect RETs the 
most. It can be seen that among all technologies, oil and gas subsidies have a negative and 
significant effect on RETs at 0.1%. Quantitatively, a reduction of 0.72% in subsidizing the RE 
sector is caused by investing on RD&D on oil and gas. Budget allocation on coal was found to 
be negative, but insignificant. As mentioned by Lazkano et al. (2016), coal-based technologies 
are yet to be replaced by RETS, while RETs still rely on coal-firing plants to meet the electricity 
demand. This may also imply the issue of “lock-in”, namely that countries that have a history 
in investing on advancing coal, are “locked-in” in these types of innovations; hence, having no 
statistical impact on RE (Beck & Martinot, 2004). 
Subsidising CO2 capture and storage seem to have a positive but insignificant effect on RETs 
allocations. Indeed, and as mentioned before, although classified as a fossil fuel technology by 
the OECD, its recent advance is to reduce carbon emissions to the atmosphere from fossil fuels. 
It has however, been used in the past and continued to be used today as means to increase the 
lifespan of conventional oil fields by increasing their internal pressure and facilitating increased 
oil production. Although the net reductions of emissions depend on the fraction of carbon 
captured, a power plant equipped with CO2 capture and storage could reduce carbon emissions 
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by 80%-90% (IPCC, 2005). It can be argued therefore that despite being a fossil fuel 
technology, it does not undermine RET allocations as they serve the same purpose. This is the 
only fossil fuel technology where the third hypothesis (of independence) is supported.  
With regards to subsidies to the two nuclear technologies, both were found to have a negative 
and significant effect on RD&D allocations on RETs (at 1% in the case of fission, and 0.1% in 
the case of fusion). Quantitatively, subsidising nuclear fission has a greater effect on RETs 
budgets, reducing them by 0.86%, as compared to the 0.73% reduction caused by subsidizing 
nuclear fusion. Further questions are relevant to nuclear fission indirect subsidies such 
government support for nuclear waste management, insurance underwriting for nuclear 
accidents and nuclear power station decommissioning. Despite these indirect support 
mechanisms for nuclear fission being fairly widespread, there is little in the way of data 
detailing national budgets allocation. 
In terms of the control variables, the electricity market share, as well as energy price, and the 
fossil fuel subsidies (in the form of budgetary transfers) were found to be statistically 
insignificant for all the specifications examined, while the dummy for the Kyoto protocol was 
found to be positive and significant at 5% only in the first specification.  
The total RD&D budget allocations was found to be positive and significant at 0.1%, which 
implies that RD&D budget allocations positively affect the allocations on RETs. This is also 
the case for electricity consumption which was also found to be positive and significant at 0.1% 
for all specifications. Previous allocations (captured by the lag by one year of the dependent 
variable) were also found to be positive and significant for all specifications, but their effect 
varied among specifications; at 1% in the first specification, at 5% in the second, and at 0.1% 
in the third.  
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Table 26: Estimated coefficients of the regression analysis for all specifications  
 
Dependent Variable: RD&D Budget 
Allocations on Renewable Energy 
Technologies 
 
 
Specification 1 
 
 
Specification 2 
 
 
Specification 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Total RD&D Budget 
Allocations on Fossil Fuels 
-0.2362383*** 
(0.000) 
  
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on Fossil Fuels (excl. 
nuclear) 
  -0.1718357*** 
(0.000) 
 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on Nuclear 
 -0.2866117***  
(0.000) 
 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on Oil and Gas 
  -0.3223004*** 
(0.000) 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on Coal 
  -0.5103654 
(0.058) 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on CO2 Capture and 
Storage 
  0.0977072 
(0.134) 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on Nuclear Fission 
  -0.1503488** 
(0.002) 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on Nuclear Fusion 
  -0.3208568*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control 
Variables 
Market Share  0.0741351 
(0.512) 
0.1909758 
(0.144) 
-0.0548383 
(0.610) 
Kyoto Protocol 11.23931* 
(0.047) 
 10.37383 
(0.066) 
5.094946 
(0.243) 
Energy Prices -66,210.4 
(0.140) 
-7,7431.05 
(0.066) 
20,064.786 
(0.612) 
Total RD&D Budget 
Allocations 
0.2002876*** 
(0.000) 
0.2023008*** 
(0.000) 
0.1143754*** 
(0.000) 
Electricity Consumption 0.0000901*** 
(0.000) 
0.0001031*** 
(0.000) 
0.0001027*** 
(0.000) 
Fossil Fuel Subsidies -9.17e-10 
(0.067) 
-8.85e-10 
(0.076) 
-5.18e-10 
(0.161) 
Lagged DV 0.1938937** 
(0.005) 
0.1744546* 
(0.011) 
0.2447495*** 
(0.000) 
Energy GBAORD 0.0098859 
(0.462) 
0.0201205 
(0.167) 
0.0606469*** 
(0.000) 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
The following table summarises the elasticities of the main independent variables for all 
specifications:  
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Table 27: Estimated Elasticities 
Elasticities 
Dependent Variable: 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on Renewable Energy 
Technologies 
 
 
Specification 1 
 
 
Specification 2 
 
 
 Specification 3 
Total RD&D Budget 
Allocations on Fossil 
Fuels 
-0.62   
RD&D Budget Allocations 
(excl. nuclear) 
 -0.12  
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on Nuclear 
 -0.54  
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on Oil and Gas 
  -0.13 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on Coal 
  -0.04 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on CO2 Capture and 
Storage 
  0.023 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on Nuclear Fission 
  -0.23 
RD&D Budget Allocations 
on Nuclear Fusion 
  -0.18 
Source: Author 
 
7.5 Discussion 
To sum up, in this chapter the role of subsidies to fossil fuels on subsidies to RETs was 
examined. This was done by collecting data on six RETs (i.e. biomass, geothermal, hydro, 
ocean, solar, and wind) and summed together, thus placing the focus on those specific six 
technologies which are the focus of this thesis. Similarly, data on different fossil fuels were 
collected (i.e. oil and gas, coal, CO2 capture and storage, nuclear fusion, and nuclear fission) 
thus allowing to examine the effect at both aggregated as well as a disaggregated level. Support 
for the first hypothesis was found in almost all cases implying substitutability between fossil 
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fuel budget allocations and RETs allocations. On the totally disaggregated specification (third), 
it was found that budget allocations on coal and CO2 Capture and Storage were statistically 
insignificant, implying independence.  
Although the hypotheses, and therefore the effects can be argued to be obvious, the results – 
and especially those of the last specification – allow for a number of conclusions to be drawn. 
These in return have some very important implications for policy makers. It is highlighted that 
the different fossil fuel technologies have different effects on RE, and should not be treated as 
a single indicator, as in most previous studies. Overall, it was found that when treated as a 
single indicator, fossil fuel RD&D budgets have a negative and significant effect on RE 
allocations. However, on the complete disaggregated scenario, it can be seen that subsidies on 
coal and CO2 Capture and Storage were statistically insignificant. This is important in the sense 
that it supports the notion that there is currently a “lock-in” in coal technologies, and with the 
RETs being currently perceived unable to meet both base and peak load, as well as having 
RETs that rely on coal infrastructure to operate (see biomass), allocating budgets might still be 
of the essence. Based on these, it would appear that the optimal approach is for a government 
to allocate more budgets on RETs, while cutting on gas and oil, and nuclear. Subsidies should 
still be allocated on coal with CO2 capture and storage (abated carbon), for the former because 
under current conditions it is still needed, and for the latter as it appears to be an important way 
to reduce and meet the emission targets, without lessening the innovation activity of RETs.  
Like with the previous chapters, this too has limitations. The first relates to the relatively short 
time span of the data. As explained, additional fossil fuel subsidies are in place which however 
are only available from 2000 onwards, and it is a variable that cannot be excluded. The second 
relates to the fact that there are more determinants of RE subsidies than accounted for in this 
chapter. That said, while the key ones have been employed, the lagged DV is likely to have 
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captured much of the impact of some potentially missing variables. These and the consistency 
of the results with the literature and the Hypotheses render confidence in their value. Moreover, 
and overall the results seemed to be robust to the three specifications used, and in line with 
theory and previous evidence.  
Clearly more work is required to complement the findings. In particular, as regards the 
determinants of subsidies, more control variables should be employed, however these were out 
of the scope of this thesis. The precise reason why coal is found to be relatively insignificant 
has been explained, however why it fails and/or exceeds may be country dependent and hence, 
more in depth qualitative analysis to complement the econometric findings should be done. 
What is more, policy makers could benefit from the examination of the effects of RD&D 
allocations on fossil fuel on specific RETs.  
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Chapter 8 
Summary, Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a summary, conclusions and policy implications, as well 
as to look at limitations and opportunities for further research. The key research question is 
firstly explored followed by looking at each chapter’s main aims and contribution.  
The key research question was whether public policy towards RE can help foster a transition 
of energy sources from fossils to RE. The question is predicated on the understanding that:  
1. Fossil fuels contribute to climate change;  
2. Transition to RE energy sources is inhibited by market failures; 
3. Innovations in RE can help foster the adoption of RE sources;  
4. Public policy towards RE may help facilitate RE innovations; and 
5. There are numerous factors that can help public policy makers improve the degree of 
success of their interventions and that requires further research. 
Existing literature has some evident limitations, such as the lack of cross-fertilization between 
literature on industrial policy and RE, the lack of a uniform classification of the policy 
instruments, the often limited scope of the studies, and the absence of an econometric 
evaluation of the coexistence (interactions) of various policy instruments. Key innovations of 
this thesis are discussed in each chapter but more generically these include: 
1. The cross-fertilization of the literature on industrial policy and renewable energy policy 
2. The development of new theory and hypotheses and their testing  
3. The adoption of a uniform classification of policy instruments  
4. The use of interaction effects, i.e. their effects when multiple instruments are in place 
(Chapter 4) 
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5. The examination of the effects of RE instruments on specific renewable energy 
technologies (Chapter 5) 
6. Their effects when targeting one specific technology, as opposed to targeting more than 
one (Chapter 6) 
7. The effects of subsidies of fossil fuels on renewable energy subsidies  
8. The examination of regional variations 
9. The examination of the role of policy experience  
10. Data-base. Data and method specific novelties  
11. Other chapter-specific novelties  
In the above context in Chapter 1 (Introduction) the problem of climate change and the 
contribution of fossils-based energy to that is discussed. Then in the second chapter entitled 
“Theoretical Framework: Determinants of Innovation and the Role of Public Industrial Policy”, 
the main focus is on the role of innovation in fostering positive change in general and in RE in 
particular, as well as on how public industrial policy may help solve market failures and foster 
innovation in RE sources. Then, in Chapter 3 entitled “Empirical Protocol and Method”, the 
main variables were described, and suitable methodologies were reviewed, giving reasons for 
the ones employed in this thesis.  
In Chapter 4, entitled “Industrial policy for renewable energy: The innovation impact of 
European policy instruments and their interactions” the focus has been on the impact of 
renewable energy policies as well as the three renewable energy policy instruments (demand-
pull, technology-push and systemic) and their interactions on renewable energy innovation in 
15 European Union countries for the period 1995-2014. Following a critical literature survey, 
a conceptual framework and hypotheses were developed and tested by employing a unique and 
comprehensive data set. It was found that renewable energy policies as a whole as well as 
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demand-pull and technology-push instruments affect RE innovation positively and 
significantly. The impact of interactions between instruments on RE innovation is also positive 
and significant, but that in the case of specific pairs of instrument interaction the outcome is 
contingent on the specification used. Reasons were discussed for these findings, implications 
for public policy, as well as limitations and opportunities for further research. 
This chapter’s research added to the literature in a number of ways. The first is related to the 
focus on the three types of instruments. This classification seems appropriate in terms of theory 
(Pitelis, 2018), and has been adopted in some recent studies (Costantini, et al., 2015). The 
second relates to the examination of instrument interactions. It was found that RE policy will 
on average positively affect RE innovation as a whole (i.e. increase it), and that RE policy 
instruments also have significant effect on RE innovation. It was also found that the interactions 
between instruments (especially those between technology-push and demand-pull on the one 
hand and systemic on the other) have a positive effect on RE innovation when analysed on their 
own, implying that they are likely to increase it. However, when examined alongside their 
components, it was found all component instruments as well as the interaction of all three had 
again had a positive effect, though the interaction between the three individual pairs had had a 
negative effect, implying that they are likely to supress the innovative activity when all are in 
effect.  
Reasons for these findings were examined, including the possibility of different lag structures, 
a suggestion supported by the results. The findings highlight that different instruments matter, 
as well as their interactions matter and the way in which they interact and how they interact 
(for example alongside their component instruments or not). This is also the case for lag 
structures. Accordingly, much care should be taken to identify and leverage complementarities, 
while eschewing from potential inconsistencies and interactions. Such interactions between 
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these instruments have not been properly taken into account in the existing literature, depriving 
policy-makers from a significant source of information (Magro & Wilson, 2013). Based on 
this, it seems that the optimal approach is for a government to employ policy instruments that 
complement, and are consistent with each other, and that this is a matter for empirical design 
and can be contingent on each specific case. This in turn calls for further research, more 
disaggregated findings and triangulation, including the use of case studies to support the 
quantitative econometric findings.  
In the fifth chapter entitled “Can Industrial Policy Pick Winning Renewable Energy 
Technologies?” it was argued that debates on Industrial Policy (IP) have relied on conceptual 
arguments and case examples with limited econometric support. While research on public 
policy towards RE has employed econometric analyses a cross fertilization between the two 
has failed to adequately be combined with IP debates. A lasting debate in IP concerns whether 
government support to sectors and firms can help “pick winners”. More recent developments 
have shifted attention to picking winning policies, policy instruments and/or technologies, 
notable General Purpose Technologies (GPTs). Having developed theory and Hypotheses, 
econometric evidence was provided for the impact of three IP policy instruments on different 
RETs. Following that, the unexplored role of country experience in mediating this relationship 
and for regional variations in OECD and EU was examined, as well as North and South EU 
regions. In addition, the extent to which the quality of the innovation outcomes is affected by 
IP was also explored. Findings lent support to the theory-derived Hypotheses. 
More specifically novelties in this chapter include: 
1. Cross fertilisation of RE and IP literatures; 
2. Developed the argument that RE can qualify as a GPT; 
3. Applied the concept of picking winners to policy instruments and RE Technologies; 
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4. Provided fresh econometric evidence for IP; 
5. Explored regional variations; and 
6. Adjusted RE innovation for quality of innovations. 
Based on the conceptual analysis, five Hypotheses were developed and tested. Overall and on 
balance the Hypotheses were supported by the econometric evidence, and showed that:  
• IP instruments on average are likely to foster the innovative activity of RETs with 
demand-pull ones being more potent, especially in high intervention countries.  
• Targeting RETs is contingent upon country experience with more experienced 
countries being more effective. 
• There exist regional disparities with Southern countries being less effective in fostering 
innovation in different RETs. 
• Public policy support is found to induce innovation of lower quality.  
In addition to the above there were some very interesting findings regarding the control 
variables-notably the market share (that can be seen as a proxy for market power) hindering 
RE innovation. These are all significant advances in an important field. All these have clear 
and strong policy implications-mainly that the policy experience and competence matter and 
that public policy interventions can help twist incentives and cause lower quality innovations.  
In chapter 6, entitled “Fostering Innovation in Renewable Energy Technologies: Choice of 
policy instruments and effectiveness”, the effectiveness of different types of policy instruments 
on innovation for different RETs was evaluated. More specifically, data on the innovation 
activity and performance were collected and analysed for 21 OECD countries over the period 
1990-2014 – which were then used to assess and compare the effect of different instruments 
on different renewable technologies. The results showed that demand-pull policy instruments 
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have been the most effective of all in fostering innovation activity; and that their level of 
effectiveness increased when they were used to target specific RETs. More specifically, three 
different models were employed to examine the effects of the three different types of policy 
instruments on RE innovation, policy instruments targeting more than one RET (but not 
necessarily all), and policy instruments targeting one specific RET; first model examined the 
aggregated effect of policies on RETs, serving as a base case. It was found that the different 
types of policy instruments have different effects on the innovative activity of RETs and that 
demand-pull policy instruments were positive and significant in all cases with the exception of 
solar energy technologies - for which technology no instrument type had any effect. 
Technology-push instruments were significant only for the cases of hydro and wind energy 
technologies, while systemic were found to be significant for the cases of biomass, hydro, and 
wind energy technologies, but negative in all other cases. The third model, showed that when 
it comes to targeting one specific technology, only demand-pull policies seem to be effective 
– something that was also true for the case of solar energy technologies. This was further 
supported by the existing literature as well as previous studies. In terms of policy implications, 
different technologies were found to require different types of policy instruments to foster 
innovation. Demand-pull policies are stronger possibly because of their horizontal nature 
(namely that they impact upon all). Another reason is their strong design (like feed-in tariffs in 
Germany) alongside being introduced earlier; thus, creating a degree of path-dependency.  
In the seventh chapter entitled “The Interrelationship Between Subsidies to Fossil Fuels and to 
Renewable Energy Sources in the OECD” the role of subsidies to fossil fuels on subsidies to 
RETs was examined. The key claim of this chapter was that while the issue of substitutability 
between energy sources has been widely examined, the argument that supporting fossils fuels 
will hamper energy transitions, has been taken as self-evident. However, the relationship 
between subsidies to renewable energies and to fossil fuels is more nuanced. In theory the two 
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types of support can be substitutes, unrelated or even complements, and the impact on energy 
transition will depend on the exact relationship. Only if there is strong substitutability transition 
to RE is hindered. And the degree of substitutability (if any) can depend on different types of 
fossils and RE technologies. In this context, having developed Hypotheses, data were collected 
on six RETs (i.e. biomass, geothermal, hydro, ocean, solar, and wind) and summed together; 
thus, placing the focus on those specific six technologies which are the focus of this thesis. 
Similarly, data on different fossil fuels were collected (i.e. oil and gas, coal, CO2 capture and 
storage, nuclear fusion, and nuclear fission) thus allowing to examine the effect at both 
aggregated as well as a disaggregated level. Three different specifications were examined, each 
time disaggregating the independent variable more, i.e. in the first case the total fossil fuel 
technologies were considered, in the second the total fossil fuel subsidies were disaggregated 
into the total fossil fuel allocations except nuclear, and one for nuclear, and in the third, a 
complete disaggregation of the fossil fuel subsidies into oil and gas, coal, CO2 capture and 
storage, nuclear fission, and nuclear fusion. It was found that in the first two specifications, 
substitutability existed between fossil fuel subsidies and renewable energy. The third 
specification showed that substitutability existed in the cases of oil and gas, and for both cases 
of nuclear.  
The following table (Table 29), summarises all the hypotheses set in each chapter, as well as 
the respective conclusions/findings:  
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Table 28: Summary of hypotheses and key results 
 Hypotheses Conclusions/Findings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Industrial 
policy for renewable 
energy: The innovation 
impact of European 
policy instruments and 
their interactions 
Hypothesis 1: RE policy has a positive and 
significant effect on RE innovation. 
RE innovation is found to be positively and significantly affected by RE policy 
Hypothesis 2: Technology-push and demand-
pull policy instruments have a positive and 
significant effect on RE innovation. 
(1) Demand-pull and technology-push instruments have a positive and 
significant effect on RE innovation, (2) Systemic instruments were found to be 
insignificant when examined on their own. 
Hypothesis 3: The interaction between 
demand-pull, and technology-push policies 
on the one hand and systemic policies on the 
other, have a positive and significant effect 
on RE innovation. 
(1) When examined in isolation it was found that technology-push and 
demand-pull instruments interact positively with systemic ones, (2) The 
interaction between demand-pull and technology-push was found to be 
negative, (3) the interaction between all three instruments has a negative and 
significant effect on RE innovation, (4) When tested along their individual 
components, all three instruments are positive and significant and only the 
interaction of all three instruments is positive and significant, but when 
different lag structures of the independent variables were included, (5) only 
technology-push is significant and positive at its level, while the demand-pull 
ones are positive when lagged by one period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Can Industrial 
Policy Pick Winning 
Renewable Energy 
Technologies? 
Hypothesis 1: REP instruments positively 
affect RE technologies. 
Overall positive and significant effect across most RETs. Policy intervention has 
been effective in stimulating more innovation activity in RET.  
Hypothesis 2: The effect of REP instruments 
on RETs varies between specific instruments 
and RETs. 
Technology-push policy instruments have been more effective in fostering 
innovation in biofuel, hydro and solar -related technologies. Demand - pull 
policy instruments have been more effective in stimulating innovation in 
biofuel, hydro, and wind-related technologies. Systemic policy instruments are 
found to have a significant effect only when controlling for quality of 
innovation. 
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 Hypotheses Conclusions/Findings 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of targeting 
particular RETs on RE innovation is mediated 
by a country’s experience. 
Experience in practicing industrial policy matters. When distinguishing 
between “high” and “low” policy intervention groups of countries, we find 
consistently that REP are more likely to have a significant (and more sizeable) 
effect when used in the “high intervention” group. 
Hypothesis 4: The efficacy of targeting RETs 
differs across North-South EU regions. 
Policy intervention is more effective in northern than in southern EU member 
states. This result holds for both “high” and “low” intervention groups. These 
differences become even more pronounced when controlling for quality of 
innovation.  
Hypothesis 5: Public support for particular 
RETs impairs (negatively affects) the quality 
of the RET innovations. 
 The use of policy support instruments in the OECD over the sample period has 
been much less effective in encouraging impactful innovation in RE 
technologies than it had in stimulating activity per se. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Fostering 
Innovation in Renewable 
Energy Technologies: 
Choice of policy 
instruments and 
effectiveness 
Hypothesis 1: The impact of REP instruments 
on RE innovation is contingent upon the 
instrument used  
The aggregate effect of policy instruments varies according to their type. 
Specifically, the technology-push instruments have an insignificant effect on 
the overall RE innovation, while demand-pull policies have a positive effect. 
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 Hypotheses Conclusions/Findings 
Hypothesis 2: REP instrument that target 
specific RETs have a stronger effect on RE 
innovation of the targeted RETs 
(1) In the case of biomass technologies, technology-push instruments have an 
insignificant effect on driving innovative activity regardless of whether they 
concern policy instruments that target multiple RETs or only biomass 
technologies. Demand-pull policy instruments have had a positive and 
significant effect. (2) Geothermal technologies are significantly impacted only 
by demand-pull instruments, (3) Hydro and wind technologies were affected 
significantly by all policy instruments in the case of multiple-targeting REPs, 
but in the case they only targeted one then for hydro and wind technologies 
only demand-pull instruments were significant. (4) For Solar energy, in first 
case (multiple-targeting REPs) no policy instruments were significantwhile in 
the second case, demand-pull instruments are significant (5) 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7: The 
Interrelationship 
Between Subsidies to 
Fossil Fuels and to 
Renewable Energy 
Sources in the OECD 
Hypothesis 1a: Higher subsidies to fossil fuels 
lead to lower subsidies to RE (substitutability) 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were supported. That is the relationship between 
subsidies to fossil fuels and RETs is one of substitutability (H1a) , except in the 
case of oil and gas where independence was observed (H1c). In the case of 
CO2 capture and storage I found complementarity (hence supporting 
Hypothesis 2).  
Hypothesis 1b: Higher subsidies to fossil 
fuels lead to higher subsidies to RE 
(complementarity) 
Hypothesis 1c: Higher Subsidies to fossil 
fuels lead to no change in subsidies to RE 
(independence) 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between 
subsidies for fossil fuels and RE is 
mediated by the type of fossil fuel 
technology. 
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The results especially those of the last specification allow for a number of conclusions to be 
drawn with important implications for policy makers. It was highlighted that the different fossil 
fuel technologies have different effects on RE, and should not be treated as a single indicator, 
as in most previous studies. Overall, it was found that when treated as a single indicator, fossil 
fuel RD&D budgets have a negative and significant effect on RE allocations. However, on the 
complete disaggregated scenario, it can be seen that subsidies on coal and CO2 Capture and 
Storage were statistically insignificant. This is important in the sense that it supports the notion 
that there is currently a “lock-in” in coal technologies, and with the RETs being currently 
perceived unable to meet both base and peak load, as well as having RETs that rely on coal 
infrastructure to operate (see biomass), allocating budgets might still be of the essence. Based 
on these, the optimal approach is for a government seems to be the allocation of larger budgets 
on RETs, while cutting on gas and oil, and nuclear. Subsidies could still be allocated on coal 
with CO2 capture and storage (abated carbon) because it appears to be an important way to 
reduce and meet the emission targets, without lessening the innovation activity of RETs.  
As with other studies, this thesis has limitations. The first limitation relates to the use of patent 
data as a proxy for innovation which is often seen as an imperfect proxy. That said, in the 
absence of suitable and comparable alternative measures, it remains the most plausible and 
highly used indicator for this type of studies. The second limitation relates to the fact that there 
may be more determinants of RE innovation than accounted for in this thesis. However, a more 
comprehensive set of determinants than other studies was used, not least the separate 
instruments and their interactions. Other limitations relate to the relatively short time span of 
the data in Chapter 7. As explained, additional fossil fuel subsidies are in place which however, 
are only available from 2000 onwards, and it is a variable that cannot be excluded. Another 
relates to the fact that there are more determinants of RE subsidies than accounted for in that 
specific chapter. That said, while the key ones have been employed, the lagged DV is likely to 
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have captured much of the impact of some potentially missing variables. Other limitations 
include the proxies for experience, quality and regional blocks (e.g. European OECD, non-
Europe OECD) in Chapter 5.  
A more general limitation of the findings (and most related literature) is a failure to account for 
the cost of RE policies and also for the opportunity cost of supporting RE as opposed to 
allocating resources in other worthy (or less worthy) projects. In this context the literature as a 
whole suffers from a challenge to show the full cost-benefit calculus of RE support. In addition, 
in many cases public policies also support fossil fuels. It would be interesting to see how can 
this impact on support to RE.  
Despite limitations, the various innovations of the thesis alongside the consistency of the results 
with the literature and the Hypotheses lend confidence in the findings. Overall the results 
seemed to be robust to various specifications used, and in line with theory and previous 
evidence. Another key strength is the data base which is likely to be the most or one of the 
most comprehensive ones available. 
The findings of this thesis have important implications for policy makers as it was shown that 
different policy instruments matter, as well as their interactions and how they interact. Such 
interactions among these instruments have not been adequately taken into account before. In 
addition to this, it was shown that different technologies require different types of policy 
instruments in order to induce innovation. Furthermore, policy experience and competence also 
matter, and public policy interventions can help distort incentives and induce lower quality 
innovations. In terms of the renewable energy technologies as such, it was shown that different 
technologies require different types of policy instruments in order to induce innovation. It 
seems that those instruments that aim to promote the demand are overall better, and also, that 
it is better to target one specific technology instead of multiple. Evidence was also found that 
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subsidizing for fossil fuel technologies, undermines the subsidies on renewable energy 
technologies. Based on the above, it would appear that the optimal approach is for a 
government to employ policy instruments that complement, and are consistent with, each other.  
Overall some limitations notwithstanding, I believe that my analysis and evidence helped make 
some important contributions to this very important and topical issue. . The aim is to continue 
researching this very important issue and hope to motivate others to also do so.  
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